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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the politics of leadership organizing in three informal settlements in 
Cape Town. Building on the facts that internal informal settlement politics is tense and 
leadership organizing fragmented and fluid, I focus on the politics of leadership organizing as 
internal negotiations of how leadership should be organized and what institutional logics 
should be adapted. The main argument is that the politics of leadership organizing consist of 
balancing bureaucratic and democratic logics, which are not an act of mimicking or 
decoupling, but have evolved through historical and context specific discursive practises. The 
tensions and political negotiations around how to balance these essentially conflicting logics 
concern to what degree the committees and leaders should engage in bureaucratic and 
administrative efforts securing order and development, or focus on internal mediation and 
democratic procedures to keep conflicts at bay.  
  
By analysing leadership, organizing and politics at the informal settlement scale, the thesis is 
not only covering an empirical gap but also making a contribution to a niche of urban studies 
grappling with neighbourhood politics in South Africa. In order to contribute to these 
attempts and explore the politics of organizing, I suggest moving beyond instrumental and 
outcome descriptions of ‘politics of the belly’, leaders as heroes or villains, and organizations 
as rational. Instead seeing politics as a means-to-an-end and as arena specific, inspired by a 
mixture of new-institutionalism and Arendt’s philosophy, I frame politics as a human process 
of defining common concerns and negotiations over how these should be dealt with through 
specific ways of organizing. Interlinked with this, a social constructive process approach to 
organizations and leadership enables an analysis of the grounded symbolical sides of 
organizing practices and models. Further, within the framework of institutional pluralism, 
leadership politics entails the acts of balancing conflicting institutional logics by adapting and 
mediating different organizational models and practices.  
 
Applied to analyse empirical insight from following leadership processes in three informal 
settlements over three years, the thesis provides insight into how the specific urban conditions 
of South African informal settlements impact on the politics of forming organizations and 
leadership.  
 
Despite differences between the settlements, leadership practises and ideals displayed a 
similar focus on bureaucratic and democratic practises and models, indicating that these 
practises are institutionalised in relation to specific historic and pragmatic needs of urban 
informal settlements. Also, context specific behavioural norms restrict the conditions for 
speaking publicly and increase the need to adhere to bureaucratic and democratic logics. 
However, these logics are essentially conflicting. Hence, as the leadership committees are 
hybrid organizations in a setting of institutional plurality, leadership politics consist of 
balancing and adapting these different logics when tensions emerges both between leaders 
and between residents and leaders. 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
Despite the chaotic setting, poverty and marginalization, the heterogeneous collection of 
residents and the variety of informal settlements, there is a reoccurring referral to ‘community 
leaders’ and ‘committees’. There are many diverging opinions about these committees and 
leaders, by residents, by NGOs, news reporters, government officials and researchers. They 
are described as ‘heroes’ who fight for the improvements of their neighbourhoods, or as 
‘villains' who opportunistically look for links to resources, engage in clientelism and exploit 
the residents through patronage. Indeed, patronage can be expected in such a setting, and it 
should also be expected that leaders might have both idealistic and personal motivations. 
However, the main interest in this thesis is not to form an opinion on or categorize these 
leaders. Rather, I am interested in how committees and leaders emerge and develop under the 
specific conditions of urban informal settlements in South Africa, and what this tells us about 
specific urban conditions.  
 
This interest stems from the observation of similarities in different informal settlements 
regarding organizational practises and how both residents and leaders talk about 
organizational models - idealised organisational structures. With the assumption that 
organizational models are not just practical models but contain and symbolize deeper ideals, 
discourses and logics, it becomes interesting to look into why certain organizational models 
are presented. It appears that multiple internal ‘common concerns’, like security, tensions, 
conflicts and service delivery, are followed by an urge to organize committees in detail, and 
both bureaucratic and democratic models are highlighted as ideals. This is interesting, as 
bureaucracy and democracy, as two of the major institutions of modern society (Friedland 
and Alford 1991) on the one hand are related and interdependent, especially as the 
predictability and stability of bureaucratic procedures should ensure democratic quality. On 
the other hand, the organizing logics of bureaucracy and democracy are also contradicting 
each other (Etzioni-Halevy 1983, Peters 2010), and balancing these is challenging. Basically, 
my understanding of this contradiction is that bureaucratic organizing logics can be seen as 
promoting more rigid, specialized and hierarchical organisational models and procedures, 
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while democratic organizing logics often promote less specialized and more open organizing 
that can ensure participation and representation. These tensions are mostly examined at 
government levels in the tension between the bureaucratic and the political sides of the state; 
however, it seems that these logics are also relevant for politics at a neighbourhood scale. 
Hence, there is a politics of negotiating and balancing the organizational logics to which the 
committees and leaders should adhere in different situations.   
 
Furthermore, bureaucratic and democratic organizational models seem to contradict the harsh 
realities of the settlement’s fragmented socio-political environment. Instead of assuming that 
portraying such models are mere acts of ‘mimicking’, these portrayals might have deeper 
roots which are specific to the history and socio-political context of informal settlements. 
This will be the main focus in this thesis.  
 
1.2 The research problem 
Globally and historically, ‘slums’, ‘informal settlements’ or ‘squatter camps’1 have received 
attention from a wide range of research disciplines. Historical and populist assumptions that 
urban informal settlements or slums are disorganized have been critiqued, and it is recognized 
that such spaces do not need to be sites of chaos and disorder (Whyte 1943, 1955, Wacquant 
1997, 2008, Myers 2011). Main current focuses are how such settlements are impacted by 
national and global politics, how governments deal with these issues, and what social 
structures emerge out of such heterogeneous populations of low-income residents competing 
over scarce resources. Further, the particularities of the situation of the urban south, where 
informal settlements are endemic and often dominate cities, have received much attention 
during the last few decades, and are described with concepts such as ‘urban informality’ (Roy 
and Alsayyad 2004).  In this thesis, I will not engage any of these major concepts directly as I 
am more interested in the politics that evolve internally in my specific cases. The main 
contribution of this thesis is rather aimed at the literature on politics in informal settlement in 
South Africa, which can be termed a localized niche of urban theory, grappling with South 
African neighbourhood politics, leadership and organizing.   
 
                                                 
1
 Although these different concepts contain different meanings which could be debated, I will not engage in 
debates around these concepts here but choose to mainly make use of the concept ‘informal settlements’ as this 
is the most frequently used in the South African literature.  
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Scrutinizing contextual literature, the empirical gap is quite apparent, as calls have been made 
for analyses of local political and organizational practises in South African townships and 
informal settlements
2
 (Heller 2007, Sinwell 2008, 2012, Millstein 2010, Runciman 2011, 
Katsura 2012, Meth 2012, Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012b). Meth (2012) concludes that 
examination of local political practise should continue to explore on-the-ground realities at 
the scales below and above the ward committees. Leaders and committees at the informal 
settlement scale are below the ward committees, but they have no formal definitions and are 
not formally part of the decentralised local government system, where the ward councils are 
the lowest level. These leaders and committees are central nodes in internal politics and 
power struggles in informal settlements, but besides Xaba’s (1994) account on ‘Leaders in 
Lindale’ (North of Durban), they have not really been the centre of analyses. Ethnographies 
on the everyday life of informal settlement dwellers (Bank 2011, Ross 2010) provide some 
indications, but are also not explicit about the formation of committee politics and leadership.  
 
Studying different actors within local politics is important because South Africa is marked by 
an intensifying competition over the right to claim legitimate representation of ‘poor people 
in struggle’ (Stokke and Oldfield 2004). Additionally, studies on informal settlement 
upgrading and housing projects have underlined the need for an improved understanding of 
social and political dynamics within these spaces (Barry and Mayson 2000, Oldfield 2002, 
Allison 2002, Bénit 2002, Bähre 2007a, Barry et al. 2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007, 
Lemanski 2008). A problem might be that most informal settlements case studies concentrate 
on cases of local government intervention, housing upgrading, or mobilizing towards 
government, thereby focusing on politics as a state-society issue. I will, in this thesis, look at 
settlements that are not undergoing a dramatic transformation, but still contain dramatic 
leadership politics. 
 
Specifically, I will contribute to the lack of analysis of the politics of organizing. A reason for 
this gap is that politics, also in accounts on ‘everyday politics’, is focused on discussing 
politics as a fight over resources and as related to the arena of the state. This is visible in 
                                                 
2
 A main difference between informal settlements and townships in South Africa is that informal settlements 
usually consist of only shack dwellings made of sink and wood, while townships often consist of legal concrete 
built houses and some shack dwellings. Hence, towships encompass larger areas of ‘formal’ housing, and 
usually several informal settlements nest within a township. As the three settlements of this study are located 
within townships, social and political dynamics at the towship scale is relevant and literature on towships will be 
addressed and included in this thesis. 
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descriptions of informal settlements leaders. They are often portrayed as opportunist power-
seeking actors, and have been described as warlords, (Xaba 1994, Morris and Hindson 1994), 
shacklords (Cross 2005, Cross 2006), and gatekeepers (Adler 1994, Barry and Mayson 2000, 
Schärf 2001, Barry and Ruhter 2005, Cross 2005, Barry 2006, Skuse and Cousins 2007, 
Staniland 2008). They are described as taking and abusing power or are even dictators that 
rule through fear. Certainly such leaders can and do occur in informal settlements, and 
deliberately increase in-fighting (Cole 1987, Cross 2006). Especially gatekeeping, which not 
necessarily involves any kind of visible violence, is likely to be common, due to the 
difficulties of securing transparency and accountability in this setting. I argue that, in order to 
understand the deeper sources of politics we need to move beyond notions of heroes and 
villains.  
 
Hence, the broad coverage is that politics in informal settlements often concerns fights over 
resources (see e.g. Adler 1994, Barry 2006, Cross 2005, Staniland 2008), but there is little 
analysis of the deeper meanings behind organizational models. In some of the case studies on 
one or more informal settlements, surprisingly complex organizational models are mentioned. 
In other words, organizational models have been mentioned, but have not been analysed as 
implications of the institutional environment (Runciman 2011). The argument is therefore 
that, rather than seeing presentations of models as solely strategic, organizational models 
might display some of the norms and discourses of informal settlement life. It is central to ask 
how and why certain forms of leadership and organizations develop. By asking these 
questions, I aim to avoid the polarized debate on leadership power and assumptions that 
community leadership has only been created by people in search of power.  
 
The problem of the dominance of Marxian and neo-liberal approaches 
The dominance of instrumental and outcome-oriented studies of politics, organizing and 
leadership might be related to the dominance of both liberal and neo-Marxist paradigms in 
urban theory. Particularly Marxist-inspired political economy accounts, including critiques of 
neo-liberalism, seem to be popular in urban South African studies.  However, there is an 
emerging critique of the dominance of Marxian-based political economy and its ongoing 
quest to criticise neo-liberalism in urban theory (McQuarrie and Marwell 2010, McFarlane 
2011, Parker and Sites 2012). Also in South African urban literature, the focus on blaming 
neo-liberalism is critiqued and alternatives to neo-Marxian political economy perspectives are 
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requested (Mamdani 2001, Parnell and Robinson 2012, Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a). Notably, 
these critiques do not propose that political economy and other Marxian-based studies are 
unimportant. Rather, they suggest that alternative analytical perspectives could compliment 
this literature and perhaps provide different insights. In order to comply with these requests, I 
will adhere to the suggestions of rather applying perspectives from new-institutionalism to 
urban theory (Lowndes 2001, 2009, McQuarrie and Marwell 2010). This will enable me to 
move beyond instrumental and outcome-oriented accounts of politics, organizing and 
leadership, and analyse articulations of plural and sometimes conflicting organizational logics 
and processes with a social constructivist approach. With this approach I aim to move beyond 
descriptions of ‘politics of the belly’, leaders as heroes or villains, and organizations as being 
solely instrumental. It implies that leadership practices and presentations of models are not 
analysed as ‘truths’, nor as mere results of co-optation and mimicking, but as impacted by the 
specific historical and contextual norms of the field from whence they emerge. This 
framework will be outlined below and expanded on in the theory chapter.  
 
1.3 The theoretical framework, the research question and argument 
As noted above, I am drawing on the suggestions of applying new-institutionalism, both to 
add analysis of organizations beyond the dominating Marxian political economy and 
liberalist Chicago school in urban theory (McQuarrie and Marwell 2010), and to enable 
analysis of how urban politics is formed in the current context of fragmented governance 
setups (Lowndes 2001, 2009). This seems uncommon in the South African literature on urban 
neighbourhood politics, and I will therefore explain and compare these theories in relation to 
South African urban literature in the theory chapter. For now, I will give a brief introduction. 
Basically, the framework implies a social constructive perspective for analysing informal 
settlement organizational models and politics, based on specific ways of perceiving and 
approaching politics, organizing and leadership: 
 
First, regarding politics, I will combine a new-institutionalist focus on the politics of 
organizational forms (March and Olsen 1984, 1989, Hall and Taylor 1996) with Arendt’s 
ideas of politics beyond means-to-an-end (Arendt 1958, Wolin 1983, Villa 1992). This 
redirects the attention from means-to-end analysis of politics as a fight over resources, 
towards exploring politics as negotiations over how to organize when dealing with common 
concerns.  Politics is considered as an end in itself (as autotelic) and an essential human 
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activity instead of merely necessary for creating outcomes or an activity linked to the arena of 
the state. Further, by viewing politics as a value on its own and fundamentally different from 
the sphere of the home, where individual and economic issues are the focus, it looks beyond 
Marxian or neo-liberal approach ideas of politics as instrumental means to an end and as 
resource fights. This enables analysing political dynamics beyond individual economic 
survival strategies, even in the marginalized urban populations of informal settlements where 
there are intense fights over scarce resources. Lastly, if politics requires processes of 
speaking publicly, bureaucratization that sometimes minimizes public discussions might be a 
threat, and the classical tension between democratic and bureaucratic organizing logics is 
thereby relevant to discuss further.   
 
Secondly, new-institutionalism implies a specific way of analysing organizations, based on 
how they form in relation to their institutional environment.  The basic assumption is that 
institutions, as rather abstract foundations of societies, provide regulative, normative and 
cultural cognitive guidelines to how organizations form (Scott 2008). Since institutions are 
defined as the more enduring features of social life, organizations adapt to them in order to 
increase legitimacy and to improve chances of survival (Meyer and Rowan 1977). This 
implies a fundamental social constructive perspective, analysing processes and practises of 
organizing rather than framing organizations as fixed entities (Czarniawska 2008a) and 
exploring the possible meanings of organizational models, ideals and logics applied and 
presented. Taking into account the informal settlement context of organizational and social 
fluidity, I have adapted a recent body of literature of institutional pluralism (Greenwood et al. 
2011), reflecting on how organizations, confronted by a complex and plural institutional 
environment, need to apply and negotiate plural and sometimes conflicting institutional logics 
(Yu 2013).   
 
Third, the framework includes a similar socially constructive approach to leadership. 
Leadership is often associated with personalities and psychology, and because leadership 
contain strong symbolic features, leaders are often portrayed as either ‘heroes’ or ‘villains’ 
(Collinson 2005). This results in rather normative conceptions of good or bad leaders. 
Instead, leadership can be analysed as a social phenomenon under constant construction, and 
the form of leadership does not only reflect the leader himself/herself, but also his 
surroundings. This is promoted in a social constructive ‘relational perspective’ on leadership, 
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which directs attention to how leaders are socially constructed in relation to their context and 
their followers (Dachler and Hosking 1995). Conceiving leadership as contextually situated 
refocuses the attention to analysing discourses and properties of leadership practises in situ 
(Alvesson and Svenningsson 2003, Denis et al. 2012), including the incoherence and tensions 
in leadership discourses and practise (Uhl-Bien 2006). Hence, leaders portrayals of practises 
and organizational models will not be perceived as ‘truths’, but analysed as socially 
constructed - as both pragmatic and symbolical reflections of contextual and historical 
norms/discourses. 
 
This theoretical framework will be applied to analyse the empirical insights gained by 
following leaders and residents in three of Cape Town’s informal settlements for three years. 
With this as broad framework, the empirical research question, which initiated this thesis - 
‘why are there informal settlements leaders and why do they display similar bureaucratic and 
democratic ideal models?’ - formed into a more theoretical related question:  
  
How are context specific conditions of speaking publicly and plural institutional 
logics informing the politics of leadership organizing in informal settlements?   
 
This question reflects a move away from a rational-choice analysis of leadership patronage. 
Rather, it introduces a focus on how leadership organizing is formed in relation to the specific 
urban context within which it emerges, and how the ongoing negotiations of organizational 
and leadership models is essentially politics.  
 
The question reflects the main argument in this thesis: That an aspect of the politics of 
informal settlement leadership organizing consists of balancing contextually evolved 
bureaucratic and democratic logics.  
 
1.4 Outline of the thesis and sub research questions 
Chapter two, the theory chapter, will first give a brief review over contextually relevant 
literature followed by charting the gap to which I will contribute. Further, it will discuss the 
framework for analysing the politics of leadership organizing, inspired by new-
institutionalism, as outlined above. I will indicated implications of the choice of overall 
theoretical focus on the politics of negotiating and balancing organizational models, which 
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enables an analysis of politics beyond arenas and economic outcome, of organizations 
beyond rational and instrumental, and leaders beyond heroes or villains.  
 
Chapter three specifies that an empirical gap exists of analysing politics, organizing and 
leadership internally at the scale of informal settlement neighbourhoods. Thereafter, building 
on the assumption that historically institutional roots matter, I give an overview of literature 
and historical accounts mentioning committees and leadership in South African informal 
settlements. Specifically, three roots of informal settlement committees are identified: The 
organizing of community policing, the organizing of the township based anti-apartheid social 
movements, and instalment of committees by external actors. Together these three different 
roots indicate that organizing and leadership and the scale of informal settlements are shaped 
through diverging historical processes.  
 
Chapter four will reflect on methodology, particularly related to issues of accessing and 
interpreting organizational and leadership presentations in informal settlements. Throughout 
the chapter, I will engage in a critical discussion of reflexivity, which is essential in a social 
constructivist epistemological grounding to increase validity. Pragmatically, I will outline the 
research design of a multiple case study of leadership committees in three informal 
settlements. Thereafter, I will outline all the methods applied, and discuss the choice of 
mostly qualitative methods, linked to how to best answer the research question and in relation 
to methods promoted by the applied literature (informal settlement and organizational 
literature). During the three years of field visits, the settlements were visited approximately 
once a week, following settlement and committee processes, attending community meetings, 
carrying out interviews and surveys, and engaging in loose conversation with residents and 
leaders. Especially important and useful was treading lightly in the field, trying multiple 
methods, triangulating information from different sources and different methods, and 
observing committee processes unfold over time. I addition to numerous residents, 12 leaders 
are included in the thesis, but some were visited more often than others. 
 
Thereafter, the four analysis chapters follow. In these, the politics of leadership organizing 
will be analysed as socially constructed by applying perspectives and theories from 
institutional studies of leadership and organizing. Explicit contributions to the major research 
question will be interrogated through a sub-question in each chapter. The two first analysis 
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chapters will examine the institutional environment by focusing on how informal settlement 
leaders are socially constructed through context specific organizational practises, and by 
analysing the conditions of acting politically by speaking publically. This is important as 
social constructive perspective sees leadership as a social reality, embedded in and 
inseparable from context (Dachler and Hosking 1995, Osborn et al. 2002, Uhl-Bien 2006). 
The last two analysis chapters are framed by institutional pluralism theories and looking at 
how the committees are shaped by and balance plural organizational logics.  
 
Chapter five starts by introducing the three informal settlements of this study. This is 
important to set the stage, specify the cases and make them comparable. Thereafter, I will 
shed light on the social construction of informal settlement leaders and committees by 
discussing some of the contextual specific institutionalised practises that they are informed 
by. The specific research question for this chapter is consequently: 
  
How are informal settlement committees and leaders shaped through context specific 
institutionalised practises? 
 
Despite the differences between the settlements, there are similar practises that inform the 
social construction of committees and leadership, reflect some general internal common 
concerns of informal settlement. Further, instead of simply noting that informal settlements 
consist of a bricolage of discursive practises and that committees are hybrid organizations in 
a plural institutional environment, I identify and discuss three specific practises: mediating 
and regulating internal order, mobilizing, and intermediary negotiation. The difference 
between these practises and the expectations they create sets the stage for analysing the 
politics of negotiating plural institutional logics in chapter seven and eight.  
 
Chapter six, based on the aim to move from perceiving politics as means-to-an-end towards 
exploring the political processes of negotiating organizing models, consider aspects of the 
social-contextual conditions of the internal public realm. This require moving beyond the 
organizational culture of the committee and look into the specific public culture from which 
they emerge. As these leaders and committees are dealing with politics in the sense of 
negotiating how do deal with ‘common concerns’, the institutional environment of the public 
realm is vital. I will adhere to Arendt’s concept of the public realm (Villa 1992) - the realm in 
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which issues of the commons are debated, standing in opposition to the private sphere of the 
home where private issues are carried out. The research question is hence:  
 
What are the conditions of the internal public realm and of speaking publicly? 
 
Two aspects of the public realm will be addressed: the public-private division, and normative 
or discursive constraints on speaking publicly. In addition to the heterogeneous population 
and the conditions of poverty, crime, deprivation, fear and inequality, the physical conditions 
of informal settlements where people live densely and share facilities like toilets and water 
taps forms a quite particular public setting. Looking at both quantitative and ethnographic 
elements, this chapter indicates a fragile public realm. Especially, statistical social dynamics, 
conditions of public space and residents’ relations to the public-private divide will be 
explored, in addition to how normative ideas related to the stigma of living in informal 
settlements impact on the willingness of residents to speak publicly. This suggests that the 
internal public realm provides a tension between urban individuality versus disciplinary 
norms, which should impact on what organizational models are presented as symbolizing 
legitimacy, as will be investigated further in the following chapter.   
 
Chapter seven discusses how leaders present and claim legitimacy through displaying both 
bureaucratic and democratic logics. In line with the new-insitutionalist premise that 
organizations adapt to the institutional environment to gain legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 
1977, Scott 2008), I will analyse how leaders’ presentations of organizing models are 
reflections of the particular urban environment of South African informal settlements. 
Specifically, bureaucratic and democratic logics and ideals will be discussed in relation the 
context of hybrid identities (Bank 2011) and historical discourses of informal settlement life. 
The research question for this analysis chapter is therefore:  
 
How and why are leaders presenting both democratic and bureaucratic logics in 
asserting legitimacy with residents? 
 
As the committees are hybrid, the presentations of plural institutional logics are not seen as 
signs of de-coupling, but will be analysed as grounded in local practises and adjusted to the 
specific urban conditions of informal settlements. Hence, the specific presentations of 
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democratic and bureaucratic models will be outlined, and linked to contextual behavioural 
norms, conditions of speaking publicly and certain historical logics of organizing 
(discourses). This chapter indicates a specific urban condition, where democratic logics are 
applied to contrast ‘rural’ traditional models which are linked to the history of indirect rule, 
while bureaucratic logics are central to contrast the particularly instable and insecure situation 
of living in informal settlements.  
 
Chapter eight analyses how democratic and bureaucratic logics are balanced and applied in 
practise to deal with internal tensions, committee conflicts and changes. With the assumption  
that ‘legitimacy politics’ - how leaders negotiate conflicts and carry out adaptive work though 
balancing institutional logics (Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013) are relevant to 
informal settlement politics, committee processes and conflicts in each of the three 
settlements will be compared. Particular attention will be given to how different democratic 
and bureaucratic organisational models are applied and promoted in these conflicts. The 
research question for this chapter is: 
  
How is the politics of balancing democratic and bureaucratic institutional logics 
reflected in committee changes and conflicts?  
 
It will show how particularly two different democratic logics are central: the discursive 
historical memories of unity, versus a need for organizing plural voices in the heterogeneous 
settlements. Further, balancing the democratic procedures with working bureaucratically 
towards practical administrative-based upgrading is also important. A central problem that 
when the committees withdraw to bureaucratic administrative work without engaging 
democratic procedures, leaders might be detached from residents can lead to fatigue and 
increased tensions due to suspicions of corruption. Balancing these logics is vital in dealing 
with committee conflicts and changes, and the  
 
The final chapter nine, will return to the research question and discuss how, together, the 
analysis chapters have answered the research question.  
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CHAPTER 2 Theorising politics, organizing and leadership in urban 
informal settlements 
 
2.1 Introduction   
In South African urban literature, specific calls have been made to enhance the understanding 
of local politics and power dynamics at the scale of townships and informal settlements 
(Heller 2007, Sinwell 2008, 2012, Millstein 2010, Katsaura 2012, Meth 2012, Bénit-Gbaffou 
et al. 2012b). However, most these works are focused on state-society political interaction 
and less on internal politics at a neighbourhood scale. In this thesis, I will heed this call, 
giving an empirically grounded analysis of the social construction of ‘community leaders’ 
and their ‘politics’ in South African informal settlements.  
 
This chapter will centre on how I aim to contribute to urban South African literature, focusing 
on local politics, by applying a specific theoretical approach to politics, leadership and 
organizing in informal settlements. This theoretical approach is inspired by new-
institutionalism and the recent development of institutional pluralism. In essence, this 
approach moves away from an instrumentalist and outcome-oriented perspective, which is 
common in the South African urban governance literature. 
 
The first part of this chapter outlines fundamental insights into the context of South African 
informal settlement politics. These portray conditions of internal organizational fragility and 
fragmentation, multiple urban identities and norms reflecting the conditions of instability. 
Following this is a discussion of the lack of attention to politics of organizational models, 
identifying three accounts in South African urban literature to which this thesis specifically 
contributes. The overall theoretical framework of new-institutionalist perspectives on politics, 
organizing and leadership will then be introduced, which implies moving beyond 
instrumental liberal and neo-Marxian inspired studies in urban theory (McQuarrie and 
Marwell 2010, Lowndes 2001, 2009). Thereafter, this theoretical framework will be 
discussed in detail. First I will outline a combination of new-institutionalism an Arendtian 
view on politics, which allows an examination of politics as negotiations over how to 
organize around common concerns, in addition to bringing attention to the tension between 
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bureaucratic and democratic logics. Secondly, the new-insitutionalist fundament of leadership 
and organizations as a socially constructed in relation to the institutional environment will be 
outlined. This enables considering the embedded symbolical and practical values of 
organizational models. In order to adapt this to the specific context, the more recent theories 
of institutional pluralism and competing institutional logics is relevant for analysing 
leadership beyond categorizing heroes or villains, but rather formed by and manoeuvring 
within a fragmented and complex institutional setting. Simply put, the framework enables a 
focus on the politics of negotiating organizational and leadership ideals, models and practises. 
 
2.2 Context and conditions of politics in SA informal settlements 
Before discussing the gap and theoretical framework, I will outline three streams of literature 
indicating the background to the tense, fragmented and fluid setting in South African 
informal settlements. I will not add to these three streams directly, but rather build on and 
draw them into the analysis.  
 
2.2.1 From government oppression and neglect to government interventions  
National politics and policies are significant for the internal developments in informal 
settlements. Illustratively, here are descriptions of the informal settlement called ‘Crossroads', 
one of the most well-known informal settlements in Cape Town
3
. The settlement and its 
internal politics from its beginnings in 1975 changed in relation to changing national politics 
and politics (Cole 1987). In the early years of the settlement (1976-1978), the picture is of a 
peaceful settlement where the threat of forced removal or eviction and the common struggle 
to survive ensured that residents from different backgrounds collaborated and even shared a 
common Crossroads culture (Kiewiet and Weichel 1980, Cole 1987). Kiewiet and Weichel 
(1980) illustrate how internal organizing developed into a bureaucracy of subcommittees
4
, 
noting that democracy survived well. Related to this, studies of other settlements and 
                                                 
3
 ‘Crossroads’ was one of the first really large informal settlements in Cape Town. It was started in 1975 and 
was meant to be a ‘transit camp’, but grew to house around 20 000 people in five years (Kiewiet and Weichel 
1980). 
4
 Describing this system in detail, they write: The main committee consisted of natural leaders from various 
parts of the camp elected to office by ballot. This committee became responsible of subcommittees to deal with 
everyday problems. A bureaucracy developed. There was a committee responsible for sanitation, another for the 
encouragement of house painting, a youth group, a school committee, a peace-keeping committee, and so on … 
More committees developed,  - in the end there were dozens of committees, but the whole system was interlinked   
(Kiewiet and Weichel 1980: 69) 
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townships underline how organizing against crime, due to governmental neglect to deal with 
internal security issues, became central during this time (Burman and Schärf 1990, Schärf 
2001, Shearing 2001, Seekings 2001). 
 
However, a different picture of Crossroads emerges a few years later. Changes in state policy 
towards intensifying social and political control over the African population through the 
migrant labour system created tension and violence in these spaces. From 1979, once it had 
been agreed that Crossroads would be legalized, the struggle for political control within the 
community and for housing in New Crossroads led to increasing schisms and violence, 
aggravated by government policies of ‘divide and rule’ (Burman and Schärf 1990:701). 
Internal fights started between different leaders, which from 1983 escalated into what has 
been termed an ‘internal war’ in 1986 (Cole 1987, Schärf 2001, Watson 2003, Cross 2005). 
Cole (1987) emphasises that this tense political climate was shaped by strategies of and 
interactions between internal leaders and appointed representatives of local and central state.  
 
With the advent of democracy, a different range of state interventions were established. New 
housing policies demanded more direct interaction between local government and informal 
settlements on upgrading (Huchzermeyer and Karam 2006). A majority of cases studies on 
informal settlements have analysed problematic consequences of government-initiated 
upgrading projects, like community breakdown, internal divisions, misunderstandings, 
corruption and even crime (Morris and Hindson 1994, Adler 1994, Barry and Mayson 2000, 
Allison 2002, Oldfield 2000, 2002, Robins 2002b, Bénit 2002, Huchzermeyer 2002, Barry 
2006, Cross 2006, Bähre 2007a, Barry et al. 2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Barry et al. 
2007, Lemanski 2008, Lizarralde and Massyn 2008, Oldfield and Zweig 2010). It is generally 
found that conflicts and tension emerge from interventions linked to resources, followed by 
political conflicts and suspicion around who gets what. When employment is added to the 
mix, competition and suspicion over positions often evolved into internal fighting (Allison 
2002, Skuse and Cousins 2007).  Bähre (2007a:81) points out that state development led to 
fierce and violent conflicts in which mafia-style leaders, rivalling political factions, as well as 
protesting residents, tried to take charge of the development project. Bénit summarizes: 
 
… 'community' participation in the design and implementation of the 
development project, which is seen by conventional wisdom as the condition of 
its success, may also lead to the outbreak of violence (Hindson, Beyerly and 
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Morris, 1994; Crankshaw, 1996; Huchzermeyer, 2001). It seems rather utopian, 
and may even be dangerous, to expect social justice to emerge from a social 
process of participation (Visser, 2001), and to see a fair and democratic 
compromise in the result of what is often merely violent conflict. 
(Bénit 2002:48) 
 
The problem is that on the one hand, connections to external actors are essential for 
development; but on the other hand, external interventions can lead to internal fighting, 
which again can hamper developments. Technical-oriented interventions are sometimes 
followed by intervention by contesting political parties (Smit 2006, Skuse and Cousins 2007, 
Barry et al. 2007, Harber 2011), and are linked to a ‘divide and rule’ strategy, or where 
external protagonists make use of internal divisions within the communities (Bénit 2002). 
Additionally, not only local government interventions, but also other actors like NGOs, can 
cause fragmentation and corruption. Robins’ (2008:78) case study shows that despite an 
NGOs attempt to create a ‘deep democracy’ when initiating an upgrading process, the 
settlements leadership established a centralized style of leadership that tightly controlled 
resources in fundamentally anti-democratic ways. 
 
Some of these studies acknowledge the importance of community capacity and the relevance 
of internal differences between residents prior to state interventions (Adler 1994, Oldfield 
2002, Smit 2006, Lemanski 2008). While Lemanski (2008) raises the point that barriers of 
language and political affiliation, predominantly tied to racial identity, hinder unity, she 
acknowledges that diversity does not automatically imply division. Agreeing with Oldfield 
(2000, 2002), Lemanski (2008) argues that community capacity is strengthened if residents 
have engaged in a struggle towards a common goal. Oldfield (2002) shows that, despite 
differences across racial, language and political divides, unity can develop through fighting a 
common cause. This is similar to how the struggle against state removal in Crossroads united 
the residents in the early period of its existence (Cole 1987).  
 
Summing up, the studies of linking changes in state policy to informal settlements show how 
internal conflicts often emerge as a result of external intervention. The notion of ‘becoming 
politicised’ is linked to this (Bénit 2002, Oldfield and Zweig 2010, Millstein 2011), a notion 
that I will challenge later in this chapter.  
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2.2.2 Post-apartheid fragmentation of civic politics and organizing 
The major change towards democracy has extensively been analysed as significant to the 
fragmentation of social and political organizing in townships and informal settlements. In the 
apartheid period, especially ‘the turbulent 80s’, civil organizations mushroomed and nurtured 
a strong popular political culture, potentially conservative, but most of all fundamentally 
attached to freedom and democracy (Desai 2002, Heller 2007). However, with the transition 
to a new democracy in 1994, township committees and community organizing declined and 
became fragmented (Adler and Steinberg 2000, Cherry et al. 2000, Heller 2003, 2007, 
Oldfield and Stokke 2006, Ballard et al. 2006, Dwyer 2006, Robins 2008, Zuern 2011).  In 
my reading, these accounts discuss two specific impacts of this enduring fragmentation on 
township and informal settlement organizing and politics: 
 
On the one hand, a loss of a unified social movement with a common goal has led to 
fragmentation into several organizations, which compete over legitimacy claims. There is a 
range of NGOs, CBOs and social movements who claim to be legitimate representatives of 
‘poor people in struggle’ (Oldfield and Stokke 2006:130), and that take up the role of 
intermediary negotiators between ‘the poor’ and government. Illustrative is also the constant 
popping up of both protests and organizations or ‘popcorn civics’ (Bond 2005, Zuern 
2011:140), incidents of ‘parallel organizations’ (Skuse and Cousins 2007, Drivdal in press), 
and individuals ‘with several hats’ (moving between positions in civil society as activists, 
ward councillors as government representatives, local economic entrepreneurs and affected 
residents
5
) (Cherry et al. 2000, Harber 2011:34, Zuern 2011:120). The implication is a 
confusing organizational setting with lack of transparency. 
 
On the other hand, fragmentation can be an advantage as it provides a range of opportunities, 
and plural civil society can be seen as a sign of a healthy democracy (Habib 2005). Heller 
(2003) optimistically argues that the decline of the South African National Civic 
Organization (SANCO), which was intended to coordinate local civic action
6
 has been 
accompanied by a revitalization of local civics, and many have described an upsurge of new 
or alternative civil movements or ‘new voices of protest’ (Heller 2003, Habib 2005, Ballard 
                                                 
5
 Cherry et al. (2000) terms this lack of separation between elected representation and civic leadership ‘confused 
identities’, while Lucas (2000: 172) leans towards an agency perspective and describes a political entrepreneur 
combining features of a patron, warlord and broker – blending illegitimate and legitimate features.  
6
  For an analysis of SANCO, see Heller (2007), Seekings (2011) and  Zuern (2011 chapter 4).  
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et al. 2006, Dwyer 2006, Zuern 2011). It enables the urban poor to use a variety of channels, 
including patrons (i.e. clientelism), civic organization, occupational interest groups and 
political parties (Cherry et al. 2000). It also enables organizations to use plural strategies; 
while the previously more ‘united’ social movement protesting apartheid clearly confronted 
the state, post-apartheid civil organizations are more dynamic and can combine collaborative 
strategies and confrontational or unlawful approaches (Oldfield and Stokke 2006, 2007, 
Skuse and Cousins 2007, Thorn and Oldfield 2011, Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldfield 2011).  
 
2.2.3 Urban identities and norms of order 
Common to the two explanation streams above is an analysis of the impact of macro politics 
and policy on informal settlements. However, politics and organizing does not only develop 
in relation to external pressure, but internally; micro social systems and socially constructed 
norms evolve constantly (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012). This is also in line with international 
literature, which rejects disorganization theories and generally highlighted that ‘slums’ or 
informal settlements do not need to be sites of chaos and disorder (Whyte 1943, 1955, 
Wacquant 1997, 2008, Myers 2011). Insights into micro social systems at the neighbourhood 
scale are particularly prominent in ethnographic research, attempting to resist pre-
assumptions based on macro-structural explanation models (Whyte 1943). They analyse 
social institutions and identities, and, although not always a main issue, indicate how 
everyday activities impact on organizational processes. I have noticed particularly two 
findings in ethnographic accounts on South African informal settlement: the notion of hybrid 
identities and norms of decency and order.  
  
First, it is noted that urban informal settlement dwellers encompass multiple and flexible 
urban identities (Robins 2002a, Robins 2008, Comaroff and Comaroff 2009, Bank 2011). The 
notion of urban dwellers’ multiple identities and rationalities is also reflected in 
contemporary writings on ‘Southern’ urban settings (Pieterse 2010, Myers 2011). Myers 
(2011:80) describes a modernist and non-modernist mixture of rationalities visible in the 
mechanisms, norms and forms shaped by urban dwellers, and Robins (2008) shows how 
informal settlement residents are capable of switching between identities and repertoires. 
Interestingly, Banks (2011) discusses how multiple partly modernized identities have been 
present in township life since the 1950s. With such multiple identities, politics around how 
issues of the commons should be organized can be expected to be complicated.  
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Secondly, studies striving to make sense of people’s experiences using people’s own 
everyday life categories have indicated that norms of order and decency are pertinent. These 
norms are visible in concerns around crime as indecent behaviour and inform internal 
regulations, indicated in ethnographies of violence and vigilantism (Buur 2003, 2006, 2008, 
Salo 2004, Buur and Jensen 2004a 2004b). Further, norms of order are influenced by context- 
specific feelings of marginalization, and stigma, and by the fact that life in informal 
settlements is signified by uncertainty and instability
7
 (Ross 2010). Residents deal with this 
instability and the fear of stigma by engaging the discourse of ‘ordentlikheid’, which signifies 
respectability and decency or dignity (Salo 2003, 2009, Ross 2006, 2010, Jensen 2008). It 
implies that external appearances are important, being clean and neat and living as decent as 
possible, in addition to sociability and behaving decently, friendly and modestly (Ross 2005). 
Although this concept was identified among Afrikaans-speaking informal settlement 
dwellers, concerns about decency have been documented in Xhosa-dominated informal 
settlements too, described as the stigma of living in a ‘bad area’ (Bray and Brandt 2007, Meth 
2013). Reminded by Simone’s (2010) indication that the complexity of the city educes a 
multitude of attempts to create order, the norm of ordentlikheid can be understood as a 
similar process in individuals lives where attempts to portray order might be a reflection of 
unstable and fragile personal life and futures. The embarrassment and shame that people feel 
about living in informal dwellings and not houses, is followed by a portrayal of being neat 
and proper (Ross 2010). 
 
Interestingly, comparing these two insights, a conflict can be sensed when linking urban 
identities to individual freedom, and norms of decency to socially disciplinary effects. This 
tension, and its implications for leadership legitimacy, will be discussed further in the 
analysis chapters, six and seven.  
 
                                                 
7
 She describes conditions where attempts to create predictability and routine in everyday life are punctured by 
violence and lack, where stability is limited and the even most strenuous efforts often secure only temporary 
well-being, and where interpersonal and structural violence sometimes intercept to render life in its crudest 
terms (Ross 2010:5). 
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2.3 A gap in analysing the politics of organizational models in SA informal 
settlements 
While the contextual accounts above explain the general background of politics and 
organizing in informal settlements, I am in this thesis interested in the meanings of the very 
specific organizational and leadership models developed internally in informal settlements 
and the politics around these developments.  I will therefore move to discussing how this 
seems to be a gap in the contextual urban literature and how I generally aim to approach this 
gap.  
 
2.3.1 General contextual agreements and the gap of analysing organizational models 
Most South African case studies mentioning politics, organizing and leadership in informal 
settlements highlight the effects of the above described context of civic fragmentation and 
social and political fluidity. The settlements are depicted as ‘lacking a sense of community’, 
compromising of social heterogeneity and instability (Cole 1987, Adler 1994, Hindson and 
McCarthy 1994, Barry and Mayson 2000, Bénit 2002, Oldfield 2002, Allison 2002, 
Huchzermeyer 2004, Smit 2006, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Bähre 2007a, Barry et al. 2007, 
Lemanski 2008). With heterogeneity, some contestations and disagreements should be 
expected. Illustratively, Bähre (2007a) emphasises that opposing groups continuously 
develop, because as soon as one is destroyed a new political opponent emerges. Leaders and 
committees are central in these tensions and are mentioned in several of the informal 
settlement studies. Linked to Mamdani’s (1996) argument that local despotism infected 
townships (Heller 2007), these leaders are certainly not romanticized and are more often 
portrayed as villains than heroes
8
- as opportunist power-seeking actors, involved in struggles 
over scarce resources. They have been termed ‘warlords’, (Xaba 1994, Morris and Hindson 
1994), ‘shacklords’ (Cross 2005, Cross 2006), and ‘gatekeepers’ (Adler 1994, Barry and 
Mayson 2000, Schärf 2001, Barry and Ruhter 2005, Cross 2005, Barry 2006, Skuse and 
Cousins 2007, Staniland 2008). To mention some examples, Cross (2005) depict 
‘shackleaders’ as ‘quasi-political leaders or gatekeepers’ who claim control over development 
work and collected payments from rural migrants and followers in the community. In 
comparing two areas, Xaba (1994) describes how in one area leadership with oligarchic 
tendencies emerge, while in the other, a strong dictator-like leadership developed out of a 
                                                 
8
 Similarly, Seekings (2006) underline that township youth should also be viewed beyond heroes and villains. 
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‘Hobbesian state of nature’. Undoubtedly, there are opportunities for patronage and power 
abuse in a context where resources are scarce and transparency low. Further, it is difficult to 
recognize ‘legitimate actors’:  
 
A critical feature of informal settlement is that there cannot be legitimate 
representative control. It may be claimed by one or more groups, but this 
cannot be credibly tested. There is therefore enormous difficulty in creating 
conflict resolution mechanisms, and the stable, legitimate civil organisation 
which is a prerequisite for successful formal development and secure 
neighbourhood life  
(Adler 1994: 109). 
 
Although this conclusion was made 20 years ago, problems identifying legitimate actors 
prevail. Drawing the different contributions together, it is clear that leadership politics in this 
setting is signified by tension and conflicting claims of representation. While this is apparent, 
there are few studies that go further and reflect over the deeper discursive contents of 
political, organizational and leadership processes.  
 
Fundamentally, I do not disagree that conflicts and patronage should be expected and do 
occur informal settlements, but assume that there is more to leadership organizing and 
politics than this. I am specifically interested in presentations of organizational models and 
ideals, and argue that analysing the politics of negotiating organizational models can help us 
understand the grounded complexity of politics in these particular urban spaces. In the 
literature outlined above, little analytical attention is directed at organizational models and 
ideals. When organizational models are mentioned, they are often treated as curiosities rather 
than interesting opportunities for deeper analysis. Heller (2007:18) briefly mentions that 
surprisingly formal procedures and democratic norms govern organizational life in 
townships, generally. In informal settlement case studies, organizational models and practises 
are treated as empirical curiosities (Barry et al. 2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007). In a side 
comment, Barry el al. (2007:185) remark that the Wallacedene community established a 
sophisticated set of rules to guide the settlement and life within it, enforced by informal 
courts. Skuse and Cousins (2007) are surprised by the sophisticated organization models 
applied in their informal settlement case study
9
. Despite these surprises, they do not further 
                                                 
9
 This is because they argue that it is generally accepted that informal areas do not have street committees, as 
these are civic structures particular to formal, established townships and thus embodies a specific set of 
assumptions, values, scope for action and institutional capacity.  
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discuss how and why these practises and models emerge, except to assume that the 
formalistic models are results of governmental co-optation or mimicking. A comment on the 
lack of analysing organizational models is made in the related field of urban South African 
social movements. In a comment on Sinwell (2011), Runciman (2011) agrees with Sinwell 
that a greater critical engagement with internal dynamics in organizations is necessary, but 
comments that Sinwell’s analysis does not go far enough into the dynamics he urges scholars 
to explore, and therefore Runciman argues that:  
 
….analysis should pay greater attention to the role organizational forms have in 
shaping movement politics and identity. The lack of attention to the 
organizational features of social movements is prevalent within the literature as 
they are generally taken as descriptive rather than analytic features of 
movements. 
(Runciman 2011: 608) 
 
In other words, as the outcome of organizations is the major focus, there is a lack of analysis 
of the process and meanings of organizational forms. 
 
2.3.2 Relevant steps towards this gap: Community politics and circulation of models 
In this thesis, I argue that analysing how politics evolve around negotiating the legitimacy of 
certain organizational models and practises can contribute to a small field of urban studies 
within South Africa. Therefore, the main theoretical aim of this thesis is to contribute to a 
niche within urban ‘governance’ studies, focusing on local governance, politics and 
leadership in urban South Africa.   
 
Before discussing the theoretical framework that I will apply, I will outline some relevant 
studies in the South African urban governance literature to which this thesis aims to 
contribute. In my readings, I found the contributions of Katsaura (2012), Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 
(2012) and Skuse and Cousins (2007) particularly relevant.   
 
In relation to politics generally, steps are taken towards analysing political dynamics at the 
neighbourhood scale. Katsaura (2012) argues that we need to move from a concept of 
community governance to community politics. This is linked to the problems of 
romanticizing the local with concepts like community governance and ‘social capital’. The 
critique of the ‘community’ approach is also evident in some of the studies of informal 
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settlements, highlighting internal conflicts and problems of representation as outlined earlier. 
In a review of the much quoted book We are the poors by Desai (2002), Kessel asks: ‘Who 
exactly are the people making up this "community," and how do they relate to the proclaimed 
"community leaders"? What defines a "community"?’ (Kessel 2002:1).  
 
Analysing ‘community politics’ as suggested by Katsaura (2012) is one way of moving 
beyond the traps of romanticizing communities as a conflict-free unit. While I agree that 
analysis of politics is necessary at any scale of society, I suggest that moving this forward 
also requires a deeper discussion on what politics is. In the study, he does not define politics 
directly, beyond describing the political realm as a realm of power struggles, control, 
domination, conflict and political partnerships (Katsaura 2012:339). With this definition and 
with his referral to Bayart’s classical study ‘the politics of the belly’, it seems he views 
politics in the African context as a fight over material resources.  
 
As will be outlined later, I suggest that politics, besides direct confrontations over resources, 
is also about negotiations of models and logics that ‘ought to be applied’ to deal with 
common concerns. This implicates that, beyond direct confrontations, analysis must include 
more mundane practises, expression of ideals and norms, and more ‘invisible’ power 
dynamics. With this perspective, I am more interested in the politics of negotiating 
organizational and leadership models. This is political, because the models negotiated imply 
ideas about how common concerns should be solved.  
 
Some steps towards analysing organizing models and leadership in urban South African areas 
are taken with acknowledgements that multiple organizational practises and models have 
developed over time. Two accounts are relevant in this regard: 
 
First, and in relation to the contextual features of multiple identities (Bank 2011), I find 
specifically relevant Skuse and Cousins’ (2007) view that a ‘bricolage of discursive 
practises’ emerge in informal settlements, and the application of these different discursive 
practises reflects competency and literacy in community organizing. It fits with Oldfield and 
Stokke’s (2006) argument that plural organizational strategies and practises are employed by 
township-based organizations. However, as the notion of a bricolage is vague, I am interested 
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in the emergence of specific patches of this bricolage and the politics of stitching together 
these. 
 
Secondly, Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2012a, 2012b), in investigating urban South African security 
governance, brings attention to the fact that local leaders are central in the circulation of 
organizational models. These papers argue that neo-liberalism is useful but insufficient to 
understand local leadership practises, which have evolved historically in relation to the very 
specific local and national political developments. It is thereby acknowledged that organizing 
models have developed over time and imported models are adapted to these contextual and 
historical practises, in a process of ‘local appropriation of global discourses’. In other words, 
practises at the neighbourhood scale are impacted by macro politics and policies, but are 
modified and adapted to specific local contextual practises over time. This process of local 
appropriation, where local leaders are central fits with Skuse and Cousins’ (2007) claim that 
global human rights discourses are appropriated into informal settlement discursive practises.  
I see this process of appropriation as relevant not only to local urban security governance, but 
also to the politics of organizing at the scale of informal settlement as well. Additionally, the 
understanding that it is important to include a historical account of the emergence of practises 
(Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a, 2012b) is relevant to this thesis.  
 
Building on and adding to these insights, I will now introduce a theoretical framework based 
on new-institutionalism and institutional pluralism, which enables an analysis of the 
presentations and negotiations of sometimes conflicting organizational / leadership practises 
and models relate to specific contextually developed institutional logics. 
 
2.3.3 Introducing the theoretical framework: alternatives to instrumentalist analysis  
A reason for the lack of attention to the politics of organizational practises and models is the 
instrumental outcome focus. McQuarrie and Marwell (2010) ascribe this to the fact that urban 
theory is dominated by two competing paradigms: Marxian political economy and liberalist 
Chicago school of urban sociology. Marxian inspired analysis and political economy theories 
are prevalent in much of the southern urban literature. Frequently engaging in a critique of 
‘neoliberalism’ and neo-liberal policies, these studies are highly critical of romanticizing the 
local (Mohan and Stokke 2000) and of naïve use of concepts like social capital and 
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participation
10
 (Oldfield and Stokke 2007, Robins 2008). The structuring effect of capitalism 
or neo-liberalism and the influence of both international and national neo-liberal policies on 
slums or informal settlement are significant (Huchzermeyer 2004, Huchzermeyer and Karam 
2006, Graham 2006).  
 
However, a recent debate on the limitations of political economy has emerged regarding its 
neo-liberal critique in urban theory (McFarlane 2011, Parker and Sites 2012), its limitations 
to address the complexity of urban dynamics in the South (Parnell and Robinson 2012, Bénit-
Gbaffou et al. 2012a), and its limitations to analyse the complexity of the colonial legacy 
(Mamdani 2001).  
 
The problems of both neo-liberal and political economy perspectives for analysing politics in 
informal settlements, is that these often focus on the major outcomes of politics. A similar 
problem is mentioned in social movement literature; that it has concentrated on the ‘capital P 
politics’ – collective action aimed at influencing official governmental policies - rather than 
studying politics in more specialized and localized regimes (McAdam and Scott 2005:11, 
Scheinberg and Lounsbury 2008). Building on the idea of politics as processes rather than 
outcome, the focus turns to the politics of the on-going negotiations of organizational 
practises and modes. 
 
Hence, I will apply neither liberal nor political economy perspectives, but engage a different 
approach to analysing politics, leadership and organizing. I aim to move beyond instrumental 
and outcome-oriented approaches that describe state-centric politics or ‘politics of the belly’, 
organizations as rational entities. I will do this through applying a theoretical framework 
building on new-institutionalism, which instead of rational-choice, outcome and 
instrumentalist approaches, analyses the processes and social constructions of politics, 
organizing, and leaders beyond heroes or villains. This theoretical framework is borrowed 
from a different field in the South African urban literature. Fundamentally, new-
institutionalism is a central direction in political studies with the argument that ‘the 
organization of political life makes a difference (March and Olsen 1984, 1989, Hall and 
Taylor 1996). It implies a leaning towards a Weberian frame, which sees power coded into 
                                                 
10
 Especially participation has been critically debated in South African urban and social movement literature, see 
e.g. Ballard (2007), Sinwell (2009), Piper and Navdi (2010).  
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structural design (McAdam and Scott 2005), and the analysis of the ‘micro processes’ of how 
these structural designs are formed becomes central. This implies analysing the meaning of 
organizational practises, models and processes, in this case of the loose organizations of 
leadership committees.  
 
Although not directly applied to South African urban informal settlement, some urban 
theorists have promoted this perspective. First, two recent papers by McQuarrie and Marwell 
(2010, 2013) maintain that the organizational sociology of new-institutionalism is relevant, as 
little attention has been paid to organizations as derivate but also productive of urban social 
relations. They underscore that the problems with Marxist and liberalist approaches in urban 
theory are not epistemological or methodological, as they both can be deeply relational, but 
rather that they often do not give enough attention to organizations as the main object of 
analysis. This is so because these paradigms treat organizations as derivate of more salient 
processes such as class struggle, capital accumulation, interpersonal interaction, and local 
social integration (McQuarrie and Marwell 2010:262). Therefore, they do not include in-
depth analysis of the duality and ambiguity of organizing within both more informal and 
seemingly formal urban organizations.  
 
Secondly, Lowndes (2001, 2009) argues for bringing new-institutional analysis back into the 
field of urban politics.  She contends that new-institutionalism is relevant to analyse the 
current situations, where the traditional state organizations are becoming weaker with the 
move to ‘governance and partnerships’, because new-institutionalists analyse informal 
conventions as well as formal rules and structures. Additionally, she highlight the usefulness 
of new-institutional analysis in exploring how urban political leadership appropriate their 
practises in relation to the local institutional environments (Lowndes 2009) 
 
The following sections will further explain the theoretical framework, relate it to South 
African urban literature, and indicate implications for the analysis that follows in this thesis.  
 
2.4 Perspective on politics: Processes of negotiating organizational ideal models  
Although it is suggested that the application of western concepts in postcolonial studies 
should be avoided (Robins et al. 2008), I find this difficult at a basic level, as the concept of 
‘politics’ carries with it a range of theoretical connotations. Assumptions about ‘what politics 
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really is’ are unavoidable, and impact on the analysis and finding (Leftwich 2004). I will 
therefore clarify my choice of approach to politics, and how this might differ from the 
accounts on politics in much of the context-related literature.  
 
When new-institutionalism is discussed in political science, specifically by the main figures 
March and Olsen (1984, 1989), the primacy of outcomes is challenged. It is highlighted that 
the process of politics might be more central, that politics are important social rituals, and 
that ‘the organization of political life makes a difference’ (March and Olsen 1984, 1989, Hall 
and Taylor 1996). The focus on processes fits with an Aredtian perspective on politics, which 
also perceives politics beyond struggles for economic outcomes, but rather as a process of 
forming public opinions about what common concerns are and how they should be dealt with.  
 
This is relevant for this thesis since I am interested in analysing on-going internal processes 
and politics around the organizing of informal settlement committees and leaders. To further 
understand the relevance of this perspective I will reflect on two major components:  the 
conditions of negotiating common concerns, and processes of balancing bureaucratic and 
democratic concerns.  
 
2.4.1 Speaking publicly on common concerns  
As noted earlier, a problem with Marxian or liberal approaches in urban studies is that they 
have in common an outcome orientation and analyse politics mainly as power conflicts over 
material issues. They thereby contain an instrumental view of politics, as exemplified by 
Laswell’s definition that ‘politics is about who gets what, when, how’ (March and Olsen 
1984:741). Instead of this instrumental view of politics, I will adhere to a commonly seen 
alternative to a means-to-an-end or outcome view of politics, presented in the writings of 
Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1958, Wolin 1983, Parietti 2011). These ideas have generated major 
debates especially within political theory and philosophy
11
. Fundamentally and simplified, I 
understand her ideas to be based on Aristotle’s division between the ‘oikos’ (family) – the 
economic sphere and concern of the individual, and ‘polis’ (city) - the conduct of common 
affairs, which is the essence of politics (Arendt 1958). With this division, politics has a value 
of its own, beyond the material and instrumental focus of the home and the economy. Crick, 
                                                 
11
 Especially the major debate between the Arendtian inspired republican views of politics versus the liberal, and 
the Habermasian ‘deliberate democracy’ in between. 
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in his book In defence of politics, seemingly inspired by Arendt, defines politics as a 
distinctive form of rule whereby people act together through institutionalized procedures to 
resolve differences, to conciliate diverse interests and values and to make public policies in 
the pursuit of common purposes (Crick 2005:67). This definition highlights the process focus, 
and that politics concerns issues of the commons more than issues of the private life of 
individuals.  
 
With this perspective on politics, it becomes interesting to analyse the processes and 
construction of ideas around what the common concerns are and how actors dealing with 
issues of the commons are organized. In relation to this, the concept of the ‘public realm’ is 
central
12
. Although the boundary between the public realm and the private realm is vague 
(Fraser 1990), a public realm, more or less detached from both the private/economic concerns 
and state bureaucracy, is seen as essential for politics to form. It emphasises that participation 
and public discussions are significant for politics to evolve. Two concerns are connected to 
this way of understanding politics. 
 
First, postmodern critiques in political theory highlight that the public realm might neglect 
political conflicts (Villa 1992). However, while the main critique of Habermas’ ‘consensus’ 
approach is continuing (Flyvbjerg 1998), it is noted that Arendt’s ideas include plurality and 
agonistic conflict, as she sees the public realm as a space for agonistic action denatured by 
the normalizing power of the social (Villa 1992). This includes that plurality is not just a 
condition, but also an achievement of political action and speech (Villa 1992:717). Likewise, 
Fraser (1990:70, footnote 29) observes that Arendt’s view presupposes a plurality of 
perspectives and allows for internal differences and antagonism, and is therefore more 
applicable to this setting than the ‘community’ concept. 
 
Secondly, and more relevant to this thesis, a vibrant public realm requires the willingness of 
several individuals to engage in deliberating common concerns and to ‘speak publicly’. The 
problem with imagining actual ‘free deliberations’, is that social norms and discourses 
discipline what one is willing to talk about. This is the fundament of the well-known 
                                                 
12
 Inspired by Hannah Arendt’s discussions of the ‘the public realm’, Habermas introduced the related concept 
‘the public sphere’, designating a theatre in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through 
the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, hence, an 
institutionalized arena of discursive interaction. (Fraser 1990:57).  
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Foucaultian ‘power objection’ towards public realm theories (Villa 1992, Allen 2002). With 
this in mind, some fundamental discussion of discursive powers that impact on the formation 
or suppression of deliberation (Flyvbjerg 1998) is necessary. In this thesis it will specifically 
be addressed in chapter six, which addresses some conditions and the possibilities of 
engaging in discussions about common affairs within South African informal settlements.  
 
Summing up, politics is about negotiating and defining common concerns, what these are and 
how they should be dealt with. This is relevant at the scale of informal settlements, which, 
despite internal heterogeneity and fragmentation, have several common concerns that affect 
the settlements residents as a whole. Negotiations about what these common concerns are and 
the suggested forms of organizing to deal with these common concerns, are perceived as 
highly political processes.   
 
Implications: Moving beyond arenas and Hobbesian ‘politics of the belly’ 
Politics beyond arenas
13
 
The first implication of a process focus on politics is that it should be analysed as an ongoing 
human activity related to forming opinions of the commons rather than an activity solely 
connected to certain modern organizations like the state or political parties. The idea that 
politics evolve around certain grand institutions (like the state and political parties) is termed 
an ‘arena approach’ to politics (Leftwich 2004).  
 
In studies related to informal settlement politics, the ‘arena’ approach is visible in the 
tendency to analyse politics with a ‘state centric’ perspective. Although it is argued that 
community organizing needs a more grounded, complex analysis, which diverts the debate 
from the polemical understanding of state versus society (Stokke and Oldfield 2004, Oldfield 
and Stokke 2006, 2007), a state focus remains, in that politics is referred to as activism 
directed at the state. Especially in literature on social movements, the state is seen as the 
ultimate node around which politics revolve; as such movements’ main agenda usually is to 
change state structures and practises. Organizational practices considered are therefore 
specific to the state-society relation rather than dealing with internal conflicts. Bénit-Gbaffou 
and Oldfield (2011) and Oldfield (2008) discuss everyday politics as practises related to 
                                                 
13
 Arenas here will narrowly understand in line with Leftwich (2004) notion, although arenas could also be 
discussed as arenas of public spectacles.  
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accessing the state. Others choose to focus on ‘party-politics’ and political parties as main 
nodes around which politics evolve (Bénit-Gbaffou 2011, 2012, Fourchard 2012, Bénit-
Gbaffou and Piper 2012, Sinwell 2012).  
 
Discussing and analysing the politics of state-society relations is undoubtedly essential. 
However, a problem of the arena focus is that the politics analysed often is visible in active 
and organized activity, and more indistinguishable everyday processes and practises, which 
are essentially political, could be overlooked. Also Ballard et al. (2006: 454) note that the 
political nature of struggles is not confined to parties and the state. The arena approach points 
at a gap between ethnographic descriptions of ordinary everyday life and the more active and 
direct political interaction or confrontation with the state. In order to move in between this, I 
will, in line with Arendts’ philosophy, analyse politics as a process of defining concerns of 
the commons. This entails examining the everyday formation, negotiation and contestation of 
organizations that deal with (or claim to deal with) common interests within the informal 
settlements. Also, Robins et al. (2008) argue that one should research citizenship and 
democracy that begin from everyday experiences, in particular social, cultural and historical 
contexts.  
 
This is slightly different from Katsaura’s (2012) notion of ‘micro-politics’, which is also 
slightly arena focused, as the micro simply signifies smaller scale than the state.  
 
Instead of economy: the politics of speaking publicly  
A second implication of applying an Arendtian inspired perspective is that politics is seen as 
significantly different from economic activity, and different from the bureaucratic activity of 
administrating and regulating activities.  
 
In my observations, it seems that in urban studies of the South generally, with the focus on 
‘informal economy’, much attention has been directed at economic activities and the oikos - 
the organizing of the home, but less at the polis – organizing around public matters in these 
spaces. Basically, studies of informality are concerned with everyday dynamics in and around 
informal settlements. Similarly to the critique of the deterministic perspective of 
‘disorganization theory’ (Whyte 1943), the urge to move away from ‘the myth of 
marginalization’ was a main motivation for rethinking informality (Roy 2011, Roy and 
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Alsayyad 2004). As an idiom of urbanization, it marks a move away from a determinist and 
structuralist perspective towards assuming individuals and groups with innovative agency, 
shaping their environments and livelihoods. Attention is directed to the rich complexity, 
ambivalence and resilience in African cities (Hansen and Vaa 2004, Simone 2010). These 
studies have in common a fascination with the innovative and rapidly developing grassroots 
initiatives and responses to the failure of governmental service delivery. Yet, the term 
‘informality’ remains unclear and there are many different definitions. I will not engage in 
defining the term here, but simplistically note that the concept is developed from Keith Harts’ 
assertion of the ‘informal economy’, as is mostly applied in two fields: Urban land and 
housing, and production and reproduction of the informal economy (Hansen and Vaa 2004)
14
. 
While informality makes sense in relation to material issues like the built environment 
(housing, infrastructure) and economy, the distinction between formal and informal politics 
or social organizing makes less sense. Social and political organizing are social processes, 
which in a common understanding in the intersection between political and organizational 
theory (especially in new-institutionalism), can never be purely formal or explained by state 
legislation (see e.g. Lowndes 2001, 2009, Clegg et al. 2006). With new-institutionalism, 
institutions are defined as inherently informal as they have strong normative and cultural-
cognitive sides (Lowndes 2001). Due to these issues, I have decided on minimalizing the 
usage of the informality concept or the tendency of dividing between informal and formal 
institutions, which is common in much Southern development literature.  
 
Another way in which the economy focus is materialising is in the analyses of politics as a 
fight over resources. This might be related to early urban theory problematizing a lack of 
community bonds and rather individualistic survival mechanisms (Wirth 1938)
15
, and 
disorganization theories highlighting the inability of a community to realize common goals 
(Jackson 1984). In the setting of informal settlements, it should therefore not be a surprise 
that there are fights over scarce resources, and that there are residents who engage in politics 
as power seeking opportunists (Xaba 1994, Barry and Mayson 2000, Bähre 2007a, Barry et 
                                                 
14
 Although, with broader a definition, it is argued that ‘urban informality’ may be emerging as a mode of 
urbanization or as a new paradigm for understanding urban culture (Roy and Alsayyad 2004). Roy (2005:148) 
uses the term urban informality to indicate an organizing logic, a system of norms that govern the process of 
urban transformation itself.  
15
 Wirth was inspired by Tonnies’ description of urbanization as the move from ‘gemeinschaft’ (community) 
with natural, organic forms of group existence, towards a ‘gesellschaft’ (society), which is a much more 
artificial group (Wirth 1926). 
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al. 2007, Lemanski 2008, Katsaura 2012). Such Hobbesian analyses of slums are similar to 
‘disorganization’ theories, linking conflicts to a lack of social contract and cohesion and the 
particularly harsh conditions of urban informal settlement life. However, there are also 
critiques. Heller (2007) argues that while opportunistic ‘politics of the belly’ certainly does 
exist, it produces a reductionism of urban local politics: 
 
…the broader presumption of the sceptical view that unequal communities inevitably 
slip into a Hobbesian world of local authoritarianisms produces a reductionism in its 
own, one in which the very possibility of civil society in Africa is once again, in 
Bayart’s (1993) celebrated phrase, struck down by the ‘politics of the belly’  
(Heller 2007:17).  
 
Agreeing with this critique, I also believe there is more to politics in informal settlements 
than a fight over resources. Here, an Arendtian approach to politics turns the focus to politics 
as forming opinions around common affairs. It requires attention to the condition of the 
public realm and the conditions of speaking publicly. It can be assumed that, to a higher 
degree than upgraded and legal neighbourhoods, informal settlements face ‘common affairs’ 
challenges, like being threatened by eviction and receiving shared public services such as 
communal toilets and water taps. In other words, perhaps more than other neighbourhoods, 
informal settlements need a public realm where these common affairs can be discussed. 
 
Although not a main focus, some studies have given indications of the condition of the public 
realm by looking at public – private boundaries and identifying a ‘retreat to privacy’ (Muyaba 
2011, Muyeba and Seekings 2012), and by indicating the dangers of township politics (Bähre 
2002, Katsaura 2012,). The retreat to the private is problematic if it leads to a neglect of the 
public realm as distinctively different from the public (state) and the private (individual 
households, the economic market) (Villa 1992). Additionally, ethnographic descriptions of 
everyday informal settlement life give insight into normalized practises and disciplinary 
norms (Salo 2003, 2004, 2009, Buur 2003, 2006, 2008, Ross 2006, 2010, Bank 2011), which 
impact on conditions of the public realm and indicate limitations of speaking and acting 
publicly. In my interpretation, ordentlikheid becomes a disciplinary norm that guides 
personal behaviour and how individuals regulate themselves, also when ‘acting publicly or 
politically’. This is therefore relevant to understanding the politics that form in this setting, 
especially as gossip and rumour is widespread in low-income areas of Cape Town (Ross 
2010, Bank 2011, Muyeba 2011, Muyeba and Seekings 2012). The authors don’t directly 
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connect these norms and practices to politics. Certainly, most everyday practices are not 
necessarily political, but they can be seen as discourses that inform the socially constructed 
patterns of power. These indicate that although security governance certainly can turn into 
resource fights (Katsaura 2012), there are deeper behavioural norms that shape both security 
governance and governance within the settlement. 
 
2.4.2 Problems of bureaucratization  
A second discussion relevant when analysing political processes is the problematic relation 
between politics or democracy and bureaucratization. This relation is one of the most 
fundamental issues in political science and public administration theory, often inspired by the 
major work of Max Weber (1968) on the rise of bureaucratic ways of organizing in modern 
society, and literature on this topic is vast
16
. As noted in a classical new-institutionalist paper 
by Fiedland and Alford (1991), bureaucratic and democratic logics are two of the most 
fundamental institutions in modern Western society. Particularly interesting is the tension 
between these two logics. They are usually perceived as antithetical and balancing them is a 
major dilemma (Etzioni-Halevy 1983), often played out in the conflicts between bureaucrats 
and politicians in governments. Bureaucratic logics, according to Weber’s (1968) classic 
theory, is based on a specific modern
17
 way of organizing that includes hierarchical 
organizing, and that standardized and written rules and procedures inform action (Etzioni-
Halevy 1983:28). While bureaucratic organizing is seen as necessary for providing stability, 
effective administration and securing transparency through record keeping and predictable 
procedures, democratic organizing is necessary to be responsive to the wishes of the public 
and to political debates (Peters 2010). A main problem is that bureaucratic ways of 
organizing are essentially hierarchical and even authoritative, and can therefore be seen as 
antidemocratic (Peters 2010). Additionally, a pragmatic problem is that too much politics 
through deliberations and negotiations slows down development; but on the other hand, fast 
bureaucratic implementation can lead to detachment and increases chances of suspicion of 
corruption and hence tension. In any government this balance between efficiency through 
public administration and opening for democratic deliberation is difficult. However the 
relationship between bureaucracy and democracy is both paradoxical and complimentary, as 
                                                 
16
 As the main topic in this thesis is not to address this debate, but to borrow some very basic insights, the 
literature included here will be limited. 
17
 Modern in the sense that bureaucratic authority emerged with the rise of modern science, confronting 
traditional authority. 
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an effective democracy depends on an effective and well-functioning bureaucracy that 
provides predictability and impartiality in the form of securing equality in relation to law 
(Peters 2010).  
 
A range of studies have analysed what happens when an organizational sector
 
confined to one 
major institution is confronted by or adapt other institutional logics. Major sectors like the 
public sector, the private market sector, and the civic sector, are seen as fundamentally 
different, as their values and overarching aims - reflected in different logics, models and 
practices of organizing - differ. In a simplified model, major sectors are built on fundamental 
institutions of modern society: the market sector is built on institutional logics of capitalism, 
public administration sector on bureaucratic institutional logics, and political actors on 
democratic logics (Friedland and Alford 1991). A classic example of how major changes 
appear when institutional logics cross over these sectors is how the ‘family institution’ 
changed when feminists brought in logics of the market by highlighting gender divisions of 
labour. More relevant to this thesis, well-known studies of democracy (Skocpol 2003) and 
social movements (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, della Porta and Diani 2009) are concerned with 
the threat that bureaucratic logics, through processes of bureaucratization and 
professionalization
18
, will change civil society towards loosing essential democratic logics. 
Often, the problem of bureaucratization is seen as a result of governmental co-optation. 
Selznick’s (1949) study of how a grassroots organization became co-opted into local 
administration, distancing itself from the grassroots from which it emerged, is a classic in this 
regard. Co-optation of civil society organizations is often followed by that the civic 
organizations start to resemble state structures though professionalizing organizational 
models and practices. Hence, co-optation of civic organizations carries not only the risk of 
them becoming an extended arm of government, but also that they become disciplined into 
bureaucratic logics and thereby lose their confrontational political stances. 
Arendt’s writing is also relevant to this tension, although she never speaks directly about 
democracy, only on politics. However, since democracy very generally can be seen as a way 
of organizing politics with weight on broad participation, it is relevant to draw attention to 
her major worry that bureaucratization poses a threat to participatory politics (Arendt 1958). 
Here, similarities between Foucault and Arendt can be drawn by the observation that they are 
                                                 
18
 This can also be related to the classic 4 stages of social movement lifecycles as suggested by Herbert Blumer, 
where the last stages consist of formalization and thereafter institutionalization (se e.g. della Porta and Diani 
2009: 150-152) 
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both worried about the consequences and developments of state bureaucracy (Villa 1992). 
Arendt’s’ concern is that politics would give way to administration and bureaucracies that 
regulate daily life and render it more uniform (Crick 2005, Wolin 1983). As ‘diversity is the 
nightmare of bureaucracy’ (Wolin 1983:18), the logic of bureaucratic procedures is to 
standardize, regulate and simplify complex situations. The consequence of increased 
bureaucratic practises and detailed regulation with standardized procedures is that it 
minimizes the need for public discussions. Thereby, bureaucracy becomes a totalitarian force 
or machinery that removes the need for politics and the possibilities of free action (Wolin 
1983, Crick 2005).  
 
Implication: tensions between bureaucratic and democratic logics 
A frequent consequence of Hobbesian analysis, which seems to be common in analysing 
South African informal settlement politics, is a fatigue with politics as a constant fight over 
resources and a solution of increased regulation, which in essence demands increased 
bureaucracy. Hence, the tension between bureaucratic and political or democratic logics is 
relevant, and it is discussed in some South African urban and social movement literature.  
 
In line with international social movement literature mentioned in the previous section, the 
dangers of co-optation and following bureaucratization is also discussed in African social 
movement literature. While some studies briefly mention problems of urban projects 
becoming ‘politicised’ (Bénit 2002, Oldfield and Zweig 2010, Millstein 2011), Robins et al. 
(2008) and Robins (2008) worry about ‘de-politicisation’ and the ‘NGO’ifization’ of the 
‘uncivil’ tendencies in social movements. Zuern (2011:118) argues that most civics became 
less participatory and less democratic at the same time as the state became a formal 
democracy, as professionalization of participation appeared in civil society, which made 
discussions of policy increasingly technical and specialized. In development and planning 
literature, Staniland (2008) and Bähre (2007) mentions that civic organizations became co-
opted by the developmental state, disabling them from acting as part of a critical civil 
society
19
. Although state co-option does not necessarily lead to bureaucratization, and 
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 Especially SANCO has been critiqued for becoming co-opted through its too close relationship with the ruling 
party, the ANC (Heller 2007, Seekings 2011). Notably, attempts of state co-optation appear before the transition 
to democracy: the colonial state during indirect rule in 1920 engaged in various attempts to co-opt community 
policing structures (Burman and Schärf 1990) and the later apartheid state attempted to co-opt ‘community 
courts’ from 1977-1984 (Schärf 2001) 
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professionalization of a social movement also often happens as a slow and natural process, 
the fear of increased bureaucratic logics delimiting democratic logics in the civic field is 
relevant. 
 
However, in relation to decentralization and participation debates, Heller (2001), in line with 
a Weberian understanding, acknowledges that democracy requires bureaucracy
20
. He refers to 
the limits of both technocratic bureaucratic models and grassroots models. In conclusion he 
argues for a more balanced ‘optimist conflict model’, which recognizes the tension between 
political mobilization and bureaucratic institutionalization, but is optimistic in that it 
recognizes the transformative potential of politics and reject that conflicts are a zero-sum 
game (Heller 2001). Referring to Heller (2001), Oldfield (2008), in examining local-level 
participatory mechanisms, mentions that formalization at the ward level might be necessary, 
acknowledging the dilemma that some standardized procedures are necessary for 
participation but can also undermine and discourage participation. 
 
Although this debate is essential, I am not foremost interested in which of these logics are 
more important, but rather in clarifying and discussing why and how they are relevant in the 
politics of negotiating organizational models in informal settlements. This requires further 
explanation of the theoretical perspective enabling an analysis of how organizations and 
leaders, who are essential actors in negotiations of the commons, form and apply different 
logics in relation to their institutional environment. 
 
2.5 Theorizing organizing and leaders: new-institutionalism and institutional 
pluralism 
In the following sections, I will explain the social constructive perspective in organization 
and leadership theories, and outline a framework of specific ideas I will apply to analyse the 
politics of leadership organizing. 
 
                                                 
20
 He argues that because participation can never be comprehensive…there is a need to routinize and formalize 
the process through which participatory inputs are translated into outputs; hence, the technical requirement for 
rules of transparency, accountability, representation and decisional authority. (Heller 2001:136). On the other 
hand, he also acknowledges that the technocratic rationality of bureaucracy fails because it suffers from a sense 
of rational mutability of the world, and hence some sorts of politics and grassroots democratic initiatives are 
essential (Heller 2001). 
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In order to enable an analysis of processes forming organizational practises, ideals, and 
models, basic theory will be borrowed from the developments of new-institutionalism within 
organizational sociology. Those unfamiliar with organizational theories might assume a focus 
on formal efficient management and ‘how to best organize’. In the 1800s and early 1900s, 
this was true, as scientific management and Taylorism was looking at how to maximize the 
efficiency of industrial organizations through technical and managerial means. However, 
since the Hawthorne experiments of the 1920-30s, organization theory took a humanistic 
turn, in that informality and informal organization was ‘discovered’ (Clegg et al. 2006: 76-
83). Since then, particularly institutional approaches to organizational studies, starring figures 
like Philip Selznick, gained dominance.  
 
2.5.1 New-institutionalism and the social construction of organizations and leaders  
Taking into account both internal and external social forces, institutional 
studies emphasize the adaptive change and evolution of organizational forms 
and practises… the most interesting and perceptive analysis of this type show 
the organization responding to a problem posed by its history, an adaptation 
significantly changing the role and character of the organization. Typically, 
institutional analysis sees legal or formal changes as recording and regularizing 
an evolution that has already been substantially completed informally  
(Selznick 1957:12) 
 
The focus on processes of organizational forms as emphasised by Selznick in this quote, has 
inspired the development of the very large theoretical field of new-institutionalism
21
. 
Basically, studies that fall under sociological new-institutionalism’, are concerned with 
analysing organizational and leadership practises and processes (Barley and Tolbert 1997, 
Pettigrew 1997, Czarniawska 2008a), logics (March and Olsen 1984, Friedland and Alford 
1991), and symbolical models and legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Dimaggio and 
Powell 1983). This implies an analytical focus on social construction, which also has been 
taken up in current leadership theories.   
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 I will not go into the vast debates on the difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutionalism here, neither the 
debates around the different variances of new-institutionalism.  It should however be noted that I will focus on 
sociological new-institutionalism, which differs from historical institutionalism and rational-choice (economic) 
institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). The advantage of sociological new-institutionalism is that it defines 
institutions broadly including not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the symbolic systems, cognitive 
scripts, an moral templates guiding human action, thereby breaking down the conceptual divide between 
‘institutions’ and ‘culture’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947).  
37 
 
The process focus 
The ‘process focus’ is often inspired by Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) classic The social 
construction of reality (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The fundamental idea is that institutions are 
socially constructed templates of action, generated and maintained through ongoing 
interaction, and that organizations are formed and informed by these institutions (Barley and 
Tolbert 1997). It is essential to understand the difference between the more tangible 
‘organizations’ like actual committees, and the vaguer ‘institutions’, which are not social 
units but can be seen as multifaceted social structures with significant symbolical values. 
Notably, institutions as a core concept of social science are often defined vaguely and imply 
different things in different disciplines. Czarniawska (2008b) notes the problem that this 
perspective on institutions diverges from the everyday meaning of the word, which often sees 
‘institution’ as a public administration organization. Similarly, Lowndes (2001) contends that 
such ‘vulgar institutionalism’ does not acknowledge the difference between institutions and 
organizations and that ‘weak ties’ can be as important as formal constitutions. To clarify this, 
institutions can be defined as multifaceted, durable social structures, made up of symbolic 
elements, social activities and material resources (Scott 2008:49). With this broad 
understanding common to sociological new-institutionalism, institutions can be both norms 
and rules, and are usually both more historically durable and less consciously ‘visible’ to 
humans than organizations. This is why bureaucracy and democracy can be seen as general 
institutions of society, while a specific unit like a specific government department is an 
organization. The institutional sides of this specific government department, can be seen in 
the discourses and logics applied which becomes visible in the choices of organizational 
models and procedures. This division between institutions and organizations is important 
because it enables an analysis of how organizations are formed in relation to institutions. 
When the institutional sides of an organization are studied, attention should be paid to how 
the organization has been influenced by history the social environment, how the organization 
adapts to centres of power, and how leadership justifies its existence ideologically (Selznick 
1957:6). A major focus of institutionalist organization studies is therefore to analyse logics 
behind organizational practices and the presentations of organizational models, and to link 
this to the institutions of the environment from which it has emerged. This suggests that 
institutions provide ‘logics’ that give guidelines, which organizations comply with in order to 
gain endorsement from important audiences and because logics provide a means of 
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understanding the social world and thus for acting confidently within it (Greenwood et al. 
2011:318).  
 
Legitimacy and the symbolic sides of organizing: the theories of decoupling and 
isomorphism  
By focusing on how organizations strive to adapt to the social world, the symbolical sides of 
organizations become central, especially for gaining legitimacy. The legitimacy focus in new-
institutional organization theory is often inspired by Weber, not only through his different 
authority types (traditional, charismatic and rational-legal)
22
 but also through his discussion 
of social practice being oriented to ‘maxims’ or rules, suggesting that legitimacy can result 
from conformity with both general social norms and formal laws  (Deephouse and Suchman 
2008).  
 
A central theory is that of ‘decoupling’; suggesting that those organizational models reflect 
the myths of their institutional environments to gain legitimacy instead of the demands of 
their work activities (Meyer and Rowan 1977)
23
. A related theory is that of ‘institutional 
isomorphism’ (Dimaggio and Powell 1983). Like many theorists of public administration, 
they are inspired by Weber (1968) theories of how bureaucratic forms of organizing are 
expanding in modern society and that this development is irreversible and hence becomes an 
‘iron cage’. Inspired this and by empirical observations, they are asking ‘why is there such a 
startling homogeneity of organizational forms and practises’, Dimaggio and Powell (1983) 
and argue that organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations in their 
field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful. The similarities further indicates 
that certain institutional logics are dominating modern society, and it is suggested that 
especially bureaucratic logics are major ideals that organizations model themselves after by 
implementing bureaucratic organizational models as ‘myths and ceremonies’ (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). This implies that organization models might reflect more the assumptions of 
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 See, amongst others, Etzioni-Halevey (1983:27-28), Scott (2008:13) for a discussion of Weber’s three ideal 
types, which notably are related to historical developments and were not claimed to exist in pure forms. Hence, 
when applied, the ideal forms are often misinterpreted. In African literature, the usage of the term neo-
patrimonial is arguably based on a misinterpretation of Weber, forgetting that he described legitimate types of 
authorities, not regimes (Pitcher et al. 2009).  
23
 Further explained, organizations are driven to incorporate the practises and procedures defined by prevailing 
rationalized concepts of organizational work and institutionalized in society. Organizations that do so increase 
their legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of the immediate efficacy of the acquired practises 
and procedures. Institutional products, services, techniques, polices, and programs function as powerful myths, 
and many organizations adopt them ceremonially (Meyer and Rowan 1977:41). 
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what is legitimate than the actual functions that the organization needs to carry out, and that 
organizations thus have both formal and informal sides (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Therefore, there is an essential ambiguity of organizational life, as organizations are 
strategically oriented entities assembled to carry out specific goals, but that their actions also 
are driven and influenced by sometimes more unconscious adaptations to the expectations of 
their institutional environment. It is this duality of organizing that McQuarrie and Marwell 
(2010) and Lowndes (2001, 2009) argue urban scholars have barely begun to grapple with.  
 
Leaders as socially constructed  
Leaders are, from this perspective, viewed less as ‘independent brokers and negotiators’, and 
more as influenced by surroundings, more specifically as socially constructed in relation to 
their institutional environment (March and Olsen 1984). Consequently, leadership and 
organizing cannot be explained starting with leadership itself. As discussed by Scott (2008), 
the institutional environment contains regulative elements, but also more ‘informal and 
invisible’ normative and cultural-cognitive elements, that provide frameworks in which 
action takes place - in this setting, for leaders acting publicly. Inspired both by new-
institutionalism and by Berger and Luckman (1967), theories and studies of the symbolic 
sides of leadership have emerged and developed into a segment of leadership literature 
(Fairhurst and Grant 2010, Denis et al. 2010). These studies also build on a critique of earlier 
analysis of leadership traits, styles and personalities
24
. Early accounts like Pettigrew (1997) 
are re-visited (Denis et al. 2010) and expanded with the turn towards a post-modern and 
constructive ontological idea of leadership, confronting the traditional more Cartesian 
epistemology of conventional leadership studies (Dachler and Hosking 1995, Hosking 2007). 
This ‘relational perspective’ contrasts the earlier ‘entity perspective’, which focused on 
leaders themselves (Uhl-Bien 2006). It views leadership as social reality, embedded in and 
inseparable from context (Dachler and Hosking 1995, Osborn et al. 2002) and studies how 
leaders and followers are mutually constituted and co-produced (Collinson 2005). With these 
as premises, leadership is analysed beyond notions of heroes or villains (Collinson 2005), and 
rather as process and practice (Parry and Bryman 2006, Uhl-Bien 2006, Crevani et al. 2010, 
Denis et al. 2010).  
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 See Parry and Bryman (2006) for an overview of leadership theory from the 1940s up until the social 
constructive turn in the 1980s.  
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Similar to the ambiguity of organizations, social constructive studies on leadership have 
indicated incoherence and tensions in leadership discourses and practise (Uhl-Bien 2006, 
Hoskins 2007). When leadership is understood as contextually situated and practically 
enacted, it is useful to analyse both discourses and properties of leadership practises in situ 
(Denis et al. 2012). In a much cited paper within this literature, Alvesson and Svenninsson’s 
(2003) inspiration from organizational literature - Foucaultian post-structuralism and 
discourse analysis - leads them to analyse the presentations of organizational models not as 
truths, but as ideals that contrast actual work practise. They thereby argue that leaders’ 
claimed value-preferences are weakly connected to the bulk of managerial work, and 
highlight the ambiguity of leadership discourses (Alvesson and Svenningsson 2003). Hence, 
the leader’s presentations adhere to discourses that do not always reflect the limitations of 
their practises. A focus on how leaders present themselves is also inspired by classical 
interpretive tradition in sociology. Goffman (1959) displays how any everyday social 
encounter can be seen as a theatre, where self-presentations are displayed that fit with certain 
values and norms perceived to be important
25
. Further, Goffman illustrates how especially 
urban dwellers presents self-defensive sides of themselves, not only through talk but also 
through the unspoken.  
 
Inspired by these literatures, I will outline how leaders present different forms of legitimacy 
and ideal organizational models, both in speech and practice. 
 
Implications: From rational-choice to symbolism of organizational models 
It has been noted that contemporary literature on political and economic organization in 
Africa is characterized by a retreat from institutional analysis into cultural and rational-choice 
theorizing (Meagher 2007). The main problem of a rational choice analysis, as discussed 
above, is that it leaves out how deeper normative and discursive social processes inform 
decision-making and action. With new-institutionalism as described above, the focus turns to 
how organizational practises and models are informed by and reflect institutional norms and 
discourses.   
                                                 
25
 Here it is interesting to note that Goffman’s works is often perceived as a precursor to post-modern sociology, 
and parallels between Goffman and Foucault in their perspectives on power has been pointed out (Jenkins 2008, 
Clegg et.al 2006:144-149). Building on Tom Burns’ writing of Goffman, it is acknowledges that Goffman and 
Foucault had much in common in respect of the normalization of order and the routine everyday ubiquity of 
power, in its mundane invisibility (Jenkins 2008:158).  
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Organizational practises and their historical institutionalization 
Generally, the focus on practises is promoted in urban southern theory. Simone’s (2010) 
vivid descriptions of everyday life in cities in the South highlight that the intense complexity 
of urban everyday life is followed by a human urge to create order and stability. This reminds 
of Whyte’s (1943) critique of ‘disorganization theories’, by indicating that complex and 
seemingly disorganized settings are not necessarily followed by disorganization, but rather by 
a multitude of fragmented attempts to create order. In line with contemporary urban theory 
inspired by postmodernism and embracing the richness of culture and identity formation 
taking place in cities (Hubbard 2006), scholars argue for taking ‘cityness’ seriously and 
improving our understanding of African urban life by examining such everyday practises, as 
fragmented and fluid social patchworks create crossroads and possibilities in the urban South 
(Pieterse 2008, Simone 2010, Myers 2011, Parnell and Robinson 2012). This is furthered in 
urban studies related to South Africa, where calls have been made for increased attention to 
actual everyday practise at the local level (Mbembe and Nuttall 2004, Robins et al. 2008, 
Pieterse 2010, Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldfield 2011, Meth 2012). It is related to the arguments 
that discussions of politics in African context should be brought back from the realm of the 
exotic by empirically describing everyday political processes on the ground (Hagman and 
Péclard 2010), and study how new forms of politics emerge in the urban South (Pieterse 
2008). 
 
I will in this thesis focus on practises related to organizing issues of the commons, where 
leaders and committees are central. In addition to my own empirical insights, some 
patchworks of organizational and leaderships practise are identified in local studies on South 
African townships and informal settlements. Ross (2010) indicates that ‘straight-talk’ 
denoting honest and confrontational practises are particularly valued. Criminological studies 
mention township security governance practises, which take forms as either vigilantism (Buur 
and Jensen 2004a, 2004b, Buur 2003, 2006), or community policing /court systems (Bruman 
and Schärf 1990, Schärf 2001, Seekings 2001, Shearing 2001, Dixon 2004, Froestad and 
Shearing 2012). These practises are rooted in moral ideas on how the commons should look 
like and are thereby deeply political. Social movement and development literature discuss 
practises of mobilizing and confronting or collaborating with the state (Oldfield 2000, 2002, 
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Oldfield and Stokke 2006). Some of these accounts will be drawn together and compared 
with my own insights in the analysis chapters.  
 
Further, practises that are applied because they are taken for granted rather than by rational 
choice, usually have historical roots. As highlighted in new-institutionalism, practices 
become normalized and hence institutionalized over time. Practices become ‘insitutionalised 
when they cannot simply ‘be removed’ as they now carry symbolic values, and people take 
them for granted as they become ‘traditions’ of ‘this is how we do things around here’. It is 
therefore important to understand the historical development of practices. This relates to a 
central argument posed by Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2012a, 2012b), that models are circulated 
historically before neo-liberal models were invented.  
 
The symbolical value of organizational models 
Applying institutionalised practises become important not only because they are useful 
directly, but also because they have values attached to them. Therefore, representing and 
portraying organizational models and ideals are significant to claim legitimacy.  As noted in 
section 2.2, there are a few informal settlement case studies that mention ‘surprisingly’ 
complex organizational models, with clear bureaucratic and democratic ideals (Barry et al. 
2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007). Yet, they do not analyse these models.  
 
Some indications of values of democratic models are mentioned in a few studies. Cherry 
(2000) argues that the symbolic identification with democratic systems are strong in 
townships, but that the people inside the civic structures describe the structures as highly 
democratic while those outside defined them as undemocratic and exclusive. Also, some 
historical roots to organizational models and logics are mentioned in the social movement 
literature. One explanation of democratic logics can be found in a note by Zuern (2011:75-
76), who links the importance of democratic models to pragmatically organizing a very large 
movement, and symbolically to contrast the anti-democratic apartheid regime and its indirect 
rule system of integrating traditional leaders. Besides these observations, I have found little 
explanations as to why certain organizational models are favoured and perceived as 
legitimate.  
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Summing up, new-institutionalism provides an analytical focus on how portrayals of 
organizational practises and models are reflections of contextual roots and history rather than 
being solely pragmatic. It provides a possibility to analyse how organizations and leaders are 
constructed in relation to their institutional environment. Furthermore, since the indications 
are that the institutional environment of informal settlements is a fragmented and fluid one, I 
will draw in recent literature on organizational responses to a pluralistic institutional setting. 
 
2.5.2 Institutional pluralism and the politics of negotiating logics  
Although still focused on western contexts, recent developments of new institutionalism have 
added value to understanding a more complex and fluid institutional field than that of stable 
organizations. These focus on the implications of institutional pluralism or complexity of 
organizations (Kraatz and Block 2008, Pache and Santos 2010, Greenwood et al. 2011, Yu 
2013). For an understanding of what institutional pluralism is, it is useful to first understand 
what it is not, that is, they are not ‘mature institutional fields’, which are signified by more 
stable priorities between logics, and thereby more stable organizations (Greenwood et al. 
2011). Compared to ‘mature’ fields, where priorities between logics are more likely to be 
stable, organizations face institutional complexity whenever they confront incompatible 
prescriptions from multiple institutional logics (Greenwood et al. 2011:318). Facing multiple 
institutional logics increase organizational instability, variations, conflicts and political 
negotiations. This is also reflected in social constructive leadership literature with the notion 
of ‘hybrid leadership’, implying that plural forms of leadership can co-exist in the same 
context (Gronn 2002). 
 
Towards regaining room for agency: Plural logics rather than isomorphism or 
decoupling 
As highlighted earlier, new-institutionalism poses a central critique of a rational-choice 
analysis. Actors are given limited ‘rational choice’ as they are adapting to what they believe 
is appropriate rather than what is calculated as efficient (March and Olsen 1989). Hence, in 
relation to the classical structure-agency problem
26
 of determining ‘where structural 
determination ends and power and responsibility begins’ (Clegg 1989:129), new-
institutionalism resembles structuration theory (Barley and Tolbert 1997) in that institutions 
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 The structure-agency problem can be related back to the ancient antinomy between freedom and control 
(Scott 2008:75) 
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provide frameworks for organizational behaviour, but organizations change these over time 
and thereby slowly modify institutions. However, a critique of new-institutionalism is that it 
moved too far into structural explanations, losing sight of possibilities of agency and power. 
Clegg et al. (2006) maintain that organization theory lost this focus on power after Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) and Dimaggio and Powell (1983) started analysing the similarities of 
organization models.  
 
In order to deal with the lack of power and agency, the focus on logics has received renewed 
attention. What can be termed the ‘institutional logic perspective’ is distinguished from new-
institutional theory by emphasising the partial autonomy of actors over social structures 
(Thornton et al. 2012). It was introduced by Friedland and Alford (1991) to analyse how the 
inherently contradictory institutional orders of capitalism, state bureaucracy and political 
democracy shape how individuals engage in political struggles (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). 
Institutional logics are defined as ‘the socially constructed, historical pattern of material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce 
their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social 
reality’ (Thonton and Ocasio 1999: 804). In a simplified version, institutional logics may be 
understood as practises, beliefs and rules guiding an institutional order and providing actors 
with vocabularies of motive and a sense of self (Yu 2013:106). The room for agency is 
apparent - a plural institutional field opens up for moving between structures and adapting 
multitudes of logics, and politics develop around questions of which logics to adhere to.  
 
The regaining of agency in institutionalism is perhaps best formulated in the critiques of 
decoupling and isomorphism theories (Lounsbury 2008, Thornton and Ocasio 2008, Kraatz 
and Block 2008, Pahce and Santos 2010, Greenwood et al. 2011, Thornton et al. 2012). 
Thornton and Ocasio (2008:100) argue that, while sharing concern with isomorphism and 
how cultural rules and cognitive structures influences organizational structures, the 
institutional logics approach differs from classical new-institutionalism in that it focuses on 
the effect of differentiated institutional logics on individuals and organizations in a larger 
variety of contexts. Basically, when assuming a plurality of institutional logics, isomorphism 
becomes more complicated, as it becomes hard to determine exactly what institutional logic 
dominates. 
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Similarly, against decoupling theory, hybrid organizations, which, as defined by Scott (2008) 
are able to integrate logics in unprecedented ways, respond to permanently competing logics 
and can have coexisting practises linked to different logics (Pahce and Santos 2010. In other 
words, contrary to the idea of decoupling which argues that some organizational models are 
only applied as symbolical myths and are not useful for organizational practice (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977), the critique raises the point that organizations balance several models that can 
be pragmatically applied in different ways. Kraatz and Block (2008) stress that decoupling 
theories must be based on assumptions of what the ‘core’ of an organization is in order to 
determine if something is decoupled. The problem is that it is hard to find such a core in 
organizations facing plural logics.  
 
These attempts to bring back a stronger focus on agency are particularly relevant in a context 
of institutional complexity, like in informal settlements. By discussing how community 
leaders manoeuvre between different institutional logics, room for agency can be indicated in 
addition to the structural constraints. Adopting an approach that recognizes structuring effects 
without losing sight of the possibilities of agency is acknowledged as a central challenge in 
urban African literature as well (Pieterse 2008). Pieterse contends that the challenge is to 
adopt an approach that recognizes the structuring effect of the economy, bureaucracy and 
discursive diagrams of power without relinquishing an appreciation for agency (Pieterse 
2008:85)
27
. In the case of informal settlements leaders,  the question of where structural 
determination ends and power and responsibility begins’ (Clegg 1989) can be posed by 
asking to what degree the leaders and their committees are structural results of e.g. 
traditionalism, apartheid structures and neo-liberalism, and to what degree and in what 
situations the leaders manoeuvre actively between these.  
 
Legitimacy politics 
Several recent studies have applied the plural logics perspective to analyse the politics of 
conflicting logics that emerge when several organizational models might be seen as 
legitimate, in other words ‘legitimacy politics’ (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 
                                                 
27
 Similar arguments are also made in some South African literature: With reference to Cooke and Kothari’s 
(2001) critique of the lack of power and politics in participatory oriented research, Sinwell (2008) suggests 
applying structuration theory by Giddens to understand the interrelationship between people’s resistance and 
domesticating structures. Also Dwyer (2006) mentions structuration theory as one way of overcoming the 
structure-agency binary in social movement theory. Stokke and Oldfield (2004) rely on Bourdieu’s concept of 
power and define politics as a symbolic struggle to define existing power relations and legitimacy. 
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2009, Pache and Santos 2010, Yu 2013). In accounts on organizations facing a plural 
institutional environment, it is popular to draw on the argument that  
 
…some of the most important struggles between groups, organisations and 
classes are over the appropriate relationship between institutions, and by which 
institutional logic different activities would be regulated and to which 
categories of persons they apply (Friedland and Alford 1991:256).  
 
Thereby, politics emerge around negotiation around which institutional logics to adapt to. In 
recent studies on organizational responses to pluralism, this focus on contradicting 
institutional logics has become popular to draw on when analysing the politics of plural 
logics (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Pache and Santos 2010, Yu 
2013).  
 
This is particularly relevant to analysing the politics of leadership organizing. Revisiting 
Selznick’s (1957) work Leadership in Administration, Kraatz (2009) analyses how situations 
of pluralism will require organizational actors, especially leaders, to carry out integrative, 
adaptive and developmental work. In other words, it becomes central for leaders in an 
institutional complex setting to negotiate and mediate different logics. This does not only 
give room for agency to the leaders to draw on certain logics at certain times, but also 
increases the possibilities for confrontations and tension towards these leaders as there is 
likely to be other preferences of which logics to adapt. It can thereby lead to ‘legitimacy 
politics’ that emerge when several models might be seen as legitimate (Stryker 2000, Kraatz 
and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013). Importantly, such politics is not zero-sum game, but 
a generative process through which organizations adapt to changing conditions (Yu 2013). 
The organizations can be seen as open systems that change and adapt to different institutions, 
and analysing tensions around competing organizational models thereby gives insight into 
everyday politics of informal settlement leadership. 
 
Implications: Beyond decoupling – the politics of balancing multiple logics  
Adhering to the framework of institutional pluralism provides some advantages for the 
analyses in this thesis, because it fits better with the fluid and fragmented context of informal 
settlements. There are several indications that the setting of informal settlement organizing is 
one of ‘institutional complexity’. As outlined earlier, the most frequent used concepts 
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describing informal settlement life and organizing are ‘fluidity, fragility and fragmentation’. 
It is stated that informal settlements contain a variety of community organizations, which 
make use of a variety of strategies (Oldfield and Stokke 2006, 2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007, 
Millstein 2008). In cases studies comparing informal settlements, both Xaba (1994) and 
Oldfield (2000) conclude that the form of the leadership and particularly the way they engage 
with government organizations varies. Oldfield (2002) highlights the fragility and fluidity of 
community governance, specifically the fragile character of relationships between leadership, 
residents and the capacity of community organizations to mobilize. Lastly, institutional 
complexity is indicated when Skuse and Cousins (2007) mention that the committee practises 
are a bricolage of discursive practises – new and old strategies and practises. This fluidity, 
fragility, fragmentation and bricolage of practises indicate that there are several institutional 
logics which impacts on organizing strategies, practises and models. Last but not at least, it 
fits with Bank’s (2011) portrayal of how urban township dwellers possess multiple and 
hybrid identities, which have developed into own forms with a different meaning. It is in line 
with contemporary southern urbanism literature that acknowledges the multiple rationalities 
(Pieterse 2010, Myers 2011) and flexible identities (Robins 2002a, Robins 2008, Bank 2011) 
of urban dwellers.  
 
The relevance of analysing plural institutional logics: acknowledging plural urban 
identities 
Further, the notion of plural institutional logics, which confront assumptions of decoupling, 
enables an analysis of multiple identities.  
 
First, analysing plural institutional logics is relevant in relation to the anti-exoticism debate, 
specifically to steer away from exotic portrayals of African communities as predominantly 
traditionalist or ethnic (Pitcher et al. 2009, Comaroff and Comarroff 2009). A few accounts 
of informal settlement politics focus on ethnicity, traditionalism and kinship (Nustad 2004, 
Watson 2003, 2009, Meth 2013). Traditional authority is manifested in the significance of 
witchdoctors / sangomas within politics (Meth 2012), and by the prevalence of ‘traditional 
leaders’ (Watson 2003). Based on assumptions that residents migrate from rural areas,  
Nustad  argues  - based on research in a large informal settlement in the mid-1990s - that the 
leadership resembles more a ‘traditional ideal type’ than a legal-rational in the terms of 
Weber’s ideal types (Nustad 2004:52-55). Watson (2003) draws on a Weberian framework 
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and places informal settlement leadership within ‘traditional legitimacy’ and its specific 
African modification of ‘neo-patrimonialism’. This is connected to the idea of the 
continuation of the rural in the urban in Africa (Mamdani 1996). However, empirical studies 
have shown that kinship ties in township areas are weakened (Harper and Seekings 2010) and 
that neighbours seem to be more important than kinship networks (Ross 1996, 2003, 2010). 
Robins (2008) agrees that patrimonial and authoritarian styles of politics continue, especially 
related to struggles over housing, but highlight that these are not timeless neo-traditionalist 
political discourses, but rather reproduced or hybrid forms related to the conditions of deep 
poverty. There are also specific critiques of the exoticism of focusing on ethnic traditionalism 
(Robins 2002a, Comaroff and Comaroff 2009, Bank 2011). Bank (2011) explains that the 
focus on ‘ruralness’ and kinship in South African townships is linked to the influential work 
by Mayer and Mayer’s Townsmen and Tribesmen from 1961, which emerged in a period 
where it was popular to critique Wirth’s (1938) ideas on urbanism as defined by a weakening 
of kinship bonds. What Mayer and Mayer neglected when focusing on the continuation of the 
traditional in the urban was the multiple identities and specific adaptations of urban identities 
of township residents (Bank 2011). Such multiple identities are reflected in the multiple and 
sometimes paradoxical political practises of informal settlement residents. Bank (2011) 
further counters the ‘myth of ruralness’ by highlighting that the emergence of cosmopolitan 
culture in an East London township is more than simple imitation or mimicry of western 
cultural forms; rather, this culture shows how western cultural forms were absorbed and 
culturally appropriated. I believe that portrayals of legitimacy, which are strongly culturally 
related, can be analysed in similar manners; in other words culturally appropriated rather than 
simple imitations.  
 
Secondly, the notion of co-existing plural institutional logics is relevant to steer away from 
‘polemic understandings’ of communities in relation to the state (Stokke and Oldfield 2007). 
Illustrative here is Watson’s (2009) ‘clash of rationalities’ between techno-managerial 
government administrators and a marginalized urban population surviving under conditions 
of informality. The conflict of rationalities Watson suggests is between the logic of governing 
and the logic of survival (Watson 2009). Although Watson acknowledges that rationalities 
are diverse and overlapping, the idea of a clash of rationalities does imply a dualism or a 
‘polemic’ understanding of state versus society (Stokke and Oldfield 2007), and can lead to a 
simplification of rationalities drawn on by the urban poor. Hence, logics besides survival 
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might be analysed as simple attempts of mimicking or results of co-optation. Contrasting this, 
it is noted that even communities that are less connected to state rule establish their own laws 
and rules, which remarkably often are similar to state laws and institutions (Schärf and Nina 
2001). Additionally, Robins (2008: 166-167) disagrees with the ‘clash of rationalities’ ideas, 
as informal settlement residents are capable of switching identities and repertoires. Together, 
this brings attention to my argument that the bureaucratic and democratic models presented 
by informal settlement leaders might reflect parts of their repertoires rather than being results 
of co-optation or mimicking. Mimicking can in the language of institutionalism theories can 
be related to decoupling. The critique of decoupling as outlined above can be brought in to 
complicate the assumptions of mimicking, refocusing the attention to the intertwining of 
different forms of rationality and the balancing of plural logics (Lounsbury and Carberry 
2005).  
 
Summing up, adhering to the premise of multiple rationalities and drawing on literature that 
acknowledges ambiguity as central in organizations and leadership, allows an analysis of 
presentations of plural and conflicting ways in which of informal settlement leaders negotiate 
and balance different logics, and the politics that revolves around this balancing.  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have pointed out the lack of analysing organizational models in informal 
settlements, and elaborated on a framework, inspired by new-institutionalism and institutional 
pluralism, that enables an analysis that contributes to closing this gap. 
 
I have started by outlining relevant contextual literature that highlight the fragile and 
fragmented conditions of informal settlement politics, and outlined how this is reflected in 
specific accounts on informal settlement politics and leadership. This has led me to identify 
the gap in the analysing of the contextual meanings of certain organizational models in 
informal settlements, and the politics around negotiating these models. Some steps towards 
narrowing this gap have been identified, particularly the notions of community politics 
(Katsaura 2012), hybrid discursive practises in informal settlements (Skuse and Cousins 
2007), and the circulation of organizational practises (Bénit-Gbaffou et.al 2012b). Thereafter, 
I have raised the point that an instrumentalist focus on informal settlement politics and 
leadership might be related to the dominance of both neo-liberalist and neo-Marxian 
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perspectives, and introduced the new-institutionalist inspired framework that is suggested to 
be relevant to urban studies (Lowndes 2001, 2009, McQuarrie and Marwell 2010).  
 
The main focus in this chapter has been on explaining this theoretical framework, relating it 
to a critical discussion of how politics, organizing and leadership is regularly analysed in SA 
urban theory. Simply put, the process and social constructive approach that is essential in 
new-intuitionalism provides a focus on how leadership and organizations develop in relation 
to institutional environments. 
 
First, the discussion on perspectives on politics has shown that a problem in SA urban 
literature is an arena and economy-focused portrayals of politics as a resource fight. With the 
arena focus, ‘politics’ and ‘everyday’ is rather divided; while social movement and 
development scholars relate politics to the arena of the state, ethnographers describe everyday 
life processes. Perceiving politics as a process of negotiating common concerns (Arendt 
1958, Villa 1992) allows for including the political effects of everyday practises and norms, 
and enables analysing internal negotiations of organizational and leadership models as 
political (March and Olsen 1984). Further, as I am particularly interested in the politics of 
portraying bureaucratic and democratic organizing models, some tensions between these 
logics – the pragmatic efficiency of bureaucratic versus the deliberative values of democratic 
logics (Peters 2010) - have been highlighted.  
 
Secondly, I have discussed how new-institutionalism and institutional pluralism enables an 
examination of organizations beyond instrumental, and leaders beyond heroes or villains. 
Particularly useful is perceiving organizations and leaders as socially constructed in relation 
to institutionalized practises rather than solely outcome generation entities (Czarniawska 
2008a), ambiguities of pragmatic and symbolical sides of organizing (Scott 2008), and the 
tensions that emerge when balancing plural institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). 
This refocuses the analysis towards the symbolical sides of organizing and how leaders 
portray specific democratic and bureaucratic logics in order to adapt to contextual ideals of 
legitimacy. Further, the notion of an institutionally complex setting frames the balancing of 
logics as ‘legitimacy politics’ (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013), 
which is useful for examining the tensions between bureaucratic and democratic logics. 
When analysing committee conflicts, it refocuses the analysis from assumptions that conflicts 
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are induced by interventions towards seeing them as emerging in institutional fields, signified 
by plurality. 
 
This broad social constructive perspective on organizing and leadership framework will in the 
following analysis chapters be applied by analysing certain aspects of informal settlement 
committee organizing and politics. Notably, this perspective has also many shortcomings, 
amongst others that it does not allow for measuring degrees of representation and legitimacy.  
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CHAPTER 3 Specifying the empirical gap and outlining historical roots of 
informal settlement committees  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will specify the empirical gap of analysing leadership and committees at the 
informal settlement scale, and outline the historical roots of such leaders and committees, 
based on a literature review.  
 
The constant referral to ‘committees’ and ‘community leaders’ caught my interest early in the 
research, both in empirical encounters and in reviewing informal settlement case studies 
secondary data, like reports and news articles. Reviewing contextual literature, I found many 
studies on organizing and leadership of social movements and of the ward committee system, 
but little on organizing and leadership internally in informal settlements. As noted by Meth 
(2012), this is a gap in the literature as much attention has been given to the ward scale but 
less to local political practise below the scale of ward committees. Hence, I start by clarifying 
this empirical gap. This includes outlining how informal settlements in South African cities 
often are islands of informal pockets within townships, and discussing how the committees 
and leaders in these settlements can be seen as one scale below ward councils  
 
After these clarifications I outline relevant historical accounts which give a fundament for 
understanding why there are committees and leaders at this scale. They are mentioned in 
three bodies of literature, which indicate three different roots of the emergence of informal 
settlement committees and leaders: First, studies of security and crime in townships / 
informal settlements indicate the organizing of community policing and justice committees; 
secondly studies of the township-based liberation movements indicate the organizing of street 
committees in relation to social movements networks; and thirdly studies of development and 
planning initiatives indicate the instalment of committees by external actors.  
 
The focus on historical roots is based on a major theoretical premise in this thesis: that 
organizing logics, practises and models are embedded in taken-for-granted and historically 
institutionalised practises. Drawing on the fundamental idea in new-institutionalism that 
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organizational practises can become institutionalized over time (Selznick 1957, Scott 2008), 
the historical component is important, as institutions do not emerge in a vacuum; they always 
challenge, borrow from, and, to varying degrees, displace other institutions (Scott 2008:95). 
The importance of historically institutionalized practises are also reflected in accounts on 
South African urban politics, which underscore that local power dynamics take their own 
forms, building on historical roots before neoliberal policies were instituted (Bénit-Gbaffou et 
al. (2012a, 2012b).  
 
3.2 The empirical gap: leaders and committees at the informal settlement scale 
The empirical research gap in this thesis is specified to examining politics, organizing and 
leadership within the specific neighbourhoods of informal settlements.  
 
As specific neighbourhoods, informal settlements are one scale below townships, often 
located within townships. Townships cover larger areas and consist mostly of small 
government-built houses (referred to as matchbox houses), and informal settlements are 
pockets of occupied land between the housing areas. In other words, in South African cities, 
informal settlements are formed in smaller pockets of urban land adjacent to core formal 
areas (Abbot 2004:193). In Cape Town, there are approximately 300 informal settlements, 
and most of these are located within the townships of the ‘Cape Flats‘. An informal 
settlement can be seen as a political neighbourhood unit where politics plays out, as it is 
divided by clear borders from the neighbouring formalized areas, has its own name and own 
leaders or committees, which may compete or collaborate with each other. The leaders and 
committees are therefore neighbourhood-specific organizations dealing with issues within the 
borders of its neighbourhood, and not interest-specific organizations, like social movements 
that aim at changing issues at higher scales like state law, government practises etc. On the 
other hand, informal settlements are not segregated islands (Abbott 2004) as they are 
informed and affected by local and national politics and policy. 
 
Although much research has investigated informal settlements, especially when becoming 
‘formalized’ through upgrading to formal housing areas28, little research has focused on the 
                                                 
28
 For such case studies, see Morris and Hindson 1994, Adler 1994, Barry and Mayson 2000, Allison 2002, 
Oldfield 2000, 2002, Robins 2002b, Bénit 2002, Huchzermeyer 2002, Barry 2006, Cross 2006, Barry et al. 
2007, Bähre 2007a, Lemanski 2008, Lizarralde and Massyn 2008, Oldfield and Zweig 2010. 
54 
 
politics of organizing and leadership itself. Instead, the topics of politics, organizing and 
leadership are mostly examined in studies of established government-related organizations or 
social movements. In urban South African politics, the relatively new decentralized local 
government system has received much attention, which consist of ward councillors of a 
number of adjoining wards represented in the sub-council areas, along with proportional 
representative councillors (Cameron 2005). How this system actually works, and to what 
degree decentralization has enabled civil participation is a significant area of evaluative 
research (Bénit-Gbaffou 2008a, 2011), and particularly ward councils are often critiqued for 
being dysfunctional
29
. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the aim is to add to the closing 
of the suggested empirical gap of examining political practise at the scales below and above 
the ward committees (Meth 2012). Informal settlement leadership, in relation to other local 
political structures, are below the ward councils. They are not ‘formally acknowledged’ parts 
of local government (see figure 1). This needs some specification. Although informal 
settlement leaders or committees are not simply established in relation to the government 
setup, it is useful to briefly explain how they fit into the broader organizational situation of 
the local government structure in Cape Town. The organizational map explains the formal 
chain of communication between citizens and local government: 
 
                                                 
29
 Most studies of ward committees have displayed their dysfunctionality especially in low-income 
neighbourhoods, the main reasons being that the ward committees are not operative and a lack of attendance at 
meetings, that the role and power of ward councilors is unclear, and partisan politics (Buccus and Hicks 2008, 
Oldfield 2008, Bénit-Gbaffou 2008a, Piper and Deacon 2008, Staniland 2008, Esau 2008, Sinwell 2009). The 
Ward system is often seen as an obstacle to enhanced participation and other venues for participation at the 
neighbourhood level might be more significant (Oldfield 2008). Decentralization does not necessarily create 
greater accountability, and multi layers of politics can paradoxically disempower the most deprived ones (Bénit-
Gbaffu 2011). On the other hand, it can also be questioned if practises of local participation are side-lining 
governmental participatory channels like the ward council (Bénit Gbaffou 2008a).  
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Figure 1: CoCT’s model of how the city council works in relation to the citizen. This Figure on how the resident 
‘fits in’ is presented on the City of Cape Town’s web pages (CoCT online 2014) 
 
 
This model displays the outcome of the decentralization process with the turn to democracy. 
Informal settlement leaders are relevant in relation to the categories ‘resident’, ‘community- 
based organization’, ‘ward committees’ and ‘wards’.   
 
The model (Figure 1) displays that the first step for a resident is to engage with CBOs, which 
are defined on CoCT’s web page that provides information about the Council: 
 
Community based organizations (CBOs) are voluntary associations 
representing common interests. They are very important to the City for 
communication and consultation purposes. Each subcouncil maintains a 
database of CBOs in its own area. CBOs should regularly re-register so 
information about them is as accurate as possible. They must also ensure that 
they are regularly mandated to speak on behalf of their communities. 
(CoCT online 2014: Community based organizations) 
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The informal settlement committees could fall into the category of CBOs. Notably, the last 
sentence in this definition is particularly interesting: that ‘they must ensure they are mandated 
to speak on behalf of their communities’. It is questionable if ensuring such a mandate is 
possible in the case of informal settlement committees.   
 
The next step, as displayed in Figure 1, is for the CBOs to engage with Ward committees, 
which report and advice the democratically elected Ward councillor. Notably, the 
administrative organizing of local government though sub and wards councils cuts across the 
townships, and each ward council often has to relate to several informal settlements, all of 
which are at times competing for resources and the ward councillors attention.  
 
Further, organizational maps are always a simplification of a more complex and informal 
situation, and often act more as symbols than ‘reality’. The categories are fluid as individuals 
move in between these or can even take up positions in several of these at the same time. 
Also, the chain of arrows is not consistent; departments often negotiate directly with CBOs 
and committee leaders, thereby skipping the Ward and subcouncils. Leaders and committees 
can engage with this channel but also access local government more directly, either through 
independent NGOs or social movements or through political parties. This might be due to the 
fact that the ward committees do not always operate, and each councillor can decide whether 
to take up issues brought to them by the civics (Staniland 2008). On the other hand, ward 
councillors often make use of committees and leaders in informal settlements to, e.g. hand 
out food parcels, and since these practices are not regulated there is no way of monitoring if 
this is done fairly, creating opportunities for these leaders to act as gatekeepers (Staniland 
2008).  
 
With these specifications of the empirical gap – investigating the politics of leadership 
organizing at the informal settlement scale - I will now bring together different contextual 
literature, which provides some fundamental indications as to why there are committees and 
leaders at this scale. 
 
3.3 Three historical roots of committees and leaders in informal settlements 
Certainly, ‘community organizing’ happens in all communities and throughout history, and it 
has been noted that civic organizing in SA has deep roots, dating back to the 1880s (Bundy 
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2000). I will not go that far back in time, but look into literature that mentions committees 
(including the more specific ‘street committees’, and ‘community leaders’) in South African 
townships and informal settlements. 
I have found three groups of literature with different theoretical orientations, which, although 
never the main topic, do give indications of how and why leaders and committees have 
formed in informal settlements: 1) The need to organize security mechanisms that have 
emerged since the early beginnings of informal settlements in South Africa (Burman and 
Schärf 1990, Schärf 2001, Shearing 2001, Seekings 2001, Buur 2003, 2006, Buur and Jensen 
2004a, 2004b, Dixon 2004, Froestad and Shearing 2012): 2) the urge to join social 
movements especially during the fight against apartheid (Zuern 2011, Adler and Steinberg 
2000, Seekings 2000, Cherry 2000): and 3) increased government and other external 
involvement especially in the post-apartheid period (Lemanski 2008, Bähre 2007a, Staniland 
2008, Bénit 2002). The three roots are analysed in different bodies of literature – 
criminology, social movement literature and development and planning literature. Each of 
these three literatures are important for different theoretical developments, but for emergence 
of leaders and committees at the informal settlement scale, it is necessary to draw them 
together.  
 
3.3.1 Formation of policing and justice committees  
Early historical descriptions of informal settlements often mention community security 
committees or community policing committees (Kiewiet and Weichel 1980, Cole 1987, 
Burman and Schärf 1990). Historically, variances of community policing have been observed 
in townships since the 1940s (Schärf and Nina 2001)
30
. Occurrences of community policing 
are related to government’s approach to informal settlements:  On the one hand, government 
strictly and harshly controlled informal settlement in relation to the rest of the city
31
, and on 
the other hand, residents experienced a neglect of government attention to security issue 
                                                 
30
For an overview over historical developments of community policing in South African townships, see 
Seekings (2001) and Schärf (2001). 
31
 In 1948 a series of raids initiated to arrest the ‘illegal’ Africans, and the following decade informal settlements 
were confronted by a state determined to gain control over the settlements (Cole 1987). Controlled squatter 
camps’ were introduced as a more indirect form of social control in the 1950s, related to the ‘Prevention of 
Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 (Cole 1987:6). The apartheid interventions under the 1951 act consisted of 
evictions, the mandating of municipalities and land owners to institute eviction proceedings, forced relocation 
to controlled transit camps, active control over informal settlements and criminalization of land invasion 
(Huchzermeyer 2010:133). Such interventions continued throughout the apartheid era. Notably, Huchzermeyer 
(2010:133) argues that while reversed in the Housing Act of 1997, all of these interventions have since found 
their way back into practice.   
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within the settlements. Due to this neglect and residents worries, residents organized their 
own security mechanisms. The different manifestations of more or less organized practises of 
dealing with crime have in common a logic of taking security and order matters into their 
own hands, as this is not provided by the state. Similarly to how vigilantism can be seen as 
filling a gap that the state is not able or willing to fill (Buur 2006) or as a form of insurgency 
(Meth 2010), the organizing of security through community courts and street committees in 
townships are often explained as ‘non-state forms of ordering’ or (Nina and Schärf 2001, 
Burman and Schärf 1990, Schärf 2001, Shearing 2001) or ‘extra state initiatives’ (Seekings 
2001). Further, the line between community policing and vigilantism is often blurred, as they 
intersect and sometimes are continuations of each other (Buur and Jensen 2004b).  
 
Particularly interesting are the described ‘street committees’ and ‘community courts’, which 
can be characterised as monitoring and mediating organizations. Community courts can be 
traced back to traditional structures institutionalized under the colonial system of indirect 
rule
32
, and were part of an array of social support and control mechanisms created by 
community members, like informal banks and insurance schemes, lotteries, and alternative 
medico-spiritual health systems (Schärf 2001). They functioned as subsidiary forms of local 
government, coexisting along formal apartheid authorities, and spread from the rural areas 
with the arrival of the first magistrates, to townships and informal settlements across South 
Africa since the urbanization in the late 19th century (Burman and Schärf 1990). The rural 
and more traditional roots, however, diminished with the social movements confronting 
apartheid in the 1980s, taking over the street committees and community courts (Seekings 
2001). While community courts had the function of settling local disputes and collecting 
funds for specific community needs, street committees - ‘homeguards’ - acted as a 
community police (Cole 1987:18-19). Schärf describes the typical pattern of a street 
committee:  
 
Usually they have membership of 50 to 150 households (neighbours), from this 
membership the committee members are elected and meet at weekends, the 
rules are ‘common-sensial’, and there are no costs involved. They patrol the 
streets at night to keep order, settle cases of disputes between neighbours 
emphasising discussion and education.  
(Schärf 2001:45) 
                                                 
32
This will be further discussed in chapter 7.  For a comprehensive discussion on indirect rule described as 
‘decentralized despotism’, see Mamdani (1996). 
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Elaborating on the organizational model, Burman and Schärf (1990: 706) define street 
committees as ‘the lowest level of a loosely constituted three-tiered system of informal local 
rule in the townships’, and affirm that they, with few exceptions, are found in all the 
established townships and informal settlements in Cape Town. 
 
Importantly, community security initiatives have constantly been reshaped and redefined, 
both in relation to state policies and the political agendas of local leaders (Bénit-Gbaffou et 
al. 2012b:947). Sometimes, security practices of neighbourhood watches have materialized 
into more formal networks of ‘Community Policing Forums’ (CPFs), which are directly and 
formally connected to the police
33
.  
 
3.3.2 Formation of street committee networks though anti-apartheid social movements 
A second body of literature that mentions informal settlement committees and ‘street 
committees’ is linked to the time of township resistance movements towards the apartheid 
system, which led to massive organizational networks, especially in the turbulent 1980s. In 
South African social movement literature, street committees are described as being formed as 
result of the mobilizing and protests against the apartheid state (Zuern 2011, Adler and 
Steinberg 2000, Seekings 2000, Cherry 2000). It is argued that this new organizational model 
revolutionized civic action, as street committees became the key to civic strength in the mid-
1980s, and that the networks behind the mobilizing and the protests were street committees 
(Zuern 2011:74). These are described as a three-tiered network: At the micro level, each 
township street would form a committee, while the second tier was constituted by an area 
committee, and a local structure of the civics would constitute the township’s highest 
representative forum
34
 (Adler and Steinberg 2000). Pragmatically, this form was taken due to 
two needs: the need to keep the organization underground and the need to keep lines of 
contacts open (Zuern 2011). Cherry describes how the street committees were geographically 
                                                 
33
 For more on Community Policing Forums see Dixon (2004). 
34
 There are some different understandings of exactly how these organizational modes emerged. The name 
‘Matthew Goniwe’ comes up as the activist who pioneered street and area committees in the Eastern Cape town 
of Cradock in 1983-84 (Adler and Steinberg 2000:7, Seekings 2000:70, Cherry 2000:93, Zuern 2011:74). In 
these accounts, it was Goniwe who organized the three-tierd network. In another account, Bank (2011:193) 
notes that: Mayekiso and his associates created the spatial architecture for civic organization, where the yard 
was a building block on which township organization was built. The creation of yard committees as the bottom 
rung of a spatial hierarchy of organization, which included street committees, area committees, branch 
committees and ultimately a central committee, proved to be a crucial organizational innovation in the struggle 
politics of the 1980s. 
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rather than organizationally defined, and the process of establishing committees was carried 
out in a seemingly inclusive manner though mass meetings: 
 
Leadership made calls at rallies for the structures to be set up and activists in each area 
played a crucial role in setting up the structures. A general meeting would be called in 
an area and at this meeting a core group of volunteers would be formed. They would 
then go around to each street, assisting in the formation of committees by calling 
meetings of all residents in a particular street. At the street meeting, the residents 
would elect a committee of between nine and twelve members.  
(Cherry 2000:93)  
 
With the transition to democracy and the decline of street committee structures under 
SANCO (Seekings 2011), it might be that argued that such mobilizing also declined. 
However, Staniland (2008), who accredits SANCO for organizing a hierarchy of street 
committees, notes that they are still evident in many townships, and he explains the structure 
in-depth: 
 
In Guguletu SANCO is organised geographically around defined territories, 
which link together in a hierarchical fashion. At the lowest level exist the area 
committees, which are comprised of the street committees and residents of 
approximately five streets. In turn these area committees send representatives 
to their SANCO branch of which there are four in Guguletu. These branches 
also on occasion call public meetings. These then link into, and report to, 
regional and then national SANCO structures. Each of these structures has an 
executive committee which is theoretically elected at regular intervals. SANCO 
operates as an umbrella body for the street committees, to which disputes and 
complaints are referred if they cannot be resolved at the local level  
(Stainland 2008:38). 
 
This detailed description is similar to the street committees linked to security as described by 
Schärf (2001) above.  
 
Notably, both loose notions of street committees and practises of mobilising residents against 
external threats like evictions or to join social movement protests continue to be prominent in 
informal settlement life. Protests actions continue today, more directed towards state service 
delivery (Alexander 2010). Some of these are small, and risk becoming trivialized as 
‘popcorn protests’, which, compared to more large-scale mass movements, suddenly pop up 
and immediately die down (Bond 2005).  
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3.3.3 Post-apartheid instalments of committees and leaders by externals 
I perceived a third root of the creation of leaders and committees as establishments of  
externals who intervene in the settlements. Informal settlements as low-income 
neighbourhoods have always gained attention and a variety of organized external actors have 
intervened. However, with the advent of democracy and the dominance of the collaborative 
governance and participation discourses, there have been increased interventions by a variety 
of ‘externals’, like local government departments, local, national or international NGOs, 
CBOs or political parties. There is sometimes a confusing myriad of actors involved in 
informal settlements, who act, or wish to act, as ‘intermediaries’ between informal 
settlements and local government. Further, different external actors often establish leaders 
and committees when they engage with informal settlements. 
 
First of all, government involvement is significant. Notably, Thorn and Oldfield (2011) 
highlight that informal settlements experience multiple faces of the state: the political through 
linkages with politicians, the bureaucratic though local government departments, and law 
enforcers or the court.  
 
The bureaucratic side is specifically experienced through local government departments that 
are involved in service delivery, like installing toilets (flush- or chemical toilet, sewage 
collection, waste collection, and access to water taps
35
. This is linked to the changes in 
policies towards informal settlements towards more ‘participatory’ approaches. As local 
governments gained responsibilities for securing housing rights for informal settlement 
residents
36
 and / or installing drainage, toilets, and in some cases electricity, a new mode of 
interaction emerged. The ‘Informal Settlement Upgrading Programme’ of 2004, as a part of 
the national housing policy, represented a new paradigm where in situ upgrading was stressed 
as more responsive to poverty and vulnerability than relocation (Huchzermeyer 2006). 
Related to this, increased intervention and, in line with the broader ideals of ‘deepening 
democracy’ through decentralization (Ballard 2008), measures are taken to increase 
                                                 
35
 Departments involved include Roads and Stormwater (cleaning drains), Water and Sanitation, Solid Waste 
Management, Informal Settlement Department and Anti Land Invasion Unit 
36
 The new Constitution recognized housing as a human right (Huchzermeyer 2010), and states ‘adequate 
housing’ as a right for all its citizens, the realization of which is defined as a responsibility of the state (The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996). In 2004, the ‘Breaking new Ground’ policy paper as part of 
the housing Informal Settlement Upgrading Programme emerged, which made South Africa one of the few 
countries that developed a national policy on informal settlement upgrading in response to international 
campaigns (Huchzermeyer 2004, Huchzermeyer  and Karam 2006, Graham 2006). 
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participation and interaction between local government departments and local communities. 
The establishment of ward committees was a key component of local government 
community-based involvement; they would function as mediators between residents and local 
governments (Oldfield 2008, Heller 2001). However, due to mistrust of or a lack of interest in 
these mandates (Staniland 2008), local government departments sometimes prefer to work 
directly with the settlements. The police sometimes establish Community Policing Forums in 
informal settlements. Health committees are established in order to engage with a subcouncil 
‘health inspector’ connected to the local government health department. When large 
upgrading projects are initiated by local government, community committees or community 
leaders are sometimes installed (Lemanski 2008, Bähre 2007a:82-83 and Bénit 2002).  
 
The political side of government is experienced through the diverse political parties involved 
in informal settlements, and recently, renewed attention has been paid to the role of party-
politics in such spaces (Piper and Nadvi 2010, Bénit-Gbaffu 2011, 2012, Fourchard 2012, 
Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper 2012, Sinwell 2012). One reason for increased party politics might 
be the fact that the ward councillors are elected through party representation
37
. Similarly to 
social movements
38
, parties need to expand their support base to gain votes, legitimacy and 
claim representation of certain groups. Especially around election times, volunteers from 
different parties promoting and signing people up for party membership can be observed in 
informal settlements. As will be displayed later, the role of party politics is highly debated 
within the committee and between residents, although party connections can play a 
significant role for residents in accessing the state (Bénit-Gbaffou 2012). 
 
Further, a variety of NGOs, CBOs or social movement networks also establish committees in 
informal settlements, as they approach leaders to make them join their networks. Already in 
the 1980s, as described in the case of Crossroads, international NGOs assisted the inhabitants 
in building committees (Cole 1987), and it is noted that the involvement by ‘non-state actors’ 
in informal settlements is increasing (Allison 2002). This increase is linked to the fact that 
both local councillors and government officials often rely upon civil society to perform quasi-
administrative tasks as the capacity of local government to monitor and administer service 
delivery is limited Staniland (2008:45). Civil society organizations therefore play central 
                                                 
37
 See Piper and Deacon (2009) for a critical discussion of this setup.  
38
 The line between civil society and parties is often blurred, and committees in civil society can be ‘taken over’ 
(or established) by parties like the ANC; see Zuern (2011:82).  
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roles as mediators between local government and local communities, and establish a network 
of informal settlement committees and leaders as significant sources of mediatory legitimacy. 
However, their establishment of committees is not always a success, and in a case study of 
the informal settlement Marconi Beam, Saff (1996:249) writes that as a consequence of a 
weak community organizing, the NGO has acted as a secretariat on behalf of the civics. Also 
Robins (2008) discusses an NGO attempt, eventually unsuccessfully, to establish democratic 
structures in local communities.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In the first part of this chapter I have specified that, in line with the call to investigate politics 
and organizing below the ward council (Meth 2012), this thesis adds to closing an empirical 
gap in examining politics, organizing and leadership within the neighbourhoods of informal 
settlements. In order to start approaching this gap, I have specified how informal settlement 
leaders and committees can be seen as one scale below the ward councils, although not 
formally recognized as such.  
 
Further, in order to start understanding why there are committees and leaders at this scale, I 
have, on the premise that organizations and leaders emerge due to historically 
institutionalized practises (Selznick 1957, Scott 2008), identified roots to the emergence of 
committees in these neighbourhoods. This is in line with the argument that historical roots, 
prior to the inventions of neoliberal policies, should be reviewed to understand the 
appropriation of organizational models (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a, 2012b). Based on a 
literature review, I have categorized three roots: The organizing of community policing, the 
organizing of the anti-apartheid social movements, and instalment of committees by external 
actors. These three roots are linked to different political periods in South African history. 
First, internal organizing of policing and justice committees have deep roots and emerged  in 
the colonial period of informal settlement history (Burman and Schärf 1990, Schärf 2001, 
Seekings 2001). Thereafter, the period of heightened activism against the repressive apartheid 
state led to the establishment of committees linked to social movements (Zuern 2011, Adler 
and Steinberg 2000, Seekings 2000, Cherry et al. 2000). Lastly, the increasing engagement 
by externals and especially by the more collaborative oriented post-apartheid state has led to 
the instalment of leaders and committees (Bénit 2002, Bähre 2007a, Lemanski 2008, 
Staniland 2008). This confirms that particular historical changes in policies are significant for 
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the development of informal settlements and the relations between informal dwellers and the 
state.   
 
These historical roots often are not linked, as they are discussed in three different sets of 
literature with different theoretical orientations. Interestingly, the system of securing 
grassroots participation through a ‘three-tiered system’ of street committees has been 
observed by many but connected to different roots. While in social movements literature 
street committees are described as having been formed as result of the mobilizing and 
protests against the apartheid state (Zuern 2011, Adler and Steinberg 2000, Seekings 2000, 
Cherry 2000), Schärf (2001) and Burman and Schärf (1990) describe the street committee 
system as having evolved in relation to internal security measures and community courts. 
This chapter shows that drawing these together is important. Specifically, it helps to establish 
that, rather than being linked to only one root, there are possibilities that several of these roots 
impact the formations of current committees. Related to theories of institutional pluralism 
(Kraatz and Block 2008, Pache and Santos 2010, Greenwood et al. 2011), this outline of 
plural institutional roots indicates that there is not a ‘lack of institutions’, but rather an 
organizational field signified by institutional complexity. Lastly, it is important to note that 
both democratic and bureaucratic grassroots organizational models are mentioned in some of 
these historical accounts, and these will be drawn into the discussion in chapter seven and 
eight.  
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CHAPTER 4 Methodology: Reflections on accessing and interpreting 
organizational presentations in informal settlements 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Starting the fieldwork, I was supposed to explore ‘cross-scale governance’ related to flooding 
in informal settlements. However, I never got that far. After some months of visiting informal 
settlements, I still felt I knew too little about general ‘governance’ at this level to move 
further. Especially, perhaps due to my specific interest in organizational theory, my curiosity 
about leadership and organizing at this scale led me to carry out more field work and try a 
range of different methods.   
 
The analytical focus on institutional logics emerged after most of the fieldwork was 
conducted.  Therefore, I will in this chapter reflect on several aspects of methodology: How I 
came up with the focus, how I encountered the field and what methods I applied in order to 
get information on organizational and leadership process and practises, and how I interpret 
these as institutional logics. In other words, this chapter is not only about data collection 
techniques, but about the whole process leading to the product of this thesis.  
I will first clarify how my epistemological grounding in a ‘soft social constructivism’ 
paradigm affects my overall approach to gathering and interpreting information, and highlight 
that I will engage in reflexivity throughout the chapter to increase validity. Thereafter, I will 
reflect on how the topic focus emerged during the research, followed by a discussion of the 
choice of a (multiple) case study as a research design. Then, the data collection techniques 
will be outlined with particular attention to validity and limitations. With the range of 
methods applied, the data covers 12 leaders and numerous residents in the different 
settlements. Lastly, ethical dilemmas will be considered.  
 
Two interrelated issues will be streamlined through this chapter:  
First, much consideration will be given to how the specific field of informal settlements and 
their community leaders can be approached. Informal settlements are difficult to research, 
since they change rapidly, are heterogeneous and infiltrated with conflicts. Researching such 
spaces also carries certain ethical problems, and consideration must be given to how to gain 
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access and choose appropriate data collection methods. As will be discussed later, I took the 
time to tread lightly, spending time trying multiple methods, which also enabled triangulation 
of information from different sources and different methods. Particularly relevant was 
observing processes unfold over time. 
 
Secondly, to obtain information and to analyse social constructive processes and symbolic 
sides of self-presentations in light of interpretative theories, direct questions with concrete 
answers are not enough. Analysis of these logics and public presentations are hugely 
subjective, and concerns the issue epistemology, which requires discussing reflexivity; the 
rigorousness of the research through reflecting on how own deeply rooted convictions 
influence the research focus and methodological and analytical choices. Therefore, attention 
will be given to explain every step that led to the findings of this thesis, enabling contestation 
of these findings. I will reflect on how these choices are influenced by both personal and 
theoretical background. 
 
4.2 A constructivist paradigmatic grounding and streamlining reflexivity  
Underlying all methodological choices is the researcher’s fundamental alignment paradigms 
of ontology (what is reality?) and epistemology (what is knowledge?). Scientific paradigms 
are debated humanities and social sciences, and several paradigms are listed. Guba and 
Lincoln (2005) outline four broad categories: positivism, postpositivism, critical theory and 
constructivism. These paradigms oppose each other, as the constructivist (postmodern) 
paradigm evolved as a critique of the positivist research tendency to claim to be able to 
objectively measure social ‘truths’ (Guba and Lincoln 2005). It is therefore not advised to try 
to incorporate both paradigms for a rigorous analysis. Nevertheless, these paradigms often 
‘interbreed’ (Guba and Lincoln 2005). With this in mind, my theoretical focus indicates that I 
am more aligned to a social constructivist perspective than a positivist paradigm. The major 
empirical question that I could not help moving towards was deeply triggered by my curiosity 
– why there are community leaders – and is based on a familiarity with a socially constructive 
view of not assuming that leadership is a ‘natural’ phenomenon.  
 
Taking a more constructivist approach to knowledge (epistemology) complicates the research 
process, as the interaction of the researcher in the field must be accounted for in several 
aspects, compared to the more straight forward paradigm of positivism, which views methods 
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as techniques / instruments for data gathering (Silverman 2006). With the fundamental 
critiques of lack of objectivity in interpretive research, some postmodern writers take an anti-
methodological stance, preferring the substance (research topics) to the form (methodology) 
(Seale et.al 2004). I align myself to a critique of the ‘anything goes’ assumption, which 
sometimes occurs in qualitative research, and to scholars who emphasise aspects of 
rigorousness and validity even with a postmodern /constructivist paradigm (Seale 1999, Seale 
et al. 2004, Guba and Lincoln 2005, Silverman 2006, Yanow 2006). I will therefore 
interrogate my criteria for knowledge claims through assessing issues of reliability and 
validity throughout this chapter. Reliability concerns the consistency of findings; in other 
words, that others researchers should be able to find similar answers when conducting the 
same investigation, while validity implies that the researcher’s observations should strive to 
be accurate representations (Silverman 2006:282). Accounting for reliability is difficult in 
qualitative research, but to some degree it can be covered by securing insight into every step 
of the process and keeping all the field notes in a systemized file with an overview attached 
(see Appendix A). More important is validity, which in interpretive research is carried out 
through reflexivity (Yanow 2006). Yanow (2006) highlights that, although interpretive 
research cannot be objective or rigorous in the way positivistic research claims it can, it can 
be carefully crafted and systematically carried out and thick descriptions can be rich in 
descriptions and rigorous in its argumentation. Further, the main ways of securing some 
validity and to be open to critical investigations is to be open and reflexive about the research 
process
39
. Hence, I will reflect over the choices made related to design, methods and analysis 
approaches throughout this chapter.   
 
4.3 Identifying the topic of leadership organizing 
In this section, I will discuss the process of how my thesis topic emerged and my general 
approach to relating theory and empirical data. This is also relevant to the fundamental task 
of delimiting what the study units are cases are of, and if they are simply empirical units or 
theoretical constructs  - created by the interests of the investigator (Ragin 1992).  
 
                                                 
39
 On reflexivity on qualitative organizational and leadership research, see e.g. Fairhurst and Grant (2010), 
Yemba et al. (2009), Clegg and Hardy (2006), Cunliffe (2003). 
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Generating knowledge through the combination of theory and empirical studies is 
traditionally divided between an inductive (theory generating) and a deductive (theory 
testing) approach (Layder 1998). Inductive research, especially grounded theory, is generated 
by empirical research (fieldwork), while deductive research, conventionally, is carried out by 
establishing theory first and testing hypothesises. It is generally said that qualitative 
researchers engage in inductive, hypothesis-generating research (Silverman 2006:56). 
However, it has been recognized that even though these two approaches - treated as distinct 
and as opposing each other - are often intertwined in doing research. Layder (1998) presents 
‘adaptive theory’ as an alternative approach, which combines the use of theory to lend order 
and pattern to research data, while simultaneously adapting to the order and pattern contained 
in this emerging data. The open-ended characteristics of adaptive theory involve that no prior 
hypothesis (to test theoretical assumptions) needs to be formed, because intentions are 
descriptive and explanatory (Layder 1998).  
 
Setting up a hypothesis without having a feeling for relevant variables was not an option in 
my case as the empirical field of informal settlements was completely unfamiliar when 
starting out the research. Instead, searching for possible empirically grounded variables 
seemed more appropriate. Rather, I formed the research questions to fit with that I felt was 
important in the empirical field and in relation to my ongoing reading of literature. 
Nevertheless, I would not call my approach inductive; as theoretical ideas did more or less 
unconsciously guide my search for information and a research question. In relation to the 
discussion if the cases are empirical units or theoretical constructs (Ragin 1992), the cases 
are, on the one hand, empirical units of committees in informal settlements, but on the other 
hand they were constructed during my field visits due to my curiosity about why there are 
such committees and why there are similarities in the presentations of organizational models 
in different informal settlements. This curiosity regarding presentations of organizational 
models is likely to be influenced by my theoretical background and my ‘institutionalized’ 
desire, through years of studies, to employ theories of organizational theory. I had during my 
studies been fascinated by the social constructive perspective on organizing and leadership 
inspired by Berger and Luckman (1967), which do not take any organizational forms or 
leadership for granted, but rather as constructed in social relations over time. This was why I 
never felt satisfied with the simple answers to how politics unfold and why there are leaders 
in these informal settlements, and it led me onto the long quest of discovery, which in turn 
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became this thesis. In this way, this fits with a common critique of ‘grounded theory’, 
acknowledging that the theoretical framework we have been institutionalized into through 
years of studying impact on what we look for in the empirical field whether we want it or not.  
 
Notably, this also changed the focus of my thesis significantly from that presented in my 
proposal, as should be expected in qualitative-oriented studies. Initially, my thesis was a part 
of a larger research project on climate change adaptation focusing on ‘conditions for cross 
scale collaboration’40. I engaged in this question by looking at conditions for cross-scale 
collaboration in informal settlements experiencing flooding, however I soon realized that I 
was lacking a deeper understanding of fundamental political and sociological dynamics in 
these spaces. This changed my empirical focus towards a purer sociological account on 
internal governance, politics and leadership. With this change, the initial literature identified 
was not compelling, and I went back to look at contextual literature (slums, urbanization, SA 
informal settlements) in addition to organizational theory.  Further, instead of engaging in an 
intense period of fieldwork, I went back and forth between fieldwork and reading during the 
three main years of my research. In this way I slowly gained and digested insights while 
reading. This engagement with theory as an on-going part of the internal empirical research 
process is captured well in Layder’s (1998) adaptive theory.  
 
4.4 Choice of research design: case study with ethnographic elements 
Before describing the actual methods applied in the field, I will discuss choice of overall 
framework or design of a multiple case study. Fundamentally, I made this choice in order to 
enable some comparisons of leadership committees in different informal settlements. This 
choice is also related to the research question and to what design other researchers in similar 
fields and contexts have recommended.  
 
Regarding the context, slums have been given attention by researchers from a range of 
academic disciplines since the 18
th
 century (Davies 2006), and a range of methodological 
approaches have been applied. Early slum research was much based on statistics, but, 
especially from the 1920s, several researchers of the urban sociologists of the Chicago School 
                                                 
40
 Within much of the climate change adaptation literature, the call for improved cross-scale collaboration is 
emphasised, however, how such collaboration could be organized, and if the collaboration actually is real and 
effective, poses numerous contested questions with few answers. 
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conducted more qualitative and ethnographic research (Whyte 1955). Both ethnographic 
studies (including more populist accounts by journalists), and statistical surveys or 
‘enumerations’ are still ongoing in addition to case studies. Much of the great classic works 
on slums / informal settlements / shanty towns have been based on ethnographic fieldwork 
(see Whyte 1955, Suttles 1968), and it is still argued that ethnographies are particularly 
relevant for studies of urban marginalized groups (Wacquant 2002). Also in South Africa, a 
few ethnographic books based on several years of fieldwork in informal settlements or 
townships have been produced (Salo 2004, Bähre 2007c, Ross 2010, Bank 2011). These 
works each have different focus, but have in common detailed empirical stories and 
experiences of everyday life, with attention to culture and interpretations of culture. It is 
argued that ethnographic fieldwork is best situated for understanding and documenting 
process of cultural production (Atkinson 2004). In this thesis, the process of how leadership 
is formed and contested is also seen as a cultural production, in line with socially constructed 
theories. 
 
There is an interesting link here between this ethnographic slum research and the niches of 
leadership and organizational studies, which I have discussed in the theory chapter.  In these 
social constructivist-based theories, Whyte is celebrated for inspiring research on 
organizational cultures and informal organization (Jones 1991, Bryman 1991, 2004). Bryman 
(2004) draws on Whyte to point out:   
 
A greater emphasis on observation might be more likely to capture informal 
leadership, since the researcher is likely to have an especially good vantage 
point from which to view leadership as a process, as much as something that 
formally designated leaders do. Interestingly, one of the most instructive 
studies of informal leadership—Whyte's (1944) investigation of an Italian–
American street corner gang in Boston—was based almost exclusively on 
participant observation. Whyte’s study showed how leaders emerged in what 
formally was a leaderless context and how leaders maintained their positions 
within the subculture. 
(Bryman 2004:758). 
 
Several others have promoted ethnographic methods in organizational theory (Yanow 2010) 
and leadership studies (Fairhurst and Grant 2010). In the book Organizational Ethnography, 
Yemba et al. (2009:3) mention that writing detailed accounts of organizational life is a long-
standing tradition, and classic studies on ‘informal organizations and bureaucratic underlife’ 
written in the 1940s to 1960 include Whyte (1948), Selznick (1949), and Goffman (1959). 
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Returning to these roots, many organizational sociologists promote ethnographic methods. 
Related to the institutional logics perspective, which is said to draw strength from 
triangulating quantitative and qualitative methods (Thornton and Ocasio 2008), it is argued 
that ethnographic methods are relevant for studying institutional work within organizations, 
as an ongoing concern in anthropology has been the activities through which people create, 
maintain and revise institutional forms in everyday life (Bjerregaard 2011).  
 
Thus, although ethnographic methodology forms a central part of my fieldwork, I have 
chosen to not carry out a pure ethnographic research. A reason for this is that I am not trained 
in this methodology, but the main problem was that I would have had to learn both isiXhosa 
and Afrikaans to really get into the daily life and culture. Instead, I choose a case study 
design, holding in mind that case studies and ethnography are more similar than dissimilar 
and are often used in combination (White et al. 2009), and that case studies are used by 
critical and interpretative researchers as well (Willis 2007:239). An important difference is 
that, as case studies are aimed at providing a holistic and in-depth insight into the cases, they 
can include a range of data collection methods and compare data emerging from different 
collection techniques. Additionally, ethnographies are highly specific and do not allow for 
comparisons. An in-depth ethnographic study of only one informal settlement might have 
given deeper insights into the specific culture of that settlement; however, it would not enable 
comparisons could be relevant since there are more than 300 informal settlements just in 
Cape Town (CoCT 2011). Hence, I decided on a framework of a multiple case study of three 
empirical case locations before I really knew what my theoretical research focus would be, 
because I thought it would make it easier to find and compare some interesting trends. I 
decided that three cases would be a good number, as two cases often lead to dualistic 
conclusions. 
 
There are several debates on what case studies are and what they should or could do. In this 
thesis, I will rely on Yin (2001) and Ragin (1992). Yin (2003:13) defines a case study as an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
Weight is placed on explaining the case in-depth, underscoring consideration of the context. 
Conducting research on two or more cases is described as a ‘multiple-case design’ (Yin 
2003:46). Advantages of multiple case studies are that they can give more general 
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conclusions, but the disadvantages are that they might not go as deep as single case studies 
(Yin 2003). In this thesis, the central objective is to give insight into the politics of speaking 
publicly and articulating conflicting organizational logics; and by comparing committee 
formations in three settlements, both similarities and differences can be looked into. Notably, 
I found the similarities in how organizational logics were expressed and practises carried out 
particularly interesting and I perceive the cases as ‘general phenomena’ (Ragin 1992) of 
informal settlement dynamics. Therefore, I decided to not compare the settlements 
systematically by writing up one chapter on each settlement. A focus on similarities 
dominates chapter five, six and seven. Some fundamental differences are outlined in chapter 
six and discussed further in chapter eight. The research question is not preliminarily about 
differences, but rather about identifying similarities in patterns, practises and symbolical 
organizational models.   
 
Identifying the three cases 
In order to make the cases comparable, cases were chosen within a similar context; they are 
from the same area (Philippi) and are all three fairly young settlements and not undergoing 
any major upgrading schemes. I first encountered informal settlements through shadowing 
and helping another researcher in the field in April 2010. In May 2010, I contacted an NGO, 
who introduced me to two community leaders in an informal settlement in Philippi. I decided 
to appoint them to carry out a monitoring and documenting task of flooding in the area in 
June / July 2010 (this information was compiled in the reports Drivdal 2011a, 2011b). 
Further, in order to get more embedded into the setting, I decided to stay for a couple of days 
in the informal settlement, ‘Sheffield Road’, in August 2010. Later the same month, the three 
main cases of this study were selected. It was important to not be associated with political 
parties or local government. For that reason, I was introduced to the settlements through other 
channels. Kosovo, I knew from the pilot study where had gained some local contacts. GP was 
identified for me by two leaders from another settlement who suggested that this was one of 
the settlements with the worst physical conditions. Together, we entered the settlement and 
asked around for the ‘community leaders’. Lastly, Egoli was suggested to me by another 
researcher and a former employee of local government.   
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4.5 Triangulating data collection methods on contexts and organizational 
presentations  
Preparing for engaging with the field, I was nervous and insecure as the field (informal 
settlements) was completely new to me. The empirical focus had been allocated to me as part 
of a research project, and I had actually never visited an informal settlement in Cape Town 
before. Further, I read that that doing research in the specific context of South African 
informal settlement might be particularly problematic as there often is internal tension and 
suspicion (Barry and Ruther 2005), and since you as the researcher can easily be drawn into 
political battles (Bénit-Gbaffou 2010). As displayed by Seekings (2010), research on political 
organization and protest in South Africa in different periods gives prominence to certain 
voices, and the challenge now is to integrate diverse voices. Additionally, Walsh’s (2008) 
reflection on how academics represent and thereby construct the ‘poor’ is critical, as this 
construction throughout the fieldwork entails development of power relations that impact on 
the representations. Thus, I decided to tread lightly, be open and explorative, and test 
different kinds of methods to see what could work.  
 
In addition to evaluating what methods are feasible to the field, the choice of how to generate 
data must be based on how logically it would be best to find answers to the research question. 
As the main question is a ‘how’ question, major focus should be directed to qualitative 
methods (Yin 2003). It is also maintained that qualitative methods studies are central in urban 
studies, because they challenge notions of homogeneity and display the diversity and 
difference in the real world (Watson 2003).  
 
Since case studies can incorporate a range of methods, and the luxury of a doctoral thesis is 
time, I decided to start field work as early as possible and try different methods. An 
advantage of combining and comparing data collected with different methods is that it 
enhances triangulation, which further, is argued, enhances validity (Seale 1999, Yin 2003). 
Triangulation includes combining multiple theories, methods, observers and empirical 
materials, to produce a more accurate, comprehensive and objective representation of the 
object of study (Silverman 2006:291). Comparing the data that emerged from written 
material, observations, unstructured interviews and a structured survey indeed gave me the 
impression that the situation and perceptions are portrayed differently by the respondents 
depending on the data method. For instance, it was interesting to observe how individuals 
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acted/behaved while ‘hanging out’ with them (participant observations), compared to how 
they expressed themselves in focus groups / collective dialogues.   
 
A problem with combining different data collection methods is the epistemological paradigm 
to which they are aligned. It is reasoned that case studies relying on several methods (mainly 
when quantitative methods are involved) are understood to be more post-positivist, while 
ethnographic studies are more constructivists (White et al. 2009). However, Guba and 
Lincoln (2005: 169) highlight that, although mixing paradigms is impossible since 
commensurability between worldviews are not possible, mixing methods for data collection 
is possible. Hence, although I used different methods for collecting information, the analytic 
framing I adhered to in the analysis chapters is well placed in a (soft) social constructivist 
paradigm. As will be explained below, the quantitative data is used mostly for specifying 
context, and in a few areas in supporting some of the arguments, but less for analysis. In the 
following sections I will shortly describe each method. 
 
4.5.1 Secondary data and quantitative survey for contextual deepening 
The context is important in case studies. In order to get first-hand insight into these contexts, 
I collected secondary data and carried out two surveys.  
 
Secondary data: Statistics, news articles, maps and reports 
To start with, I read up on all reports and case studies of informal settlements in South Africa 
that I could find. In some papers I found interesting accounts, which were not really analysed, 
especially on organizational forms. Some were in footnotes. These will be drawn in and 
compared to own insights in the analysis chapters. 
 
Further, I collected a range of reports and statistical data on South African and Cape Townian 
informal settlements, in order to shape a contextual account and make the settlements 
comparable. As will be discussed in chapter five, it was useful to understand some general 
informal settlement trends in order to not make assumptions about what is particular and not 
about the three settlements of this study. Additionally, data on numbers of shacks in the 
settlements were provided by CoCT reports and it was interesting to compare these numbers 
and time frames with oral accounts from interviews, which often overstated the numbers.   
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I also extracted maps from reports and from google.maps, to see how the settlements have 
expanded over time.  
 
As soon as the three settlements were decided upon, and throughout the period of the 
fieldwork, I collected all the news articles about these settlements that I could find from 2003 
until 2013. All in all I found ten articles mentioning Egoli, four mentioning GP, and 17 
mentioning Kosovo (see reference list. Note that I have included only the ones I applied in 
the thesis). It was also worthwhile studying these articles to see how the journalists 
interpreted the situations and who they interviewed, compared with my own interpretations 
and connections.  
 
Quantitative survey  
Aligning with Seekings (2008) who states that there is still a lack of quantitative social 
science research is South Africa, I found a lack of quantitative reports on informal 
settlements (see also Huchzermeyer et al. 2006:25-27). It appears that quantitative 
approaches are more utilized by government and NGOs
41
 than academic institutions.  
 
As basic quantitative information on the settlements was lacking, I decided to carry out 
surveys in two of the settlements. The third settlement, (Kosovo), had already been surveyed 
some years ago, and I decided to use this data instead of exhausting residents with another 
survey.  
Since I was not too familiar with these areas, I decided to collaborate with other researchers 
and copy the questionnaire that an NGO has applied many times to different informal 
settlements (see Appendix B). It is a relatively standardized questionnaire, and I thought that, 
since it had been applied many times, it ought to be a useful questionnaire. I also hoped that 
the NGO could use the data that I generated. Additionally, it should be mentioned that as the 
survey was carried out in collaboration with two other researchers with different interests, we 
included some additional questions.  
 
The questionnaires were carried out by walking door to door. I did not do all this work 
myself, but got some assistance by locally appointed assistants (four in each settlement. The 
                                                 
41
For instance, the NGO called Slum Dwellers International has embraced mapping and ‘enumeration’ 
(surveying) of informal settlements and as empowering tool for the communities, see e.g. the special issue of 
‘Environment and Urbanization’ 2012 volume 24, issue 3. 
76 
 
two surveys covered 279 households (approx. 81%) in GP and180 households (approx. 52%) 
in the other settlement (Egoli). For the first survey, two leaders from another informal 
settlement (that had carried out enumeration in their own settlement) helped us to get started 
and trained the four settlement representatives. It took five to six days to carry out the surveys 
in each of the settlements. These assistants were interviewed after the process for evaluative 
purposes and for a reliability check. The data from the questionnaires were compiled and 
inserted into the SPSS statistics programme, which I used to develop some graphs and 
figures. Some of this data was presented back to residents at an open community meeting.   
 
Evaluating the process, I found that the survey generally and some questions particularly did 
not work well, implying certain reliability and validity problems. Basically, the survey was 
too long. Some residents indicated that they were tired of researchers that just come to look 
and to fill out forms. Regarding some of the questions, it was particularly challenging for 
many residents to answer questions on income. Further, some answers did not seem that 
plausible. In a report evaluating the census process, a similar issue was reported: One 
participant admitted that, when asked questions they perceive to be invasive, they tend to give 
false answers (Stats SA 2004:67). Last but not at least, some questions and subcategories did 
not work well. For example, the question on choice of health facilities included the option of 
‘traditional healer’, and many of the respondents found this funny, and no one ticked that 
option in favour of clinics. These problems relate to a foundational limitation of surveys with 
pre-determined questions: people do not get the chance to explain certain complicated issues.  
For these reasons, I will not use data from those questions that appeared unreliable, only 
some of the fundamental data like age groups and movement patters. However, I believe that 
surveys, slightly better designed than the one I used, could give significant information. For 
instance, questions could have been posed on networks and legitimacy, on general resident 
knowledge of and relations to different organizations, on general levels of trust towards 
community leaders, etc.  
 
However, in reflecting back, the survey exercise was useful in three ways: First, data is 
important to gain fundamental contextual insights, and chapter five and six has employed 
some quantitative data for this purpose. For instance, it gave some interesting insights into 
tendencies, such as the issue of young people living alone and on-migration, which will be 
discussed in chapter six. Secondly, the data also provided information that can help classify 
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the cases (see chapter five), and provided a basis for comparison. Comparative studies of 
informal settlements are necessary and are lacking, and a goal of my research was to make 
these cases comparable in further research. Third, the actual exercise of carrying out the 
surveys by walking door to door was hugely interesting. It gave me the chance to walk 
around through the entire settlement, meeting different people that I later revisited. I thereby 
carried out observation as I carried out the surveys, which gave me interesting indications on 
how residents generally react and respond to such external intervention.  
 
4.5.2 Qualitative data on models and practises: focus groups, interviews and participant 
observation 
Quantitative data can lay the foundation to understanding what social process might be 
important; they cannot explain social processes - in other words, answer a ‘how and why’ 
question. The main weight in this thesis is consequently on qualitative methods. The main 
reason for doing qualitative research is to learn from the ground instead of the researcher 
deciding on pre-established variables that the people encountered must answer.  
Numerous residents were consulted through these methods, and all in all 12 community 
leaders from the different settlements. However, I mostly visited two different leaders in each 
settlement during the field visit period, for the pragmatic reason that these were the ones that 
had the time and interest to talk to me.  
 
Focus group interviews  
In order to get some initial impression on how people interact, I arranged four focus groups 
with around 20 people attending each one. The topic of these focus groups were health and 
sanitation, which is a public issue about which many residents are concerned. The advantage 
of a focus group is that the participants can discuss issues while the interviewer can observe 
how different issues are treated and how the group members respond to each other 
(Silverman 2006:201). In order to be able to observe as much as possible, I employed two 
women from a health NGO, who live in informal settlements. That way I could sit back, 
observe and note down the conversation, but it also helped in breaking down the barrier and 
the expectations of the participants. Thereby, this method functions like a mixture of 
interviewing and observation.  
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A main usage for this method is to extract information about the meaning behind the groups’ 
assessments, information on uncertainty and group processes, and information about what 
normative understandings lie behind the groups’ collective decisions (Bloor et al. 2001). It is 
also argued that focus group interviews have the potential to uncover statements and ideas 
that participants would not have made in interviews or in daily life (Bloor et al. 2001), and 
they are often used in an exploratory way to get inspiration on possible variables and 
perspectives that could be relevant (Macnaghten and Myers 2004). For this thesis, some 
interesting insights emerged regarding barriers for residents to express themselves on public 
matters. Further, it was interesting to observe how the interaction took place. Many of the 
participants were very shy to talk, while the leaders, when present, talked a lot and 
furthermore the other participants asked them directly to take their problematic issue further. 
Additionally, I found it fascinating how some of the participants who had been to workshops 
earlier seemed to perform the task of what is expected of them to do in a workshop. 
Nonetheless, I decided to limit the use of such focus groups. This above all because 
indications were given that with earlier workshops, expectations were created, followed by 
disappointments. It was expressed by some residents that they were tired of ‘workshops’ and 
it was a waste of time.  
 
Interviews  
Carrying out interviews appears to be the easiest fix and the most popular qualitative method, 
especially open-ended ones with few questions, leaving room for the participants to elaborate 
on issues they find relevant (Silverman 2006). Compared to survey interviews, the actors get 
the chance to explain issues in their own words without having to choose from predetermined 
categories, and important information can be revealed.  
 
Excluding the informal interviews and discussions with residents, I carried out 47 more 
organized interviews. Some of these were rather short, intended to follow up specific issues 
that came up as interesting. I interviewed nine leaders in the three settlements and 
additionally five in five other settlements. In addition, some of the first residents that moved 
to the settlements, residents that lived alone, residents that had been engaged in 
neighbourhood watches, families that were prone to flooding, residents who cleaned the area, 
and informal traders were interviewed. Although questions were prepared, the interviews 
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were mostly open-ended and only a few questions were asked. Most of them were not 
recorded with a voice recorder in order to avoid intimidation of the respondents.  
 
A challenge was that informants often came up with irrelevant information, 
misunderstandings, and were shy to elaborate on the questions and preferred short answers, 
like in a survey. Residents came up with much better explanations and seemed to express 
themselves more easily in random discussions, in other words when I made use of participant 
observation.  
 
Ethnographic participant observation, field visits and field notes 
The most significant insights emerged through participant observation with both leaders and 
other residents over time.  
Often, the terms ‘participant observation’ and’ ethnographic fieldwork’ are used 
interchangeably. Both terms entail spending long periods watching people, coupled with 
talking to them about what they are doing, thinking and saying, designed to see how they 
understand their world (Delamont 2004:218). However ethnography is a broader term, and 
partly relies on the method of participant observation (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). In 
other words, participant observation is more specifically about the method of data collection; 
which is a mix of observation and interviewing (Delamont 2004).  
 
During 36 months, I approximately visited the settlements once a week, which comes to 
about 150 days of field visits (see Appendix A). During most of these visits I conducted 
participant observation with different leaders, but also with other residents. For the most part 
I engaged in ‘sociological participant observation’ entailing day visits, but I also engaged in 
an ‘anthropological approach’ by staying overnight in each settlement for some days 
(Delamont 2004). I only did three overnight stays, because I did not want to waste people’s 
time. The times I spent there at night did give some interesting insights, an improved feeling 
of everyday life, in addition to an increased trust by many residents. During the day visits, 
especially the first year of field visits, I would mostly visit my main contact persons, which 
often were leaders. They would show me around in the settlement and helped me arrange 
interviews with residents in their homes. After the first year I felt safe to enter the settlements 
without arranging it through the contact persons to chat with random people. I also 
participated in and observed meetings. This included meetings with just the committee, 
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public meetings for the settlement residents arranged by the committee, and meetings 
between the committees and public local government officials and other external actors.  
 
The importance of keeping field notes of such visits is highlighted in most methodological 
books on ethnography (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). I always kept a field notebook.  If 
something interesting happened, I followed this up and engaged in conversations. I noted 
down as much as possible about what happened and what was said. The quotes used in this 
thesis are therefore mostly the notes that I scribbled down in conversation and open ended 
interviews. I made sure to write as fast as possible while people were talking to get down as 
much detail as possible. When leaving the settlements, I added notes about the situation and 
my interpretation thereof. Hence, these field notes were not only important to glean situated 
accounts, which I have used much in the analysis chapters, but also for keeping track of own 
feelings and interpretations, which will be discussed in the reflexivity sections below.  
 
Atkinson (2004:103) mentions that it is important to understand the slow, unfolding and 
repetitive nature of collective action, which cannot be grabbed hastily through journalistic 
impression. Visiting the settlement and following committee and leadership processes over 
time was useful in this research in several aspects: 
 
First, following developments of the settlements by capturing cases as they happen instead of 
‘back-casting’ gave insights into processes and since politics is a constant process where 
ideas, people and organizations come and go. Secondly, visiting regularly instead of for an 
intense period of fieldwork, only taking one snapshot in time, gave me time to digest and 
reflect on my encounters. Third, it was useful to gain trust from and make sure that the 
information I got (and the way I understood things) were as valid as possible, because people 
often presented themselves differently over time. After the first visits, stories got more 
complicated. There are some things that you cannot really ask when you first meet people, 
and it is better wait for them to be comfortable enough with you to bring up more personal 
and perhaps uncomfortable stories naturally. Getting information about politics and 
leadership required me to tread carefully, as there are a lot of tensions around these issues. In 
the first encounters, I did not ask much about this, also because my focus had not yet shaped 
into the question about the politics of leadership organizing. I will engage in deeper 
discussions of limitations, validity issues and ethical concerns in the following sections.  
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4.5.3 General limitations of access and how to get around them  
Engaging in fieldwork in an unfamiliar culture has both advantages and disadvantages, and 
affects access. On the one hand, being a female foreigner had the advantage of not being seen 
as a threat, related both to gender issues (Silverman 2006:84) and that they could talk 
privately in their own language if they wanted to hide something. Being a young woman also 
led to some situations where residents wanted to protect me. In one instance a leader escorted 
me to my car as a community meeting was unexpectedly announced. I tried to resist as I was 
very interested to see what was going to unfold, but the leader explained shortly that the 
meeting was about personal matters and accusations of a criminal offence by a resident, that 
he worried it could ‘get nasty’, and he indicated it could lead to vigilante violence. I was 
disappointed, but had not really a choice but to leave. I later found out that it had not turned 
violent although there had been other displays of anger in the meeting.  
 
Language barriers sometimes limited my access to understanding what was going on in some 
situations, since I don’t speak the mother tongue of most the residents (neither isiXhosa nor 
Afrikaans). Yet, I found the language barrier to be less problematic than I expected, as most 
residents spoke English very well. I did have to ask someone to translate some situations. In 
public discussions, they would not always speak English, and I missed out on information in 
some these meetings, although usually asked someone next to me to translate. Observing the 
interaction between residents and leaders in the meetings was interesting, noting who was 
talking about what themes, who spoke up and not, and the conformity to specific meeting 
procedures.  
 
Further, I was worried about getting access to random and ‘unbiased’ residents. I found that I 
was collecting mainly interesting information on my main contact persons, which mostly 
were (or became) community leaders. All the leaders I encountered were interested in 
chatting with me and showing me around in the settlement, and they usually spoke English 
well. Many residents, however, were shy and would refer me to the leaders. Therefore, it was 
mostly leaders that helped me identify people to interview, through a ‘snowballing’ process. 
Thus, I was worried that snowballing carried the risk of being only strategically introduced to 
‘allies’ of certain leaders, and I noticed that leaders often dominated conversations with 
residents. Hence, I needed to apply other mechanisms. I started approaching residents when 
leaders were not present. I also identified people to interview through the survey data. 
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Further, after the first year of visits, I started feeling more comfortable, and I visited the 
settlement without contacting leaders first, approaching random residents. One way of getting 
into a chats with random residents and finding excuses to visit and chat was to make use of 
their businesses, for instance someone fixed my car, sewed my clothes or shoes, or I bought 
candy or fruit from their small shops. While waiting for my car to be fixed, I would chat 
loosely with the people working and hanging around, to get an impression on how they view 
politics and the different leaders. Spending such ’informal’ time enables residents to inform 
the research and give suggestions on topics that they find important, and increased the 
chances to  observe naturally occurring events, reducing  the dependence on interview 
accounts. 
 
I will now move to a discussion on reflexivity, which as noted in the introduction is essential 
for constructive qualitative research.  
 
4.6 Reflexivity and interpreting the theatre of leadership  
Writing up the analysis chapters involves several choices of how to use, organize and 
interpret the ‘data’, which is particularly complicated when the range of information is huge, 
leaving much room for creativity and interpretation (Denzin and Linkoln 2005). Further, in 
qualitative methods, the line between theory and data analysis is not clear cut like in 
quantitative methods, and, particularly in constructive qualitative research, the actor’s point 
of view should not be seen as ‘truths’ (Silverman 2006). It is also highlighted that research on 
political organizing in South Africa needs to go beyond voices and include reflections over 
the things that participants do not say (Seekings 2010). Analysing actor’s self-presentations 
leaves enormous room for interpretations. Thereby, analysis is ongoing while collecting 
information and writing up, and is part of the process of choosing topics, themes and 
categories, which are compared to theories, and deciding on meanings of the data 
(interpretation). These choices will look clear cut in the analysis chapters, but behind these 
choices are both theoretical and personal influences. I will therefore consider reflexivity, 
which, as underlined earlier, is essential when discussing an analytical approach and methods 
in social constructive-inspired qualitative research (Yanow 2006). 
 
In addition to reflecting on how own institutionalization into a specific theoretical focus 
influenced changes in my research focus, more personal reflections are required, as all social 
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science research is influenced by the researcher’s subjectivity. In ethnographic work, it is 
essential to acknowledge that the orientations of the researchers will be shaped by their socio-
historical locations, including the values and interests that these locations confer upon them 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:15). Also in social constructive research on leadership, 
researchers should systematically ask themselves how their research is being influenced by 
their own social background, preferences and the circumstances under which the research 
takes place (Fairhurst and Grant 2010:96). As discussed earlier, reflexivity is the way in 
which qualitative researchers strive for validity and rigour, by including a consideration on 
how own backgrounds and emotions influence the fieldwork (Guba and Lincoln 2005). 
 
As mentioned earlier, I also used the field note booklets to scribe down emotions and 
interpretations I made after the field visit in order to be able to track how my emotional 
condition could affect the interpretations I made. Some of the issues that came up will be 
discussed in the following sections.  
 
4.6.1 Entering and leaving the field  
According to Delamont (2004), reflexivity should include reflecting on both entering and 
leaving the field, and I will consider this in addition to issues of field relations.   
 
Particularly two issues impacted on my impressions when entering the field: The ‘chaos and 
dirtiness’, and the enormous inequality.  
 
First, I believe that the researchers relation to ‘chaos and dirtiness’ is important. In several 
writings on slums, there seem to be two opposite encounters: the ones who see a fascinating 
and colourful space and the other that sees a chaotic, dirty and depressing space. As discussed 
in the theory chapter, such diverging interpretations are also visible in much of the classical 
literature on cities, where some would see spaces of possibilities while conservative theorists 
would rather focus on chaos and despair (Hubbard 2006). It is perhaps this mixture of feeling 
of exotic and apocalyptic, the intense stimulation of several of your senses (smells, colours, 
sounds) that meets you when you enter a slum, which becomes visible in the style of writing 
and representation of the material. For people who like order and systems, this space must be 
very frustrating, but people who are inspired by complexity would see room for possibilities 
and entrepreneurship. I would see myself in the latter group, as I am not drawn to order and 
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neatness, however getting to know residents and their difficult situations was also very 
depressing and frustrating. Additionally, the intensity varies with the field visits. The first 
time I visited was a warm summer day, and I encountered a vibrant and colourful sphere, 
which amplified my interest. On the other hand, on one of the cold and rainy winter days, the 
mood is incredibly depressing.  
Secondly, the visible inequality was shocking. The first visit to one of the informal 
settlements, which is situated right next to a large farm with a nice house, made a huge 
impression. As a resident pointed out, ‘even the pigs in that farm have better conditions than 
us; the pigs have nice houses with electricity’. Seeing and hearing such statements provoked 
emotional reactions, evident in my field notes from that encounter.  
 
Due to the severe conditions in informal settlements, both encountering and leaving the field 
was emotionally draining. Worries about what will happen to these people made it hard to 
leave the field at all. Many of the residents I worked with still contact me, and I actually 
never really left the field. I do not visit to collect more information or discuss the research in 
these visits but to follow up on some of the relations I have built, which also carries certain 
ethical considerations, which will be discussed further in the ethics section.  
 
4.6.2 Field relations with leaders and interpreting the presentations of self 
A fundamental dilemma of ethnographic fieldwork is that, when engaging in conversations 
with individuals over a long time span, one can become too friendly with the ‘informants’, 
‘going native’ and identifying with the participants (Silverman 2006:82). This was a problem 
I worried about from the start, because knowing myself well, when I first engage in deep 
conversations with individuals and learn about their history and their ideas, I easily become 
too engaged. It relates to the issue that doing fieldwork involves ‘living simultaneously in 
two worlds’- that of participation and that of research (Hamersley and Atkinson (2007:89). In 
other words, participating but at the same time always being distant and never corporately 
included is a significant aspect of field relations.  
 
Looking at the data collected, much of this centres around observations on what the leaders 
do and how different leaders presented themselves in social interaction with me as a 
researcher, with residents, other leaders and other externals. Reflecting over field relations 
with these leaders is therefore specifically important, as the research is produced in a social 
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setting where the interaction between the researcher and the ‘research subject’ is not a one- 
way communication, and the ‘information’ is thereby shaped by several sides of this 
interaction.  
 
First, it is important to acknowledge the symbolic and emotional value we connect to leaders. 
Personally, I have always felt an ambiguity toward leadership and authorities, maybe since I 
grew up in a very liberal family. I was often annoyed with popular accounts of the 
importance of leadership, and during my undergraduate studies I found constructivist theories 
on leadership and power persuasive. Yet, during the fieldwork, I did realise that the charisma 
of some leaders affected my interpretations. This is also reflected in my field notes. As 
conflicts between leaders are common, I needed to be aware of how leaders portrayed 
themselves and others to get me on their side (Bénit-Gbaffou 2010), especially when leaders 
would describe themselves as the legitimate leaders and blame rival leaders for being 
undemocratic and corrupt. I acknowledge that not taking sides is difficult, as we as humans 
make moral judgements when observing any situations. I noticed that when chatting to one 
side about the conflict about the other side, I would feel empathy with the one I was talking 
to. Moving to the other fraction, my empathy would change. These confusing and changing 
moral judgements that I could not escape making, made me realize how easy, but dangerous 
it is to take sides on such matters. By talking to several and often opposing leaders, to 
residents not involved in the leadership and following the settlements over time, I tried to 
balance my interpretations, in addition to showing that I did not take sides. Still, it was often 
hard to not become associated with one side of the conflict. It was also hard to not become 
upset with the sometimes harsh accusations related to violence. Notably, it is not an aim to 
discuss which leaders are good or bad, or who is right or wrong in this thesis, as this job is up 
to judges and law enforcers. 
 
Secondly, as pointed out by Ervin Goffman, even what one would regard as everyday 
encounters or simple interactions are full of complexities. In the book The presentation of self 
in everyday life, Goffman (1959) describes how humans put up a theatre in every social 
setting, trying to present certain sides of themselves and actively impact upon others’ 
perceptions of oneself. Actors tend to adapt to definitions and perceived norms of the setting 
in order to keep the peace (Goffman 1959). In the social setting of interviews and participant 
observation, humans might be particularly thoughtful of what the presence of the researcher 
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implies. They might say what they think the researcher wants to hear, show the researcher 
what they think he/she want to see, or systematically hide things (Delamont 2004:224). 
Outsiders, like me, are often seen as a possible source of support or an introduction to a 
network that could supply resources (especially jobs). I noticed that some leaders picked up 
my intentions, and adapted their focus on what I seemed to be interested in. In interpreting 
this, it is essential to not make the mistake of treating an actor’s point of view as an 
explanation or ‘truths’ (Silverman 2006, Walsh 2008, Seekings 2010). In addition to the 
advantage of being able to visit and revisit different leaders and residents over time, 
triangulation of information is important for dealing with contradictory explanations. For 
instance, observation of what leaders actually do compared to what they are saying in 
interviews is important. In interviews they would naturally state how important they are, but 
only by observing that residents actually approach the leaders with issues and by observing 
community meetings could I assume that they do have some particular roles within the 
settlements.   
 
4.7 General ethics and dealing with marginalized populations 
Formally, in order to get the research proposal approved, I engaged in an ethics clearance 
process with the UCT Law Faculty. This process included standard ethical considerations in 
social research, like assessment of informed consent, privacy, harm, exploitation and the 
consequences for future research (Hammerlsey and Atkinson 2007). Doing fieldwork in the 
South and particularly in low-income areas has some extra ethical implications; hence issues 
of exploitation will be considered (Ryen 2004). 
 
Before outlining these reflections, I will make a note specific to the context; that the way in 
which researchers represented the field is highly sensitive. I realized this by observing public 
debates around the book Diepsloot by Harber (2011). He, like others before him, was accused 
in a newspaper article of ‘whitewashing’ and racism in trying to represent a black township 
with a white man’s pre-judgmental eyes (Ball 2011). This critique fits with a fundamental 
ethical problem in ethnographic work; that it grew out of a tradition where ethnographers 
presented research of the ‘primitive others’, often to colonial powers, and can therefore be 
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called a racist project (Denzin and Lincoln 2005:20)
42
. Being aware of this, I tried to step 
lightly. This also influenced my urge to neither romanticise nor demonize the politics of these 
places, and to avoid exoticism of slum research (Wacquant 1997, 2008) or of ‘exotic’ 
portrayals of traditionalist African politics generally (Hagman and Péclard 2010). 
 
Informed consent  
When encountering leaders and residents, I informed them about the basic intentions of my 
research. I decided to not make residents sign any papers, the main reason being that there 
have been reports of scams, and that some residents therefore rightfully are very sceptical 
about signing papers. Additionally, as raised by Marks (2012), based on her field work 
experience with public police and political activists in South Africa, the common way of 
signing consent forms might compromise confidentiality, and crucial information might be 
hidden by actors, which could undermine the validity of the research. So instead of providing 
forms to sign, I presented my research and myself verbally, based on the informed consent 
paper I shaped in interaction with the ethical committee of the Law Faculty. However, as 
pointed out by several ethnographers, fully informed consent is impossible with participant 
observation (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:210). It is impossible to tell all the participants 
everything about your research, because with an ethnographic framework the researcher does 
not know the course the work will take, because people might not be interested in the 
research, and because it might change the participants’ behaviour. This is what Marks (2012) 
terms the tenuous divide between overt and covert research signifying ethnographic 
fieldwork.  
 
Taking these issues into account, I tried to inform participants as best as I could, also when I 
changed focus towards committees and leadership. I discussed my thoughts with residents 
and leaders. I also presented some of the information back to residents in meetings and 
through compiling reports, however, most residents did not seem interested in the findings 
but rather in possibilities for aid. Additionally, hiring a few residents as ‘research assistants’, 
carrying out surveys, small interviews and observations, was also aimed at providing 
residents with more insight into my work.  
 
                                                 
42
 This relates to the major and long-lasting debates over the ‘triple crisis of ethnography’; representation, 
legitimation, and praxis (Denzin and Lincoln 2005:26), but this discussion will not be taken further here. 
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Privacy and confidentiality 
Privacy and confidentiality is secured by keeping the residents and leaders anonymous, and 
when citing them, by using codes. Children and under-aged were not interviewed. 
In a few cases, residents did not want to be interviewed, and also in some cases some were 
reluctant to talk about certain issues, which I respected. The fact that certain information was 
withheld was interesting in itself and will be included in the analysis.  
 
Harm 
As this study did not involve any ‘experiments’ (as in the medical sciences), there were no 
possibilities of physical harm to the participants. It could be argued that there was the 
possibility for creating some anxiety with some participants; although I do not believe that 
this happened in this study. Nevertheless, as these spaces experience some political tension, I 
made all participants anonymous by coding them when citing, in order to avoid any possible 
harm through publication of findings.  
 
Ethical dilemmas in the field 
Sometimes I was faced with ethical dilemmas due to the particular environment of informal 
settlements. As raised by Marks (2012), some situations can be morally compromising. As 
there is much social drama and crime in informal settlements, I did sometimes unwillingly 
get involved. One example is when I was staying overnight in one of the settlements, drama 
unfolded over a missing child. A woman came screaming and everyone gathered to try to 
help her. Her son had been kidnapped by her ex-boyfriend. Some residents turned to me and 
asked to borrow my car, which I had parked in the settlement, to drive around and look for 
the child. I could not say no, but I was scared to join as it was already dark. So they left with 
my car, and several hours later, at night, they came back with the boy. They would not say 
what happened to the kidnapper, but just stated they had dealt with him, and ‘vigilante’ 
justice was indicated. I was happy the boy was back, but felt guilty that I perhaps had 
contributed to vigilante justice.  
 
Otherwise, I managed for the most part to stay away from morally compromising situations, 
especially because the residents I got close to protected me from such issues, and because I 
early on learnt to stay indoors at night and stay away from situations that involved alcohol.  
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Exploitation and reflecting over ‘giving back’  
As noted earlier, a moral dilemma I have been struggling with is the fact that while I will get 
my fine degree, the individuals that I have engaged with and ‘used’ for my research get little 
in return. The problem of exploitation is pertinent in situations where researchers typically 
investigate those who are less powerful than themselves or low-income areas like informal 
settlements (Ryen 2004, Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). As mentioned by Hammersley 
and Atkinson (2007), there will usually be benefits and costs to both sides, but the 
contributions to the participants are hard to measure. In my experience, although many 
researchers claim that covering and giving attention to vulnerable people is important in the 
long run, it seems to me that such research does often not have significant impact on the 
actual people researchers engage with directly. The feeling of guilt connected to this might be 
common to researchers in such fields, as also reflected by Bourke et al. (2009:101-102):  
 
I went back a number of times, finding it more harrowing every time. The guilt 
overwhelmed me …I didn’t change their lives. I didn’t change anything for 
them. The research changed my own life, but that didn’t matter. The 
participants live exactly the way they did before.  
(Bourke et al. 2009:101-102).  
 
Some residents did indicate that researchers ‘just come and do their research and then go 
back to their nice houses’. Perhaps in order to deal with this, many researchers also become 
activists (Walsh 2008, Seekings 2010). Although I am reluctant to call myself an activist, I 
did take some measures to at least give something back. First, I did informally ‘employ’ some 
of the residents to help me, and paid them for their work. This was not only because I felt it 
was problematic to occupy time that they could have spent trying to earn money, but also for 
empowerment and increasing knowledge about the research (of course, their input was also 
useful). Secondly, I made sure to assist where I could, for instance sharing information with 
NGOs that were establishing projects in the settlements, and helping the lawyer that was 
defending one settlement in an eviction case. This is in line with the recommendation that  
 
…there are occasions where a researcher should stop being a researcher and 
engage in action that is not directed at the outcome of the research, however, 
most of the time, the temptation to abandon the researcher role should be 
resisted.  
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2005:228-229).  
 
I also found it important to not indulge in philanthropic ideas (often including strong 
paternalistic traits) that I could help these communities to organize better, but to be true to  a 
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constructivist perspective where the researcher is in no position to claim ‘true representation’ 
and give empirical recommendations on how to ‘better organize’.  
 
Consequences for further research 
A last point should be made on a sense of fatigue with researchers, which can affect future 
researchers’ access. Walsh (2008) notes that continuing protests and mobilisations by the 
‘poor’ in South Africa has been closely followed and joined by a range of academics and 
activist who clamber on board to explain, report and comment on the struggle, highlighting 
that it sometimes increases the fatigue of the actual ‘poor’, as this reporting and commenting 
does not bring about change. I noticed early on that in Cape Town too there is a broad range 
of actors engaging with informal settlements, including researchers, NGOs, local government 
officials and political party representatives. These often make what residents perceive as 
‘promises’, which sometimes are not followed up. Unsurprisingly, many residents are tired of 
such interventions, in the same way they are tired of politicians that ‘just come and promise 
things but don’t deliver’. During my fieldwork, I constantly had to underline that the research 
might not have practical outcomes. This was difficult, as expectations of ‘external’ actors are 
high, and I did notice some disappointment from residents in the settlement that have had 
little external engagement before I intervened.  
 
Additionally, in order to not exhaust the residents, I tried to make use of data that is already 
collected, in order to not overload people and make them answer similar questions several 
times. 
 
4.8 Summary  
Summing up, I have considered several aspects of methodology and of the process leading to 
the arguments of this thesis. As the theoretical framework for my analysis is constructivist 
and interpretive, I have included discussions of reflexivity  in the process of finding the topic, 
framing the research, deciding on and carrying out data collection methods, and analysing the 
information.  
 
After emphasising that, with a constructivist grounding, reflexivity is important in every 
aspect of the research process, I discussed how my theoretical background in a socially 
constructive perspective of leadership and organizing influenced how that became main topic 
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of the thesis. Due to this theoretical aspiration, I could not steer away from my fascination of 
the organizational models and ideals presented. Following this, I explained that I decided on a 
multiple case study framework to enable some comparisons instead of a pure ethnographic 
strategy, the latter being recommended by both ‘slum researchers’ generally and by social 
constructivist organizational theorists. However, ethnographic methods, as I highlight in the 
following section, was one of the most vital methods for gaining insights into processes of 
leadership and committee formation over time. Following the settlements and some leaders 
over time was important to gain a broader perspective (rather than taking a snapshot in time), 
to slowly develop field relations, and to slowly digest impressions and my interpretations of 
these. Finding answers to the question of institutional logics cannot be answered through a 
survey data (although it can give some contextual and demographic insights), the analysis 
chapters are based mainly on reflections over insights from qualitative methods, especially 
participant observation. 
 
Adding to this, applying a multiple case study design rather than a pure ethnographic design 
enabled me to make some comparisons and triangulate insights from a range of data 
collection methods. Looking at information collected through different methods including 
secondary data, surveys, interviews, participant observation and focus groups, was imperative 
to see different sides of the informal settlement context and of conflicts between leaders.  
 
Lastly, I have reflected on limitations, interpretations and ethics. As the field of informal 
settlements is particularly chaotic and carries several ethical concerns, I decided to step 
lightly, spend much time, and talk to different residents and leaders. This was also important 
to avoid taking sides. 
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CHAPTER 5 Introducing the three settlements and the institutionalised 
practises shaping settlement committees 
 
5.1 Introduction  
I tried to ask my research subjects directly why there are community leaders. The answers 
were always pragmatic, stating that there must be leaders, if not, there will be chaos. 
Illustratively, a leader plainly explained: There must be leaders, all over South Africa there 
are community leaders. (Community leader 9, Kosovo 6.4. 2011). That leaders at this scale 
are taken for granted indicates, within a framework of new-institutionalism, that leadership or 
committees are organizations with institutional features. By institutional features I do not 
mean institutional as in formalized as promoted in informal economy literature (Hansen and 
Vaa 2004, Meagher 2007). Rather, as discussed in the theory chapter, I perceive institutional 
features as displaying not only rules, but also norms of cultural cognitive ideas that have 
become normalized or ‘taken for granted’ over time (Lowndes 2001, Scott 2008:95). Hence, 
the institutional features of the committee organizations can be seen as the reoccurring taken 
for granted practises that contribute to the social construction of leaders. These features 
should be specific to informal settlements, based on some major common concerns that need 
to be dealt with in this urban setting. This chapter therefore poses the question:  
 
How are informal settlement committees and leaders shaped through context specific 
institutionalised practises? 
 
I will discuss this question by outlining the organizational practises that emerged as 
significant during the research and that seem to shape leaders and committees in the different 
settlements. Before discussing how these practises contribute to the social construction of 
leadership, I will introduce the three settlements and highlight some differences between 
them. Thereafter, instead of categorizing types of leaders or committees, I will discuss types 
of practises that are significant in the ongoing social construction of leaders and committees. 
Through observing leaders in action over time, and in relation to the three historical roots of 
informal settlement committees outlined in chapter three, I have here categorized three 
institutionalized practises I found important: mediating and regulating internal order, 
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mobilizing, and external intermediary negotiation. These three practises can be seen as three 
significant patches of the ‘bricolage’ of practises (Skuse and Cousins 2007). They are 
circulating practises (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a, 2012b), and are often interlinked, but have 
different purposes, and have evolved into complex practises in the cases of this study. More 
importantly, they seem to encompass both political and bureaucratic tasks, which lead me to 
interpret them as micro-government with blurred lines between the democratic and 
bureaucratic duties.  
 
5.2 Introducing the three settlements  
The three informal settlements in this study are all located within the Philippi area of the 
‘Cape Flats’. In fact, most of the informal settlements in Cape Town are located on the Cape 
Flats. 
 
 
Figure 2: Location of the three settlements in relation to other informal settlements in the Cape Flats. Copied 
from CoCT (2011), case study locations inserted. 
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Figure 3: Location of the three settlements in Philippi. Received by request from the City of Cape Town GIS 
Department. 
 
5.2.1 Graveyard Pond informal settlement 
When I first visited GP, I found the place to be the most depressive informal settlement I had 
encountered. It is very crammed and the paths between the shacks are narrow. In the winter, 
but also on rainy days in the summer, the paths and many of the shacks are flooded, and as 
the location is particularly low the water becomes stagnant and turns green and smelly. 
Further, there are very few toilets and no legal electricity. In other words, the physical 
conditions are particularly bad in GP, and it is viewed by the media as one of the worst 
settlements (Kabeni 2010, Maseko 2010, Boyle 2011)
43
.  
 
                                                 
43
 Note that these articles have a party political motive and that the settlement is being used in these articles to 
argue against the political party opponent. Since the first articles, the ward councillor is now from another party, 
but the conditions in the settlement are exactly the same. 
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The name Graveyard Pond reflects both the location and physical condition of the settlement. 
It is called ‘Enyunywini’ in isiXhosa, which means when translated ‘dirty place’. The English 
name, Graveyard Pond, refers to the detention pond area next to the neighbouring settlement, 
called Graveyard, which apparently is located on top of some old graves of the early German 
farmers of Philippi. This is why, according to one resident in Graveyard, the place is haunted.  
 
 
Figure 4: Growth of Graveyard Pond. Received by request from the City of Cape Town GIS Department.  
 
Although GP is the youngest of the three settlement cases, it was particularly challenging to 
find explanations as to how it developed. After chatting to residents in the neighbouring 
settlements who observed the emergence of GP, it seems that GP did not start with a planned 
land invasion but expanded rather slowly. Visualized in the image above (Figure 4), the edges 
of the settlements were occupied first. In 2001, the neighbouring settlement ‘Graveyard’ had 
filled up, and only around five shacks were located on the edges of the pond. Slowly, over the 
next few years, a few more shacks appeared around the edges, closing off the pond. The 
settlement was fist counted by CoCT in 2006, estimating a number of 119 dwellings (CoCT 
2011). From 2007 to 2009, corresponding with the development of formal (houses in Phola 
Park /Better Life, the settlement suddenly filled up. The newcomers moved into the low 
middle area of the settlement, which during winter experiences heavy flooding (see report 
Drivdal 2011a).  
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Due to this slow expansion, GP was first not considered a separate settlement, but was part of 
the neighbouring settlement. Some of the first settlers indicated that there was no committee 
overseeing the migration (migration regulation is common in many settlements as will be 
discussed later). However, leaders appeared after the settlement grew considerably. In 2011 
GP also expanded as residents in shacks scattered in the areas close to GP wanted to be 
included. They did not have a functioning committee, and had seen that the community 
leaders of GP were active, so they hoped to stand a better chance of getting service from local 
government by joining GP.  
 
Notably, there appear to actually have been ‘three generations’ of leadership committees in 
the short history of GP. The first generation vanished as one leader was killed and another 
moved away, the second committee setup dissolved when one leader was arrested and the 
others accused for corruption, and the third generation seem to have almost dissolved due to 
fatigue. These processes will be further explored in chapter seven and eight.  
 
5.2.2 Kosovo informal settlement 
I was introduced to Kosovo through a student. It is large and confusing settlement, and 
compared to GP, it seems busier and there is much informal trade within the settlement. As 
the settlement is very large, it is referred to as compromising of three sections: A, B and C.  
 
Kosovo is arguably the most well know of the three informal settlements, as it is one of the 
largest in Cape Town and has received much attention both in media, by politicians and by 
researchers. According to a student report (DIMP 2009), the settlement got its name due to 
the media attention given to the Kosovo war in the Balkans during the land invasion. The 
name therefore reflects the struggle against eviction in the first period of the settlement 
(1999-2000).  
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Figure 5: Growth of Kosovo. Retrieved from DiMP (2009:5). 
 
Although Kosovo most likely started with a land invasion by a small group, residents with 
whom I chatted and who claimed to be ‘one of the first persons to stay here’ came up with a 
similar story: They saw or heard rumours about people cutting down the trees and putting up 
shacks, and realizing that a new settlement was emerging, they also came to set up their own 
homes.  
 
Of the three settlements, Kosovo has the most confusing committee setting, and is both 
currently and historically marked by a high degree of internal fighting between leaders. 
Kosovo has also had extensive engagement with a variety of external actors. In finding out 
about the history of the establishments of committees, different histories were given, 
indicating the high stakes. Only by constantly coming back and getting further pieces of the 
story, was it possible for me as a researcher to grasp what had happened and what was going 
on. Further, it was not only confusing for me as an external to understand who the leaders 
were, but also for residents. Encountering random residents, they mentioned that they were 
not sure who the leaders were, but what was sure, was that there were and are several leaders 
and several committees, which often are in conflict with each other.  
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5.2.3 Egoli informal settlement 
When encountering Egoli, the immediate impression is shaped by its stark contrast to the 
immediate surroundings. The settlement is crammed into a defined island of shacks between 
green fields with sheep, horses and ostriches (see Figure 6). This is because it is located on 
urban farmland in the ‘Philippi horticultural area’, which has few informal settlements but is 
in the midst of political disagreements whether to favour housing or urban farming, as 
highlighted in a newspaper article (Swart 2012).  The farm houses nearby are mostly modest, 
but seem like mansions compared to the shacks. The immediate visible inequality and 
difference in living conditions compared to its surrounding areas is shocking. The contrast 
between the settlement and the surrounding area is reflected by one of leaders, who 
underlined the visible inequality in that even the neighbour’s animals have better houses and 
living conditions than the residents of Egoli. It is also made worse by the rumour that the 
owner of the land who wants them evicted, apparently also wants to use the land to build 
stalls for his horses. Further, many residents somehow appear more rugged, maybe due to 
their hard life as farmworkers. Notably, there is a mix of people, most are Afrikaans 
speaking, but there are there are also many Xhosa’s and residents from other countries, and 
different religious manifestations of different Christian churches, Rastafarians, and a few 
Muslims.  
 
A settlement name often reflects its history and/or its location, but the name Egoli is more 
uncertain. Some say the name is based on the English/Afrikaans soap opera called ‘Egoli: 
Place of gold’, which could reflect the hope of the early settlers of a better life than on the 
farms. However, I was later informed that the name emerged as the first residents sat down 
and noted the things they don’t want in this settlement: Eviction, Gangsters, Outsiders, Liars, 
and Intruders. This then made up the name Egoli.  
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Figure 6: Growth of Egoli. Images compiled and retrieved from Planners without Boarders (2011). 
 
According to the oldest residents, Egoli started with a land invasion by about 64 evicted 
farmworkers. As they were evicted from the neighbouring farms they used to work on, they 
decided to settle on this plot of land, which they had often used as a soccer field. It is unclear 
what year this happened as different accounts are given. Some say it started in 1995, but the 
map above does not show any shacks in early 1996. It is however a fact that shack dwellers 
had settled there before the land was bought on the 30
th
 of June 1999 and registered in the 
owner’s names on 22 September 1999 (Planners without boarders 2011). Also a news 
reporter mentions that since 1999, the owners have struggled to access their land, and have 
filed three court cases over the years to have the residents evicted, thus far unsuccessfully 
(Swart 2010). As a result, residents have been living with the uncertainty of being evicted 
since 1999, and it should not be a surprise that fatigue is widespread, as the court cases keep 
coming but no solutions are in sight, and they are still living in limbo
44
.  
 
This settlement too expanded slowly but is now very dense. Who the main leaders are is 
clearer here than in the other settlements, especially since they were the initiators of the land 
invasion and started Egoli. Yet, it is sometimes unclear exactly who all the members of the 
main committees are.  
                                                 
44
 The last court case, that took two years and ended in 2012, did also not provide any solutions as the land 
owner wants his land back but cannot evict the residents without providing alternative accommodation (for 
eviction laws, see Wilson 2011). 
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5.2.4 Summary of fundamental differences 
It is difficult to measure how many informal settlements and informal dwellings there are, but 
a count carried out by CoCT show that there were approximately 300 informal settlements in 
Cape Town in 2008, and in total 134 055 informal dwellings (CoCT 2011)
45
. With the high 
number of settlements, research on informal settlements has exposed the high variation in 
location, physical form, size, rural-urban linkage, internal poverty and vulnerability (Hindson 
and McCarthy 1994, Smit 2006). Below is a simple table outlining some fundamental 
information and differences between the three informal settlements of this study.  Note that 
economic variables are excluded, as economic details are hard to measure, although it can 
generally be assumed that informal settlement residents are amongst the poorest.  
 
                                                 
45
 These numbers should not be seen as accurate as it is very difficult to actually count settlements and shacks, 
and other reports show different numbers. 
46
 Legal electricity was installed in 2008; see also newspaper article by Mbiza (2008). 
 Graveyard Pond (GP) Egoli Kosovo 
 
Approx. no of 
dwellings 2008 
 
243* (2008) 
 
331*  (2008) 
 
5154*  (2008) 
 
 
History 
 
People started staying around edges 
in 2001-2003, moved into pond in 
2008-2009 
 
Started around 1996/1999, a group 
of evicted farmworkers occupied 
the plot which used to be a soccer 
field. 
 
Started with land invasion 1999.  
 
 
Location and  
Land situation 
 
 
Philippi: Densely populated area. 
Illegal on public land - road reserve 
and detention pond.  
Heavy flooding in most of 
settlement every winter. 
 
Philippi horticultural: Sparsely 
populated area in farming zone. 
Illegal on private land. Ongoing 
eviction court case. 
Flooding of paths and low areas 
every winter. 
 
 
Philippi: Densely populated area 
Was private land, but most of the 
area bought by CoCT in 2004. 
Parts of the settlement still on 
illegal railroad reserve. 
Flooding in low areas every winter.  
 
Service and 
upgrading 
situation 
 
No legal electricity. 
15 toilets to share.  
On a ‘re-location list’.  
 
No legal electricity 
Shared chemical toilets (no flush 
toilets) and water taps by the road.   
 
 
Shared chemical toilets (no flush 
toilets) 
2005: Water taps electricity some 
areas (DIMP 2009), sanitation 
system.  
2008: Electricity whole area
46
, 
internal roads with drains.  
 
 
Language 
demographics 
 
95% Xhosa, 2.1% Setswana, 1.7% 
Sesoto, 0.8 Zulu, 0.4% Shona ** 
 
81.9 % Afrikaans, 
16.4 % Xhosa ** 
 
No numbers, but seems mostly 
Xhosa  
 
Household 
compositions 
 
Average 2.9 persons per household, 
22.5% single person households ** 
 
Average 3.9 persons per household, 
6.7%  single person households** 
 
Average 2.1 persons per household, 
33.4% single person 
households**** 
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Figure 7: Table comparing the three settlements. The information is a mix of date collected from interviews and 
survey and second-hand data
48
. The mix of data does create some problems for comparisons, and the table 
should therefore not be seen as more than an indicators. Note also that I also applied some of this data in two 
flooding reports (Drivdal 2011a, 2011b). 
 
Some of this data that seems relevant to understanding basic differences in political 
conditions will now be discussed.  
 
Size 
Figure 3 and figure 7 indicate significant differences in the size of the settlements. The City 
of Cape Town’s informal settlement count (CoCT 2011) shows that the number of shacks 
varies hugely, from 10 696 structures to as little as three to four structures. An average 
                                                 
47
 Note hete that the committees are very fluid and change rapidly and that the organizational models presented 
do neccesarily work in ths way. 
48
 The different sources: 
* CoCT informal settlement count 2011.  
** Data from own surveys 2010. 
*** Armitage et al. (2010). 
**** Goven (2007). 
 
Age 
demographics 
 
 
Average age head of household: 
31** 
22.5 % 0-6 years,  
16.8% 7-17 years, 
50.4% 18-35 years 
9 % 35-64 years  
1.1 % 65 + years** 
 
Average age head of household: 
39** 
21,6% 0-6   
19,2% 7-17 years, 
32,6% 18-35, 
23,8%, 35-64,  
2,7% over 65** 
 
 
Majority between 21 and 40 years, 
31-35 is the largest category, 
followed by 0-5 and 16-20****.  
 
Migration 
 
Average length of stay (2010): 4.5 
years.** 
Migration: 
51.1% from nearby areas (Philippi),  
38.9% from other areas in Cape 
Town,  
10% outside of Cape Town. ** 
 
Average length of stay (2010): 9.78 
years.** 
Migration: 
51,5 moved from different 
neighbouring areas(of these 22,4 % 
from farm), 
30.3% from other areas in Cape 
Town,  
7.3% from Eastern Cape. **  
 
 
Average length of stay (2004): 4.1 
years.**** 
Migration: 
73.66% from surrounding 
settlements, 14.3% rural migrants 
(mostly Eastern Cape),  
12.3% from elsewhere. **** 
 
Committees
47
 
 
 
 
Mostly one committee, consisting 
of one chairperson, a secretary, a 
vice chairperson and sometimes 3 
additional committee members.  
 
One old committee, consisting of a 
chairperson, a secretary and 
approximately seven committee 
members, four women and three 
men. 
At times, another committee 
consisting of two to three 
committee members. 
 
 
Mainly two committees. The main 
committee during the research 
consisted of 15 members, including 
a secretary, deputy secretary 
chairperson, deputy chairperson, 
and treasurer. 
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number of dwellings can be estimated to be 385 shacks
49
. In relation to this, Kosovo is one of 
the largest informal settlements in Cape Town, while GP and Egoli are more close to the 
average size. The size seems to matter in relation to how well informed residents are about 
who the main political actors and leaders are. I do not have comparative quantitative data to 
back this up as this settlement was not surveyed, but by speaking informally to residents 
during the three years of field visits, fewer know who the leaders are in Kosovo compared to 
Egoli, where 95.6 % answered that they know the leaders. 
 
Language and migration patterns 
It is commonly known that most informal settlement residents in Cape Town have originally 
migrated from the Eastern Cape. Still, there are no good statistics on this. A survey of three 
informal settlements in Cape Town, which are assumed to generalizable, shows that the main 
province of origin is the Eastern Cape - 94.2% being the statistic
50
 (CoCT 2005). This is also 
reflected in the language patterns, where the home language of 98% is isiXhosa
51
 (CoCT 
2005). As displayed in figure 7, this tendency fits with Kosovo and GP, however the situation 
in Egoli is significantly different. People have lived in Egoli for a longer time, and many 
were born in Cape Town. Figure 7 indicates that only 10.9 % are from outside the Western 
Cape, and people living in Egoli have stayed in Cape Town on average for 28.14 year. This is 
also reflected in the language patterns, as only 16.4 % speak Xhosa as the main language.  
 
A consequence of this is visible in the family patterns: In Egoli there is a higher number of 
old residents, a higher number of residents per dwelling, and a lower percentage of residents 
living alone. A major reason for these patterns might be that they do not have the same 
opportunity as informal settlement residents migrated from the Eastern Cape: to send children 
to their relatives in that province and to move back there when they are too old to work.  
Another issue is that residents’ relation to the area seems to be stronger in Egoli. On the 
relocation plans, a leader comments: If you take me away from here you can take me to the 
graveyard (Community leader 5, Egoli, 1.9.2010). Especially older people, many of whom 
were born in the area and used to be farmworkers but have been evicted from the farms, 
express a fear of being relocated. 
                                                 
49
 Calculated by dividing the counts of 134 055 dwellings by the 348 settlements.   
50
 The rest compromises of: 3.2% Western Cape, 1 % KwaZulu Natal, 0.7% Gauteng, 0.3% Northern Cape, 
0.2% Free State. 
51
The rest compromises of: 0.9% Afrikaans, 0.5% isiZulu, 0.1% SeSotho, 0.1% SeTswana. 
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Location and land situation 
Location of the settlements is important for receiving local government service delivery. 
Although they were all first ‘illegal’ as they emerged though planned or unplanned land 
invasions, only Kosovo is approved for upgrading, as the land that first belonged to a private 
owner was bought by the CoCT. Therefore, it has received more services from the city such 
as electricity, roads and more toilets (chemical, as the flush toilet project failed – see 
Armitage et al. 2010). Compared, both GP and Egoli are struggling to receive services. In 
GP, electricity cannot be installed as it is located in a detention pond and on a road reserve. In 
Egoli the city cannot bring services like electricity and toilets
52
 into the settlement as the 
settlement is located on private land with an owner who wants his property back
53
.  
 
Egoli also differs from the other settlements in that it is located in the particular ‘urban 
farming zone’ of Cape Town, as visible in Figure 3. Egoli is one of few informal settlements 
in the area, which consist of farms and a more mixed-income population. The relation 
between the settlement residents and the neighbouring areas is sometimes tense. Many 
resident and leaders feel that the richer neighbours look down upon them. Some of the 
neighbours indeed want the settlement evicted, as it brings down the value of the area, and as 
they blame the residents for stealing. Hostility towards informal settlements in more mixed or 
affluent areas is also mentioned in other case studies (Saff 1996). On the other hand, residents 
seem also to receive more individual local aid during e.g. Christmas and Ramadan.  
 
5.3 Similarities: organizing practises and the social construction of leaders 
Despite these differences between the settlements, there are significant similarities in 
leadership practises and ideals. Drawing these short introductions together, it shows that in all 
the settlements, committee organizing might be based on a variance of experiences, including 
community policing forums, political parties, social movements, ward committees, other 
organizing forms at township scales, and even work and youth organizations
54
. This is related 
to the historical roots outlined in chapter 3. With this complexity, it is clear that the informal 
                                                 
52
 Toilets are located on the public road and some residents take them into the settlement themselves. 
53
 In October 2010 (11.10) the leaders in Egoli were informed about a by-law that was going to be passed that 
would overrule that law, but nothing happened.  
54
 Other experiences might count as well, like gang practises, which were indicated once by one leader, as he 
was talking about the leadership committee in another informal settlement that is not included in my research. 
This could have been research further as it points to the often thin line between informal security measures and 
vigilantism. 
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settlement committees and leaders have not emerged due to one clear organization or 
institutionalized practice. Therefore, instead of focusing on specific grand organizations like 
SANCO or CPF, I will look into the multitude of practices that contribute to the emergence 
of and committees in the settlements. Observing leaders in action over time, I have identified 
three patches of institutionalized practises: regulating internal order, mobilizing, and external 
intermediary representation. These will be outlined in the following sections.  
 
5.3.1 The social construction of leaders through practises of regulating internal order 
The first stream of practises common to the settlement leaders is, in my observations, 
practises of community policing and regulating internal order. This is both connected to high 
amounts of conflicts between individuals or groups like family and neighbours, and the 
broader anxieties about the high crime rates in the area
55
. As noted in chapter three, the 
historically most fundamental reason why informal settlement residents started organizing 
seems to be worries concerning crime and security. In the literature, this organizing takes the 
forms of loose vigilante groups (Buur and Jensen 2004a, 2004b, Buur 2003, 2006) or more 
organized community policing initiatives, like organized street committees, self-policing 
groups, night patrols, and community courts (Bruman and Schärf 1990, Schärf 2001, 
Seekings 2001, Shearing 2001, Dixon 2004, Froestad and Shearing 2012). However, these 
practises are not organized under specific networks or organizations in the three settlements 
of this study. Although CPF’s and neighbourhood watches were mentioned, they were not 
very active. Still, norms and practices of internal justice are significant, apparent in a range of 
more informally organized practises. Thus, I am here not interested in exactly what formal or 
informal shape community policing takes, but rather how community policing practises in the 
settlements of this study form leaders and are infringed with ambiguities of moral logics.  
 
Dealing with household and neighbour conflicts 
Like in any neighbourhoods, neighbours and families argue and fight. Drama that unfolds in 
informal settlements might be especially intense, not only due a lack of formal policing, but 
also because of frustration and antagonism with the situation of informal settlement life. In 
many field visits, I witnessed or was told about such conflicts with sometimes severe and 
                                                 
55
 Especially in the townships where most of the informal settlements in Cape Town are located. Crime statistics 
show that the Nyanga police district  within which two of the settlemetns of this study are located have the 
highest statistics of murder and rape in South Africa; see report ‘Crime in Cape Town: 2001 – 2008’  
 (CoCT 2009).  
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violent outcomes. A young father kidnapped his son because his girlfriend left him after a 
violent relationship. A young mother hanged herself because her boyfriend left her. A woman 
moved to another settlement because her husband cheated on her with the neighbour’s 
teenage daughter. An old woman hit her neighbour on the head with a hammer because of a 
long-standing disagreement. Another woman stabbed her neighbour because she suspected 
her of having reported lies about her to the police. With the lack of private space, such issues 
are loudly discussed.  
 
Friends, family and neighbours sometimes assist in solving such conflicts, but leaders were 
frequently asked to intervene. Leaders are asked to come and solve even the smallest drama, 
as explained by one resident in GP: 
 
W: Even small things. For instance if the neighbour throw water into my place, 
we call the committee.. So it is a lot of stress for the committee. 
L: But why don’t they sort out these things themselves? 
W: I don’t know. People here report everything [to the leaders] – they say we 
have a committee here. 
(Resident, GP, 27.2.2011) 
 
A leader in GP similarly explains that a main duty of leaders is to deal with such conflicts:   
 
It [committee work] was more about internal family issues. Because when 
people go to the police station to report something they send them back and tell 
them to talk to the community leaders. Because there is several problems we 
(the committee) sorted out, often better than the police. Cases like if there is 
someone who throws water or rubbish in front of your house. Or for instance, 
one lady did not give back the money she owned. The lady who wanted the 
money back came to me, and I went straight there and got the money for her.  
(Community leader 3, GP, 23.8.2011) 
 
When staying with some of the leaders over time, I noticed the traffic of people coming and 
talking about their problems. Notably, the volume of this work varies between the 
settlements, being particularly high in Egoli, and between the different leaders. Some, like 
one of the older ‘mamas’ in Egoli, are approached often. This traffic of residents asking for 
her advice tires her, and she sometimes complains she is too old for this now and told people 
they must solve their drama themselves.  
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If the family or neighbour conflicts cannot be solved by leaders intervening directly, it might 
be taken to a community meeting. In Egoli, the relationship between shebeen
56
 owners and 
their direct neighbours was an ongoing source of tension, and were often discussed at such 
community meetings.  
 
A leader in GP explains dealing with internal conflicts sometimes requires that residents and 
leaders get involved in public negotiations, possibly bringing it to the police:  
 
How we deal with such problems, we first talk amongst the community leaders 
and the people that are affected by the problem. Then if it is a big problem we 
might take it to the whole community in a community meeting, or go to the 
police station.  
(Community leader 3, GP, 23.8.2011) 
 
This reminds of the organized conflict resolution through community courts in townships 
(Shearing 2001, Schärf 2001, Seekings 2001, Froestad and Shearing 2012). Comparing the 
current detailed practises with the historical organized community policing forms, it appears 
that the current practises are more sporadic and have developed in own detailed regulative 
practices. In these settlements, the practises are less organized, and more like taken-for- 
granted ways of informal settlement life, as leaders often explained that ‘it is just something 
we do here’.  Consequently, it can be seen as an informally ‘institutionalized’ practise.  
 
Organizing against crime  
Leaders are also involved in more serious issues like dealing with crime and security. 
In Egoli, crimes like theft and violence is high on the agenda, and is a frequent complaint. In 
one community meeting, one older woman furiously stood up and shouted ‘we must kill the 
robbers’, receiving acknowledging comments from the other residents. In another incident, a 
furious neighbouring small farmer came to the settlement and told the leaders someone had 
stolen several of his sheep. He said he was so angry now that he would kill that person who 
stole and did not care if that meant he had to go to jail forever. The leaders sat down and 
discussed it with him, and although they did confirm that the thief was someone from Egoli, 
                                                 
56
 A shebeen is an alcohol outlet or pub without a licence to operate. Shebeens are common in most informal 
settlements. For a discussion of community-based regulations of such places, see Drivdal and Lawhon (in 
press). 
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they managed to calm him down and promised they would confront the thief and arrange 
more community meetings on this issue.  
Ideas of community justice are frequent as many residents perceive police action as non-
present or inadequate. In February 2012, a resident was killed allegedly by a resident from 
another informal settlement, and some of Egoli’s residents called one of the leaders to give 
them ‘permission’ to find and ‘arrest’ the person themselves. They did not trust the police to 
sort out this problem, and it is but one example of the lack of trust in the police. The leader 
refused to do this and told them to go to the police.  
 
In GP too, crime is a major worry.  In earlier years, the main leader was connected to a CPF, 
and residents tell of the period with night patrols and that efforts were made to reduce crime. 
However, as this leader apparently was killed due to his intense involvement in regulating 
internal crime, the current leaders in GP feared to engage such issues.  
 
In Kosovo, residents remarked on the danger of being robbed when walking outside at nights 
or when going to the train station to get to work early in the morning. Additionally, there is 
an increasing concern with the recent growth of youth gangs and Kosovo appears to be one of 
the strongholds of one of these gangs. This was a great worry to many residents, and leaders 
often discussed how to deal with it. Apparently, there had been a neighbourhood watch 
earlier, which dissolved due to a range of issues, like fatigue and accusations of corruption. 
One leader constantly asked for aid to restart a neighbourhood watch or a police forum:  
 
There is a lot of crime here.. If there is a crime at Spar, they run inside here to 
hide…. People from outside come here in the weekends to the shebeens, and 
they buy drugs. If people see them [the criminals] they kill them. We want to 
prevent that.  The police forum is in between the community and the police. 
We want a NGO that can arrest people to take them to the police 
(Community leader 9, Kosovo, 6.4.2011) 
 
These problems with crime and ideas of how to collaborate on dealing with these issues were 
discussed in many encounters and meetings. There have also been interactions with the 
police, who have held open meetings in the settlements and trained selected residents to carry 
out neighbourhood watch work. Despite this, in 2013 there was still no operating 
neighbourhood watch.  
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Regulation of ‘un-orderly’ concerns: migration and informal economy   
In addition to the negotiating practises applied to deal with conflicts and crime, specific 
preventive regulative practises have emerged aimed at increasing control and order.  
 
Regulating migration  
With continuing urbanization, the need for space becomes more severe. A central worry with 
migration into the settlement, highlighted by both leaders and residents, is the fear that 
‘criminals would to move into the settlement’. This fear appears to be a main reason for 
establishing regulative and controlling practises. As also mentioned by Bekker and Louw 
(1994), committees are set up to regulate on-migration as it is assumed to lead to conflicts. In 
a settlement I visited earlier (Sheffield Road), the leaders had a list of people waiting for a 
shack in which to stay, and they only allowed people from within the settlement that lived in 
overcrowded shacks to buy houses, in order to avoid allowing ‘strangers’ into the settlement. 
This example is quite radical, but it seems to be a common rule in all the three settlements 
that you have to ask and get permission both from neighbours and from the leaders before 
moving into settlement: 
 
When you arrive, you look for a space, then you ask the people here, then you 
meet with the street committee. You need to bring papers, proof that you were 
staying somewhere, so that we can avoid getting criminals inside here. 
 (Resident and community leader 3, GP, 28.09 2010) 
 
The regulation is practised by monitoring new migrants building or buying a shack, and 
community leaders oversee the transaction of money from buyer to owner. I witnessed this 
while staying with one leader in Kosovo. A group of five men came to her home, and to my 
initial confusion, they started discussing and taking out a large amount of money. They 
counted the money several times in front of the leader. After they left, I was told that the 
group consisted of a person who was buying a shack, the owner, and three other witnesses, 
and that they had some to the leader so that she could oversee and make the payment official. 
Such practises can of course be exploited, and there are many rumours about leaders taking 
some extra money for carrying out and ‘administrating’ these transactions.  
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Community leaders also sometimes produce documents like ‘a proof of residency’57 which is 
necessary for e.g. setting up a bank account, getting a loan, or registering a sim card, and 
‘recommendation letters’ for residents who want to move. This also partly entails a 
mechanism for punishment, because if residents do not behave well, the leaders will not give 
them a recommendation letter.  
 
This does not imply that the leaders can decide who is going to stay and who not. Even 
though, as mentioned in Burman and Schärf’s case study of 1990, leaders can evict 
‘problematic residents’, this is difficult in practise in the settlements of this study. As evident 
in Egoli, regulation processes might also be effective at first but then decline in periods of 
conflict:   
 
 I asked for A.. when I moved here. Everyone have to ask for permission. But 
after 2008 it became out of control, because of the owner allied with the new 
committee. But now it is not a committee any more, everyone is doing their 
own thing.  
(Resident, Egoli, 3.8.2011). 
 
When you come here you go straight to A…with ID. If you are not in the book 
you not staying here. … But there is a lot of new people now, and they did not 
go to him, they just came here and stay. Especially here in the back, there are 
too much people now, and they are making a lot of trouble….. They just came 
and built. And some sold shacks but come back again.  
(Community leader 4, Egoli, 25.11.2011). 
 
It is also difficult to reject people who move in. GP, which is situated illegally in a 
government-owned area that was not meant for habitation, expanded more or less 
uncontrolled: 
 
P.. from the city told me not to allow the people to build inside there. But all 
places start like this, once one comes in – a million follows. We also struggle to 
control people when you tell people not to build they say it is not your land.  
(Community leader 1, GP, 9.11.2011). 
 
In Egoli, the owner of the land blamed the leader for letting more and more people stay there. 
From the leader’s perspective though, it is hard to deny people to move in, as noted by an ex-
leader: But we can’t say we have no place when people come, then they must stay in the 
                                                 
57
 To provide ‘proof of residency’ is supposed to be the Ward councillor’s duty, but as he does not have time, in 
many cases he hands over this job to informal settlement leaders.  
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bushes with their child…(Resident, Egoli, 16.11.2011). One leader explained that the 
settlement grows especially through the arrival of evicted farm workers who are hard to 
reject: 
 
Still today, the government allows farmers to bring people, and if people get 
evicted from the farms here, where do they run? To the informal settlements. 
That make the informal settlements very big here by us. Even though we know 
we can’t help anymore people, because why, the government don’t want us to 
help more people, but what must we do if a mother and a father and small 
children come here and say they have no place to sleep? We can’t allow that 
they sleep in the bush. Ja, we can’t allow that they sleep on the streets, that is 
not fair. Because everyone got a right to a roof over his head. 
(Community leader 5, Egoli, 28.08.2010). 
 
This difficulty of denying desperate people to move in shows that control and regulation is 
not as straight forward as often portrayed in field visits. As mentioned by Barry et al. 
(2007:172), people may flood into informal settlements despite that local government has 
asked community leaders to oversee that no more people will be allowed to settle there. 
However, in Kosovo, some evictions of assumed ‘problematic residents’ have taken place 
(see also newspaper article by Tsilo 2011), which also has increased tension between 
residents and some leaders (this will be discussed further in chapter eight).  
 
Regulating the informal economy  
There is an urge, to varying degrees between settlements, to regulate ‘informal businesses’58, 
which are ever increasing and in some instances create tension. The tension is linked to the 
nature of the business, and illegal drinking places like shebeens create much tension as the 
consequences of this business are more severe for the neighbourhood. Residents connected 
shebeens to internal crime, hygiene, noises and family conflicts, and both residents and 
leaders suggest and attempt to control, regulate or even ban them from the area (Drivdal and 
Lawhon in press). The problems with shebeens might be due to the fact that they are ‘night-
time informal businesses’, which also includes the drug trade. When staying in the settlement 
overnight, it made me realize, as also mentioned in Simone’s (2010) descriptions, how a 
different regime kicks in when the nightlife takes over. Families and friends visit each other, 
but many residents are afraid to leave their home, even to go to the toilet, and therefore stay 
                                                 
58
 However, not only informal businesses have discovered the possibilities in these areas. Increasingly, formal 
businesses like grocery chains establish in the nearby areas, in addition to companies like insurance brokers. 
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inside the entire night. And even though you are inside, you can listen in on what is going on 
outside, as the shacks are dense and the walls are thin. The noise from the street dogs fighting 
and looking for food, the noise from the shebeens and drunk people chatting loudly, singing 
or arguing, can easily be heard. 
Nevertheless, also daytime businesses like small grocery outlets, known as spaza shops, 
barber shops or food stalls, are sometimes seen as problematic. They are connected with 
jealousy and suspicion, and competition over jobs which can lead to violence, as evident in 
xenophobic attacks on Somalian spaza shops. It should be noted here that the jealousy is not 
only directed at foreigners, but at general  ‘outsiders’ who enter to establish businesses like 
braais, spazas or shebeens, or that simply enter the settlements to sell stuff. There are 
rumours that people living elsewhere, living ‘in nice houses’, deliberately turn to informal 
settlements seeking business potential and even own ‘chains’ of spaza shops and shebeens. 
Such tension has led an urge to regulate these informal businesses.  
 
In Kosovo and GP, leaders often stated that they would regulate businesses, but it did not 
seem to happen often in practise. In Egoli I did observe instances where spazas were 
regulated: In October 2011, several of the community leaders were discussing and updating 
each other on the matter of a person that had just moved to Egoli from another settlement and 
had started to build a spaza. He had not asked anyone for permission, just started to build. 
The leaders were worried and suspected him of being a drug dealer. They had called the 
police, and told the man that if he did not stop building they would take it down and chase 
him away. In another incident in January 2012, a community meeting took up the case that a 
woman planned to rent out space in her shack to persons from another area who wanted to 
start a spaza shop. The leaders did not like this idea, because they, and also other residents, 
do not like that ‘outsiders’ that don’t live in Egoli enter the settlement to make money. They 
further pointed at it could lead to competition and problems with the largest spaza shop in the 
settlement, which is owned by Somalians. This spaza gives the impression of being more or 
less integrated into the community. As stated by one leader, Somalians who own spaza shops 
are appreciated because they contribute more broadly to community matters: The Somalians 
here are nice, they help paying when we need petrol money to go to the court. (Community 
leader 4, Egoli, 7.2.2012). The leaders therefore suggested that the Somalians should rather 
help the resident woman start her own spaza and collaborate with her, instead of bringing in 
outsiders.  
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Practises of order and the emergence of leaders 
Summing up, with the need for security and order, several practises have evolved to deal with 
this, and I have here outlined practises of regulating internal order, practises of organizing 
against crime, and practises of regulating disorderly concerns.  Taking these together, one of 
the major reasons for leaders and committees to emerge is that someone needs to carry out 
these tasks. In other words, the idea that these practises are necessary for improving security, 
has led to the formation of committees and leaders. One way in which certain leaders emerge 
to deal with these issues is through a ‘natural’ process: Persons who have abilities to solve 
conflicts are consulted by residents, and a ‘snowball effect’ appears when more and more 
residents consult these persons and they gain a reputation of being able to solve conflicts. 
Thereby they are favoured by many residents as leaders, and are increasingly asked to help 
both individuals and in community matters. Two leaders, one from GP and one from another 
settlement, explain:  
 
W: I have this way of solving the problems naturally. I intervene and things 
will get better. 
M: Also when I told I was dropping, people cried no. Because I used to solve 
problems. So people are afraid that things will get worse. But some community 
leaders also do wrong things.  
(Community leader Open Space and community leader 3, GP, 1.11.2011). 
 
Also leaders in Egoli and Kosovo pointed out that people kept on coming to them with their 
problems and ‘forced’ them to be leaders. Of course, such portrayals can be seen as 
overstatements. In practise however, it does make sense and it is observed that some leaders 
are favoured for their abilities to solve problems, as also noted by Ross (2010).   
 
5.3.2 The social construction of leaders through practises of mobilization  
A second stream leading to the construction of leaders and committees is practises of 
mobilizing, often through holding ‘community meetings’. Such meetings, which are essential 
to improve democratic participation, are held irregularly, although many leaders claim the 
meetings are held every week. Several mobilizing practises are applied to cajole people into 
attending these meetings, including going door to door, putting up posters or announcing the 
meetings with loudspeakers. Still, these practises are not always followed up, can be random, 
and difficult as many residents are not present in the settlement much of the time. Hence, 
there are often residents who claim they lacked information about meetings.  
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Mobilizing is relevant when facing external threats or opportunities for the settlement as a 
whole, especially in the early period of establishing a settlement and when facing threats of 
eviction. When Kosovo was forming (in 1999), such threats led to internal mobilizing, as the 
owner of the land claimed it back. According to some of the leaders, this was why they 
started to organize a committee:  
 
In 1999/2000 we decided to have leaders. Because the police and soldiers came 
because they said that the owner wanted the land. So then we elected leaders 
who will stand for us.  
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 20.9.2011).  
 
These leaders went to government to negotiate the eviction, and local government ended up 
buying the land form the owner in 2004.  
 
Another immediate external threat was the neighbours living in formal houses next to where 
they started settling. Many of these neighbours first opposed the establishment of this new 
informal neighbourhood. According to one of the older leaders, the people in the houses were 
fighting us and burnt down my shack. Because it puts down their value to have an informal 
settlement next to them (Community leader 9, Kosovo, 19.02.2013). To deal with this threat, 
some residents actively mobilized more people to come and settle to gain mass and thereby 
power:  
 
When we started fighting with the neighbours in the houses, we got more 
people to come and build shacks here so that we were many here. When the 
people in the houses saw that we were many, they gave up fighting, and we 
collaborated with them since 2000.  
(Community leader 9, Kosovo, 19.02.2013). 
 
In order to speed up the settling process and gain mass to resist the neighbours, Community 
leader 9 also organized building material from demolition sites, which he sold to people that 
wanted to settle there.  
 
Egoli too was established through mobilized occupation, as a group of evicted farm workers 
decided to occupy a piece of land that they had earlier used as a soccer field. After 
establishment of the settlements, mobilizing of residents continued to be important to 
mobilize against evictions and to arrange public protest (commonly referred to as toyi-toyi) 
for service delivery. When important things are happening in the settlement, like negotiations 
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around service delivery, eviction cases and internal crime, residents are mobilized to join 
meetings. Several open meetings were held to inform the residents about the eviction court 
case. Further, protest marches were organized, and when necessary transport for several 
residents to join both protests or court case meetings in town. Mobilizing also extends to 
other settlements in similar positions. Some residents have engaged in mobilization at a 
broader scale by helping other settlements threatened by eviction: 
 
A: We were there – to give them advice. Because we have to come together. 
They called us there – not only us but a few other informal settlements. I drove 
all the informal settlement people there. We talked, make plans. 
M: There is people that are there that are part of us. We want to take action, 
make fight……If we know that things is going to happen there, we must be 
there in hundreds and thousands. 
(Community leader 5 and resident, Egoli, 11.10.2010) 
 
Such solidarity mobilizing with other settlements was less common in the other settlements. 
 
The development of internal mobilizers as leaders 
Often, some of the people that started the settlement and also mobilized others to move to the 
area automatically become leaders. In GP and Kosovo, most of these initiators of the 
settlements no longer live in the settlement. Only in Egoli is the main person who organized 
the land invasion and ‘started the settlement’ still the person that appears to be the main 
leader. At first I was unsure about how many actually knew him in the settlement, but 
indications from the survey data showed that 95.6 % answered that they know the leaders, 
and when asked who the leaders are, they usually named this leader.  In a community 
leadership election in 2013, he received 209 of 238 valid votes. At one point, he moved from 
the settlement, and many residents were worried: He was the first community leader, and they 
will not let him go (Community leader 6, Egoli, 21.4.2011). This of course does not mean that 
he is not contested.  
 
Therefore, the need for mobilization leads to the development of particular individuals into 
leaders. It is related to the expectations that someone should put time aside to work for the 
settlement: 
 
No one wants to become a leader…But people see what you do, then they force 
you to become a community leader….The community know how you are 
active in organizations, so they elect you.  
(Community leader 9, Kosovo, 21.4.2011) 
115 
 
 
In other words, if someone has experience with mobilizing and doing activist work, residents 
often want them to continue working for the community. The residents who are active in 
mobilizing become familiar to many residents, especially through the practises of walking 
door to door to engage residents to join meetings or protests and through regularly speaking 
up in community meetings. This is also one reason also a reason why some leaders find it 
hard withdraw, as will be discussed further in chapter seven and eight.  
 
5.3.3 The social construction of leaders through intermediary practises  
Mediating with externals, like local government, NGOs, political parties or researchers is in 
my observations a third common practise that forms leaders and committees. Intermediary 
practises have increased as an increasing range of externals need organizational units or 
contact persons in the settlements. Relevant here is the anxiety of co-optation. Related to 
South African informal settlement organizing, co-optation by the state (Bähre 2007a, 
Staniland 2008, Zuern 2011), by NGOs (Allison 2002:179) or political parties (Fourchard 
2012). Hence, as there are multiple externals that intervene at times, chances are that there are 
multiple attempts at co-opting the leaders and committees.  
 
In Kosovo, there has been much external involvement, especially after the land was bought 
by CoCT in 2004. This increased interaction between leaders and local government 
departments when upgrading projects were initiated, like installing electricity, toilets, making 
roads with speed bumps. Negotiating with local government on service delivery is presented 
as a particularly important task for the leaders: 
 
P: If there is no community leader, nothing can happen. If there is a problem, 
people go to the community leader and he contacts government.  
N: If there is floods, fires, and other problems, we don’t sleep, we call the City 
of Cape Town. 
(Community leaders 10 and 11, Kosovo 21.4.2011) 
 
The leaders do not only negotiate with the administrative side of local government, but also 
with politicians, a range of NGOs and social movements, and the ward councillors. I also 
witnessed the committee acting as mediators between residents and their employers, 
specifically on jobs within the settlement, like the appointment of internal cleaners. In one 
committee meeting they negotiated the working conditions and salary of these employees 
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with the employer. The employer was not happy with the committee’s involvement and stated 
that the committee should not be involved in such issues and that he would discuss this matter 
directly with the employees only.  
 
In GP, there has been less engagement by externals. My own engagement as a researcher, 
however, brought attention to the settlement, and the leaders were approached by media, a 
few NGOs and local government officials. In 2010, three of the leaders joined a localized 
social movement. They attended several meetings, and reported back at their own community 
meetings what had happened to the other settlement residents. They also received the task to 
report back to and mobilize more residents, which they did. After some months of meetings 
and volunteer work, the movement fell apart due to internal disagreements and splits. Yet, the 
interaction with the movement did provide some contact with local government departments.  
 
Egoli receives much attention by externals, particularly by NGOs, Christian and Muslim 
organizations, social movements, and volunteer students. Some of these have established 
ventures like farming projects or soup kitchens, while others are more focused on mobilizing. 
Due to the settlements location on private land, interaction with the bureaucratic side of local 
government has been more difficult. Other channels have been used to pressurize this 
interaction. Further, the leaders have engaged with different political parties. However, it is 
expressed that external actors, especially political parties, exploit them by making them carry 
out work for them:  
 
I am tired of parties. Some years ago I worked with ID, after that I worked a 
long time with the ANC. But I see now that they use us. They do nothing for 
us. …. … They only talk lies. 
(Community leader 5, Egoli, 18.2.2011) 
 
Such fatigue with political parties is expressed not only by leaders but also by residents. On 
the other hand, a resident mentioned that both residents and leaders have engaged in practises 
where they exploit the political parties in return: 
 
…now when the pol parties are starting to come again, it is our time to exploit 
them. We put on one t-shirt when one party comes with things for the 
community, then another when another party comes 
(Resident, Egoli, 21.4.2013) 
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This indicates that the assumption that political parties take advantage of communities to gain 
votes sometimes is turned on its head, as residents and committees are opportunistic about the 
attention they receive. As there are several externals intervening at times, leaders and 
residents use these connections without committing to any one specific external. Hence, they 
are not really co-opted by one external as might be assumed, but have developed methods of 
juggling different external links.  
 
Committee and leaders as appointed or evolved due to external contacts 
Leaders develop through these practises, as externals need some kind of organized contact 
person when engaging with informal settlements. Externals often require that the settlements 
are ‘well organized’ in order to engage in collaboration, as mentioned by an Egoli resident 
who assists the leaders and participates in committee activities:   
 
Wherever we went they said we must have a committee. Like a council, like 
the ward councillor, they did not want to talk to us because we were not a 
committee. And also for the people to have a voice. Before that is was just A. 
(Resident, Egoli, 17.4.2012) 
 
These recommendations on organizing are taken seriously and are one reason for ‘more 
formalised’ committees to emerge.  
 
Further, as mentioned in chapter three, externals sometimes install committees and leaders 
directly (Lemanski 2008, Bähre 2007a:82-83 and Bénit 2002). With the government-initiated 
projects in Kosovo, a few residents were appointed to mediate regarding these projects, and 
sometimes specific committees are set up: 
 
If there are developments - people have a meeting and elect committees. When 
the roads development project happened, I was elected and nominated by the 
community to be a project committee.  
(Community leader 8, Kosovo 20.9.2011) 
 
This leader was appointed as part of a larger pilot project in 2008/2009 when drainage 
systems and an alternative flush toilet system were installed (Armitage et al. 2010). Also 
CoCT’s health inspectors often urge for specialized ‘health committees’ to be established in 
each of the settlements.  
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External intervention can also unintentionally create leaders. I experienced this myself as I 
engaged with residents in GP. From the beginning, I worked particularly closely with one of 
the residents that helped me out with the survey. I used him as a main contact person 
throughout the field visits, and I noticed how he changed during the months of interaction, 
from being shy to more and more outspoken, also in public encounters or encounters with 
other externals. In one conversation, he pointed how his role as being my contact person 
impacted on what other residents expected of him: People appoint me. Because I am involved 
in development matters, especially after I met you. (Community leader 3, GP, 22.7.2011).  
Further, involvement by a local social movement led to the establishment of a new committee 
and increased the responsibilities of this leader: 
 
I refused first to be a community leader. Because for me it is good to work 
from the outside. So then this thing about PPF came up. That was when I was 
chosen, when I became leader. The thing that made me involved here was my 
involvement out there.  
(Community leader 3, GP, 21.8.2011) 
 
This indicates that external interventions not only deliberately impact on the social 
construction of leadership, but also indirectly and unintentionally, as external attention 
generates the hope for developments among residents generally.    
 
5.3.4 Settlement comparison and committees as micro-governments  
Comparing the settlements, the three identified practises are relevant to the construction of 
leadership committees in all three settlements, but to different degrees and at different times:   
 
In GP, practises of dealing with internal conflicts and organizing security seem to have 
shaped the first generation of leaders. It appeared that a leader in one of the neighbouring 
settlements (Siyachlala) was involved. She explained that when people started moving into 
the area, she was consulted by these early residents, and by local government who wanted her 
to prevent people moving in. When GP’s first home-grown leader emerged it was said that 
that leader learnt how to organize from the leader in Siyachlala: 
 
I think we copied this way of having a book – everything – we copied her 
leadership style and her skills. Michael, he was a good leader. He learnt from 
N. [neighbour committee leader] how to do the leadership.  
(Community leader 3, GP, 9.11.2011). 
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This neighbouring leader had ‘learnt committee work’ from being active in both the 
Community Policing Forum (CPF) and SANCO, while living in Gugulethu. She helped the 
new GP committee establish practises and models. However, also here, other leaders have 
different organizational experiences from political parties like the South African Communist 
Party and social movements.  
 
In the early years of Kosovo, the need to mobilize against the ‘common enemy of eviction’ 
was one reason for the emergence of the first leaders. Besides this, and particularly in the 
later years, it seems that many leaders have emerged due to their involvements with local 
government, with NGOs, CBOs, social movements or political parties. The experience from 
such involvement is relevant in the current committee practices. When asking the secretary 
where he learnt how to organize meetings and keep meeting notes, he explained that he leant 
it from another person with whom he previously worked for a savings group in Johannesburg, 
and he thought it wold be good to use this system and keep notes (Community leader 12, 
Kosovo, 27.3.2012). Another committee member answered he had received training in the 
‘the boy scouts’. Others responded that these practices had been picked up as members or 
local branch executives of political parties. Some had also participated in the ward 
committee.  
 
In Egoli, the main community leader emerged as he initiated the occupation of the land and 
mobilised other evicted farmworkers to join him. Further, he has a range of experiences, from 
working with different political parties to working with organized security measures and 
different NGOs. He was also involved in the ward committee for three years, as he was one 
of ten members. During this time, he engaged in informing and talking to the various 
settlements within the ward and holding open public meetings with. He showed me pictures 
of these public meetings, and explained that they used to hire a truck to drive around to 
inform residents about meetings and distribute flyers. Inspired by this, he applied similar 
methods of mobilizing when arranging meetings in Egoli.  
Other committee members in Egoli have experiences from engaging with a variety of NGOs 
and social movement networks, and contacts with other informal settlements on private land 
similarly facing an eviction. Additionally, an expansion and formalizing of the main 
committee manifested due to interaction with the police: In 2005, people in the broader area 
(Schaapkraaal) came together to fight a common security threat: the legendary serial killer 
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‘the Jesus Killer’. A loose form of neighbourhood watch had been carried out sporadically, 
but it became a more formalized ’community committee’ through collaboration between 
residents, neighbouring areas and with the police. The committee was set up with 
formalization of the committee members and through identification cards which stated ‘Egoli 
Informal settlement community worker’. It had a picture, name, phone number and a stamp. 
These identification cards were necessary when patrolling the larger area to avoid 
vigilantism.  
 
Summing up, the settlement committees are constructed through a bricolage (Skuse and 
Cousins 2007) of circulating practises (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a, 2012b). This fits with the 
observations that a multitude of practises are applied to access and negotiate with local 
government (Thorn and Oldfield 2011), and the observation that informal settlements 
committees can incorporate both community policing and mobilizing models into one 
umbrella organization (Oldfield 2000). This diversity of organizational experiences opens up 
for many variances. It is therefore difficult to determine where the committee practises have 
emerged from in each settlement, and it is problematic to link the committee to only one 
practice as it could end up ignoring the complex expectations of committees and leaders. 
Consequently, it is important not to link informal settlement committees too closely to only 
one practice or to assume that they are formed by one broader network organization.  
Although there are differences between experiences and current setup of committees between 
the settlements, the three practises do have relevance in all of them and can be drawn in at 
different times.  
 
Drawing together these practises, it becomes evident that the committees they encompass 
both political and bureaucratic sides. Further, in my interpretation, they can be seen as micro 
local-governments acting as regulators, public servants, and political representatives. 
Mobilization practises can be related to democratic ideas of interaction and participation, and 
the ‘duties’ of mobilizing and engaging with residents can be seen as part of the political side 
of the micro-government. On the bureaucratic side, some of the practises of regulating order 
have evolved into bureaucratic procedures. Intermediary practises, although they also consist 
of representation practises, often result in increased bureaucracy. This is because 
intermediary practices imply contacting externals, working with them and carrying out work 
for them; which often include increased administrative tasks like counting and numbering the 
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shacks in the settlements (which is necessary for service delivery), arranging additional 
meetings, and reporting back. Also the ward councillors sometimes delegate administrative 
duties like providing ‘proof of residency’. Further, a main issue is that the bureaucratic and 
the more democratic parts are blurred; there are no clear division between who does what 
within the committees. This underlines that there might be a constant balancing of these 
practises. Further, if the committees and leaders become specialized into one of these 
practises, the other practises might be neglected. With increasing administrative work tasks, 
the leaders might become more detached from residents, which further increase chances of 
‘gatekeeping’ or suspicion of gatekeeping. This opens up the debate of the tensions of 
democratic and bureaucratic logics in chapter seven and eight.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The three settlements of this thesis display some significant differences. They span 
differences in size, land situation, and fundamental demographics. The location, if it is 
situated on private, public or earmarked land is essential to the settlements chances of 
receiving services like electricity and in situ upgrading. Especially GP and Egoli are 
struggling with receiving such services, as the residents in praxis meant to be relocated.  
What the three settlements have in common is that none are receiving upgraded housing, and 
that they were all established in the period after Apartheid.  
 
Building on the note that there are some overall similarities in committee practises despite the 
fact that the settlements are different, the second component of this chapter has discussed 
practises that create the need for committees and leaders. These practises seem to be linked to 
general features of informal settlements like high crime rates and a need for service delivery. 
Through these contextual traits, organizational practices have emerged, become 
institutionalized, and are significant to the ongoing social construction of leadership and 
committees. I have identified and considered three major practises: mediating and regulating 
internal order, mobilizing, and intermediary negotiation. These can be seen as three major 
patches of the ‘briocolage’ of practises (Skuse and Cousins 2007) that establish committees 
and leaders. Thus, leaders have emerged through a process of being able to negotiate conflicts 
or tension, through initiating mobilization, and through external contacts.  
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Further, in answering what kind of organizations they are, the committees could be described 
as a micro local government, as they act both as regulators of security and migration, as 
public servants, and as representatives in interaction with external levels. However, they are 
much more than just bureaucrats; they are community workers in the field, encountering 
residents and dealing with their problems directly. Additionally, there is no clear division 
between these tasks. Therefore, the findings that they are shaped in relation to three 
fundamentally different practises show that they are essentially hybrid organizations. The 
organizational field of ‘informal settlement leadership’ can be understood as formed by plural 
institutional logics (Greenwood et al. 2011). This is also underlined by the fact that the 
bricolage of leadership practise is stitched together in various ways in the settlements, and by 
that the committees seem to change main focus over time, as priorities between logics are 
unstable. That leaders are expected to perform plural practises further indicates that internal 
disagreement might emerge on what these leaders should do or not, and how the committees 
should be organised. Such tensions will be considered further in chapter seven and eight. 
However, before this, chapter six will further explore particular urban convictions out of 
which these leaders and the tensions of logics emerge.  
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CHAPTER 6 Conditions of speaking publicly in urban informal 
settlements: public –private relations and disciplinary norms.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
There is undoubtedly an ambiguity towards community leaders amongst residents of the 
settlements. As public persons, they are loved and hated, and a lot of rumours surround them. 
However, although many residents are unhappy with the leaders, they are reluctant to engage 
in leadership practises themselves, speak up in meetings, and even attend community 
meetings at all.  In this chapter, I look into this problem by analysing some of the specific 
social urban conditions for residents to engage in the internal politics of the settlements.  
 
This is relevant to the framework outlined in the theory chapter, which underlines that the 
(institutional) contexts in which organizing emerge are of fundamental importance. As I am 
interested in political organizing at the neighbourhood scale, the condition of the ‘public 
realm’ within the settlements becomes a significant aspect of the context. Therefore, for a 
first hand insight into how politics in informal settlements might unfold, a fundamental task 
is to look into the conditions of the internal public realm and for acting politically within in 
this distinctive urban environment. The focus on the public realm is based on an 
understanding of politics where ‘acting politically’ implies getting involved in the common 
concerns of the settlement. In contextual literature, frequent descriptions of informal 
settlement fluidity and fragmentation indicate that getting involved and acting publicly is 
problematic. For a deeper discussion of why this is so, the analysis will revolve around 
conditions for informal settlements residents to deliberate their common affairs. The research 
question for this chapter is hence: 
 
What are the conditions of the internal public realm and for speaking publicly? 
 
After first outlining how there is a fatigue with participating in community meetings in the 
three settlements, I will analyse two aspects of the public realm context within informal 
settlements: residents’ relations to the public-private boundaries, and more normative 
constraints to speaking publicly. Public-private boundaries, will be discussed by looking into 
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social dynamics of a fluid and young heterogeneous population, in addition to the actual 
public spaces where physical conditions of people living densely and sharing facilities forms 
a unique public setting. These conditions can be related to classical theories of urbanization. 
The following part will look into how particular behavioural norms are a form of disciplinary 
power that impact on both the willingness to speak publicly and what is spoken about 
publicly. Such norms and discourses shaping the conditions of speaking publicly are more 
often found in ethnographic literature.  
 
6.2 Fatigue with community meetings  
Holding community meetings is imperative to engage residents around common issues and to 
share information for increased transparency. The lack of transparency is evident in the many 
examples of ‘gatekeeping’ or suspicion of gatekeeping (Watson 2003, Barry and Ruhter 
2005, Cross 2005, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Staniland 2008). Especially suspicion around job 
allocation is a source of tension. Bearing in mind that one of the main issues for residents, 
especially those who have migrated from Eastern Cape, is getting a job (Hunter and Posel 
2012), corruption (or suspicion of corruption) around job allocation is a major reason for 
heated politics and internal fights (Millstein and Jordhus-Lier 2012). Yet, as improved 
transparency is desperately needed, the challenge is how to actually improve transparency in 
these particular neighbourhoods without increased participation on community meetings.  
 
In the three settlements of this study, I observed that it was hard to mobilize residents to 
participate in public meetings, not only for those held in town or other areas, but also internal 
meetings. 
 
In Egoli, there were several community meetings during the years of field visits, but they 
varied enormously in frequency and in attendance. Although the survey showed that 96.7 % 
answered that they participate in community meetings, there were usually from 50 to 150 
residents attending the meetings I observed. The exception was the ‘election meeting’ in 
April 2013, where approximately 250 residents attended and voted (details of this election 
will be given in chapter eight). This is the largest assemblage I observed throughout the field 
visits, but looking at the approximate number of residents in Egoli displayed in Figure 8, 250 
persons is still only around one-third of the residents aged over 18 (which I have calculated to 
be approximately 764). Nevertheless, many residents came but left before the actual voting.  
125 
 
It should also be noted that before the meeting, the leaders put up posters at the spaza shops 
in the settlements, went from door to door to fetch people when the meetings started, so it did 
not seem that enough information was the problem. They also waited an hour for more 
residents to gather, constantly fetching more residents and calling them by using a 
microphone.  
 
In Kosovo, several meetings were held during the years of my field visits. Although most of 
these were committee meetings, there were also public meetings. One was arranged by the 
police, who intended to listen to peoples worries about the high crime rates. Some days 
beforehand, the police had driven through the settlement several times with loudspeakers to 
announce the meeting, and asked committee members of the main internal committee to 
inform as many as possible. The meeting was held openly in the middle of the settlement, 
which gave the police and some leaders the opportunity to gather more residents to join. Still, 
only around 100 residents showed up. 
 
In GP, there are few community meetings. During 2011 though, some meetings were held as 
a movement/ network formed in the area in which GP is located. These meetings came to an 
end because, after a period of discussions, nothing really happened. A few ‘workshops’ were 
also held with the research I was involved in and as local government health inspectors 
intervened. The responsibility to help arrange these meetings and to inform and engage 
residents falls on the leaders, who go door to door to collect people within the settlement. In a 
conversation with one of GPs most active leaders, he explained that, similarly to other 
settlements, it is difficult to engage people:  
 
The leader in that settlement doubted that people will come, because they have 
been promised this and that and they are now tired because nothing happens. 
Like roads and electricity. I also have the same problem because I see people 
are slow now. People start to doubt that there will be any change now, so they 
give up.  
(Community leader 3, GP, 22.02.2012) 
 
The fatigue indicated here is clearly linked to the disappointment with earlier engagements, 
although on different topics. It is a common experience that campaigns develop slowly and 
sometimes fail. Commitment also seems to some degree dependant on the topic, who initiated 
it and if it was a first or a follow-up meeting. The meetings often have similar contents, 
where the same issues are repeated. In the anti-crime meetings, everyone agrees that 
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something must be done and that neighbourhood watches need to be arranged or improved. In 
information sharing meetings on e.g. hygiene, residents are taught that they must wash hands.  
 
This fatigue with community meetings can be linked to studies on neighbour relations and 
show a tendency of withdrawal from the public to the private sphere of the individual 
households (Muyeba 2011, Muyeba and Seekings 2012). This ‘retreat to privacy’ in low-
income areas of Cape Town is linked to accumulating weak neighbourhood relations. A 
retreat to the private is problematic for the condition of the public sphere, which encourages 
public broad participation in public deliberation. Muyeba and Seekings (2012) link individual 
homeownership though housing project to this ‘retreat to privacy’. As evident in the three 
informal settlements discussed here, privacy is relevant to informal settlements without 
homeownership as well. The retreat to privacy unfolds in a reluctance of ordinary residents to 
engage in the public sphere. This can be framed under the ‘community lost’ rubric (Muyeba 
2012:43), related to the early urban literature (of e.g. Wirth 1938), which focus on the rapid 
social transformation and the rise of individualism in the urban setting. Although there 
probably are more neighbourhood meetings in informal settlements than in other 
neighbourhoods, it can be difficult to cajole informal settlement residents to attend meetings 
continuously (Saff 1996).  
 
In order to analyse the retreat to privacy more in-depth, I will now discuss both the social 
composition and the condition of the public space.  
 
6.3 Public-private boundaries: social dynamics and public space 
The ambiguity towards participating in community meetings can be related to residents’ 
relation to the boundaries between public and private space. Indications point toward a 
reluctance to engage in public discussions and an urge to retreat to private concerns. 
Obviously, with informal settlements generally consisting of a desperately low-income 
population, the struggle to survive and somehow get food on the table for you and your 
family is a major concern for most residents. However, there are also other reasons for a 
reluctance to engage in deliberating and dealing with common concerns. In these sections I 
will consider two fundamental factors: a young ‘individualized’ urban population and a 
complicated public space.  
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6.3.1 Social dynamics: Urban individuality, on-migration and household fluidity 
Some basic insights into how these settlements are made up socially are important. I will here 
discuss these two interlinked social dynamics that I found especially interesting: the presence 
of the young urban individual and ‘on-migration patterns’.   
 
The young urban individual 
The first time I arrived at an informal settlement was on a sunny weekend afternoon. The 
circumstances of the day I arrived (a sunny day and not a miserable rainy and cold winter 
day), gave similar first impressions of vibrancy that strikes many researchers encountering 
informal settlements (see amongst others Harber 2011). It struck me that I felt like I had 
arrived at a festival. It was so pulsating; music was blaring from different loudspeakers, and 
young people were ‘hanging out’ and ‘checking each other out’. It was not only the music 
and the excitement of arriving at a new place with lots of other young people that reminded 
me of a festival, but also the structures, which much like tents, were quite disorganized and 
had a feeling of ‘temporality’. However, people that come there to settle, mostly with the plan 
to move on to better conditions, eventually stay there much longer than planned. There are of 
course a lot of different residents, some large families, and a large amount of very hard 
working residents getting up before sunrise every morning to travel several hours to go to 
work, only returning back home after work. As these hard working residents mostly work and 
then sleep, I did not see them much. The dominating impression of a youthful space reminded 
me of my own the euphoric rush of managing on my own when I moved away from my 
family. Proud; because you are managing on your own, exited; because you will meet a lot of 
other young and perhaps don’t have to obey your parents’ rules. A beautiful young woman in 
a sexy red dress approached me and asked why I was there. She had arrived in Cape Town 
from the rural Eastern Cape not long ago, and was now living with her aunt. She was 
dreaming about working in the fashion industry, and was wondering why I came to this place 
and was carrying out this ‘boring’ workshop? After the workshop, we noticed a piece of 
paper left at her chair, where she had written, surrounded by doodled flowers; ‘booooring, so 
f**ing boooring’.  
 
My impression of a young and unestablished crowd did make some sense when looking at 
survey data displayed in the previous chapter.  In all the settlements, there are generally a 
high percentage of young residents, with around half of the population in the age group 18 to 
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35 years. As displayed in figure 7 (chapter five), my data shows that in both GP and Kosovo, 
very few (one percent) are over 65 years old. This fits with the CoCT (2005) survey, which 
shows that the age distribution in three of Cape Town’s informal settlements is 22% up to 10 
years, 30% between 11 and 24, 40% between 25-44, 8% over 45, and only 1 % of pensioners 
over 65 years (CoCT2 2005). Similarly, census data show that household heads in informal 
settlements are younger that those in formal dwellings: 48% are under the age of 35, 
compared to 19% in households in formal dwellings (HDA 2012:31). Notably, the age 
variation is higher in Egoli, and there are more old people: Here, my data shows that the 
average age head of household is older (39 years compared to 31 years in GP), that 23, 8%  
are between 35-64 years old, and that there are 2,7% being pensioners over 65. 
 
The tendency towards young individuals might be related to the tendency of generally small 
households: Especially in Kosovo, but also in GP, a considerable amount of residents live 
alone, and the average number of persons per household is low (see Figure 8). In one report 
this is considered to be surprising, suggesting that Kosovo is a temporary stopover for young 
adults (DiMP 2009:5). In contrast to this assumption, other surveys display similar 
tendencies: The census data from 2001 showed that 27% of the households living in informal 
settlements were single person households, and the average household size was 2.9 (HDA 
2012). A survey of Cape Town informal settlements show an average household size of 3.4 
persons per dwelling and 9.6% single person households – majority male work-seekers 
(CoCT 2005).
 
Similarly, Smit (2006) notes that the average household size is small, between 
two and three persons, in his study of five informal settlements in Cape Town,  Interestingly, 
comparing the census data from 2001 to 2011, a tendency of decreasing household is 
revealed in all the three wards within which these three settlements are located: In ward 80 a 
decrease from 3.11 in 2001 to 2.91 in 2011, in ward 33 a decrease from 3.17 to 2.88, and in 
ward 34 a decrease from 3.65 to 2.89 (CoCT 2013a, 2013b, 2013c)
59
. 
 
On-Migration and household fluidity 
An interrelated tendency is that of household fluidity and ‘on-migration’, which underlines 
the fluid and rapidly changing compositions of residents. Already in 1994, patterns of on-
migration, circulatory migration and oscillatory migration was pointed out (Adler 1994, 
                                                 
59
 Census 2011 reports for all of CoCT’s wards are available online at the councils webpages; see reference list 
for web address.  
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Cross et al. 1994, Bekker and Louw 1994). On-migration denotes that residents move from 
one settlement to another or from either a house or a backyard to an informal settlement. 
Many residents I chatted with informally indicated that when they first came to Cape Town 
from the Eastern Cape, they would stay some years either with relatives or in a backyard, 
before they bought or built their own home in an informal settlement. Even though on-
migration is a general tendency, single case studies are often surprised by these patterns and 
term their cases as different. Haferburg (2002:29), in a single case study of the informal 
settlement Phola Park, displays that 60% had moved in from another neighbourhood in the 
Cape Flats, and claimed that this settlement is not a ‘typical’ first haven for migrants. 
Similarly, Goven (2007) contends that there are surprisingly few rural migrants in Kosovo 
(only 14.3%). Rather than finding this tendency to be surprising, it seems to be the normal 
pattern when looking at the statistics of other informal settlements. Some of my own data 
compiled in Figure 7 displayed in chapter five, indicate on-migration: few have moved 
directly from the Eastern Cape, and the average length of stay is not long. The data from GP 
shows that only 10 % moved in from outside Cape Town. On-migration is indicated in other 
surveys as well. CoCT statistics state that two-thirds of the residents had lived in a spread of 
61 (mainly townships) suburbs of the Cape Town metropolitan area before moving to the 
current place, and the average length of stay in the settlements was around five years (CoCT 
2005:28). Cape Town census data of 2001 show that 63% had lived in the informal 
settlements where they were counted for five years (HAD 2012). This can be linked to that 
people move to informal settlements first and foremost to find work in the city (Hunter and 
Posel 2012), and view their stay as temporary. 
 
In my surveys, it was interesting to observe how residents answered the question ‘why did 
you move here’. The categories ‘close to family’, ‘close to friends’ or ‘close to work’ were 
insufficient. Most ticked off the answer ‘other’ and added sentences like I needed a place on 
my own. Also data collected from five other informal settlements, show that 59% moved to 
the settlements due to a need of privacy and space, while 20% answered ‘evicted’, 9% ‘high 
rent’, 5% ‘nowhere else to go’, 3% ‘conflict /violence’, and 1 % ‘death of partner/ divorce’ 
(Smit 2006:109). In open-ended interviews, many highlighted that a move from backyard 
shacks to informal settlements was an improvement, as backyard landlords gave them 
trouble. For many young residents, it is the first time they live alone in their own structure, 
and many indicated that they needed to move away from family who restricted their freedom. 
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Even for a 45-year old, moving from a crowded backyard shack to the settlement was a relief:  
It was better for me moving here, because I was staying with other people and it was hell, 
here we got our own place (Resident, Egoli, 3.8.2011).  
I observed many different compositions of households, for instance young friends living 
together. The young women interviewed reflected that they ‘wanted to live on their own’, 
because it was too crowded in the shack or backyard where they used to live, or that they 
simply felt it was time to start their own life and move away from their family
60
.  They had 
sometimes experienced fights with their family and needed privacy, and one woman 
indicated it was difficult to have a boyfriend when you share the bed with all your siblings. 
Another young woman, who had been living alone for three years and had a full-time job at 
the airport, stated that she used to stay with her sister, but then her sister got married and she 
did not want to disturb them. Asking her how she felt about living alone, she stated: It is not 
safe. But there are not many nice men [she giggles]. She explained that it is better to live 
alone than to live with a man that only gets drunk
61
.  
 
Drawing this together, it confirms that migration patterns and household compositions in 
informal settlements are often young, fluid and changing (Bekker and Louw 1994, Ross 
1996, Spiegel et al. 1996).  
 
6.3.2 Public space (physical conditions)  
Public sphere is dependent on actual public spaces where issues of the commons can be 
deliberated. Other case studies have also mentioned specific public places where public 
meetings usually are held. Ross (2010) indicates that the water tap is one such place of 
community deliberation where residents meet and talk about common issues (Ross 2010: 30-
31). Harber (2011) asserts churches and taverns (shebeens) are such communal spaces. In an 
older account, Kiewiet and Weichel (1980) describe how schools, built inside an informal 
settlement, function as meeting halls. Some of these spaces are present in the settlements of 
                                                 
60
 This also helps to explain the fast growing number of shacks in many informal settlements. As mentioned by 
one leader in Egoli, his three oldest sons who he raised in his shack, have now moved out to their own shacks 
near his own, each with wives and their own children. Out of his house, he explains, four more houses have 
emerged during the 15 years that he had lived in the settlement 
61
 It might be that the young unestablished crowd also allows for less traditional gender roles. Once I visited one 
of the main leaders in GP, he was alone home with the child. I asked him where his girlfriend was. He answered 
that she had gotten a job in another area in Cape Town, and that she was there only some days. So he had to be 
home with the son. He did not know exactly when she was coming back.  
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this study; people do meet at the water taps, and Kosovo and Egoli have several shebeens and 
churches. Generally, mass meetings seldom occur, are difficult to organize, and might also be 
related to a general lack of space in most informal settlements. In Egoli, there are two 
churches made of zinc sheets where many community meetings are held. When everyone 
does not fit into the church, people stand outside and try to listen. These churches are 
sometimes used as crèches, or as a shelter for people whose homes are flooded or have burnt 
down. For grand meetings, an empty field nearby is used, and the loudspeakers, microphones 
and chairs from the churches are carried outside. Here, the meetings I observed were open 
meetings where residents could attend and raise their concerns. In GP, there is no space for 
large community meetings in any of the homes, and the meetings are held at the drain 
(manhole sewer) in the middle of the settlement. In Kosovo, meetings have been held in open 
spaces and in church tents, but are mostly held at ‘the office’, which is a container provided 
by CoCT. Meetings have also been held in halls in other parts of Philippi.  
 
Interestingly, the relation between public and private space is somehow paradoxical in 
informal settlements. On the one hand, the urge for privacy is expressed in longing for having 
one’s own house with its own toilet and a garden, and the wish to start one’s own life by 
moving out of one’s parents’ abode. This urge is physically visible in that many shacks are 
surrounded by fences and have small patches of private courtyards. If they have space, some 
residents take one of the public portable bucket toilets into the courtyard in order to have a 
private toilet. The preference for a private place is also visible in the generally high 
maintenance given to the private home, while there is a lack of collective maintenance of 
public areas. Local government department officials express concerned with this and 
complain that there are residents who dump garbage in the public spaces or who vandalize 
public toilets. In comparison, most residents keep their shack extremely tidy inside. This 
could be related to the fact that many residents do not plan or wish to settle for a long time in 
these areas and therefore do not feel ownership of the space. 
 
On the other hand, confronting this urge for privacy, spatial facts make privacy difficult to 
uphold in dense informal settlements. One could say that most of the space is public, and 
residents share toilets, water taps and small patches of open spaces and roads. Due to the 
physical nature of informal settlements, there are more meeting places than formal 
settlements where such things take place inside private houses. Since the shacks are small, 
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and in the summer become very hot (especially zinc shacks), people sit outside. In the winter, 
especially in Egoli where there is no electricity, people sit together around fires. Children 
play together and enter whichever shack they please, and people share food. And when 
catastrophes hit the area like flooding or fires, people affected receive help and often stay at 
their friends’ and neighbours’ places (see also flooding report Drivdal 2011b). Noteworthy, 
people do read newspapers, listen to the radio and watch TV, and are often informed about 
the political situation, which they discuss amongst themselves in these spaces.  
 
Summing up, with these tense relations between public and private physical boundaries, the 
public spaces are both encompassing and limited. The possibilities of public spaces are 
manifold; however these possibilities are limited by the withdrawal into the private home 
space. This might help explain why, in addition to the low attendance of meetings, residents 
often claimed that they were not informed about certain issues. 
 
6.3.3 Discussion: individuality and retreat to privacy or urban possibilities? 
Drawing together the above insights, there might be several pragmatic reasons for the lack of 
large-scale participation at public meetings and a withdrawal to the private, which are 
essentially problematic for the public realm to develop, as suggested in Arendt’s ideals (Villa 
1992). 
 
First, on-migration contributes to the lack of stability and fluidity of actors involved in the 
public politics of the settlements. As pointed out by Cross et al. (1994) and Bekker and Louw 
(1994), on-migration could both be the result of and contribute to internal conflicts and 
violence. It can increase the fragmentation and fluidity, which can have the effect of a 
confusing setup for residents. It is seemingly a general problem in South African civil 
society; there is such an influx of organizations and political parties, combined with 
corruption scandals that people have become confused and tired of politics. In Kosovo, some 
residents express that they are tired of leaders and politics because there are too many leaders.  
Secondly, a major reason for lack of engagement is connected the classical ideas that urban 
societies are more individualized (Wirth 1938). The fact that many move to informal 
settlements to get away from family pressure and to sort out their private problems indicates a 
longing for individual freedom. Further, as raised by Hunter and Posel (2012) informal 
settlements residents are ‘there to find work’, to sort out their own economic future. Early in 
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my field work, I tried to identify some Xhosa words, and one of the first words I noticed 
coming up frequently in conversations was ‘usebenza’ which translated means ‘to work’. 
Prioritizing a private future might be one reason why many don’t prioritise engaging in 
‘community work’, increasing the withdrawal to the private realm. The hard working 
residents who travel to work before sunrise and get back late in the evening do not have much 
time to engage in local politics.  
 
Third, although much of the space in informal settlements is in fact public, there are few and 
small designated public spaces. Perhaps in reaction to this, residents in informal settlements 
are concerned with carving out a private space. Hence, the longing for privacy which Muyeba 
(2011) has described is central to residents who have relocated to low-cost formal housing, is 
relevant to informal settlement residents too, and can  be seen as a reaction  to the severe lack 
of privacy within these dense settlements. 
 
Lastly, it is interesting to note that notions of individual freedom seem to have a particular 
history in South African urban informal settlements. This is controversial, as the colonial and 
apartheid systems severely limited freedom of inhabitants to move beyond borders and 
achieve something beyond their space. Yet, within a specific period of the Apartheid system, 
informal settlements provided more freedom from intervention than townships (Kiewiet and 
Weichel 1980)
62
. As townships were planned in detail and constructed by the apartheid state 
to keep the working force of the ‘bantu’ people, informal settlements were intermediate, less 
planned and less controlled. This lack of intervention changed in the 1980s, and also with the 
advent of democracy several state regulations of economy in informal settlements have been 
imposed. However, a longing for individual freedom still appear relevant for informal 
settlement residents, especially by the young residents who have moved to gain freedom from 
their family, and residents who have moved from backyards into the settlements to gain 
freedom from repressive landlords. 
 
Although this point towards limited willingness to engage in discussing common concerns in 
the public realm, there are also particular possibilities, related to Arendt’s idea that plurality 
                                                 
62
Kiewiet and Weichel (1980:31) display residents pointing out that they generally felt freer in the informal 
settlement than in townships. One quote is particularly illustrative: He said that people generally felt freer in 
Crossroads than in the townships and this was one of the factors that helped to generate a proper community 
spirit. People had the opportunity to improve their situation within a lassies-faire economic structure without 
the complex restrictions of licences and laws  (Kiewiet and Weichel 1980:33). 
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and conflicts are essential for a functioning public realm (Villa 1992). In urban spaces, such 
plurality is prevalent, and might create new patchworks and spaces of possibilities (Simone 
2010). Both on-migration and the young urban crowd might add to this plurality. Urban youth 
have been seen as attempting to push urban life in Africa into new directions (Simone 2005), 
and have been represented as either heroes or villains in South African townships’ political 
struggle (Seekings 2006). As young individuals might be in a situation where they are not 
completely ‘institutionalized’, and with migration fluidity, it is possible that the experience 
they gain from living in other townships and informal settlements count more than the rural 
experience. Further, the detachment from family and kinship bonds can give room for 
developments for more liberated politics and a different public sphere than the assumed 
dominance of the ‘traditional in the urban’ (Mamdani 1996). Additionally, on-migration may 
add to the possibilities of new and hybrid organizational forms and patchworks, as it 
increases residents’ experiences with engaging in public discussions in different places. 
Organizational experience brings organizational learning. Thereby, the circulation of 
organization models (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012b) is increased with the on-migration of 
residents from different townships and informal settlements, and this increases the 
possibilities of various patchworks of organizational experience and network connections. 
 
However, there are also deeper reasons why residents are reluctant to engage in public 
deliberations. Importantly, not only attending meetings counts for making up a vibrant public 
sphere, but also being willing to speak publicly about public matters. Observing meetings, it 
seemed that many residents did not voice their opinion (sometimes depending on the topic of 
the meeting). One elderly man, who was one of the first people to move to Egoli, explained: I 
participate in the meetings at the church, but I don’t speak for the people (Resident, Egoli, 
10.8.2011). This moves me to discuss indications as to why there is reluctance to voice 
opinions, looking into discursive reasons conditioning residents’ willingness to speak 
publicly. I will in the following sections sketch out some (at times paradoxical) discursive 
elements of the internal ‘governmentality’, which seeks to inform a reluctance to engage in 
public discussions and notions of what can be spoken about publicly.   
 
6.4 Conditions of speaking publicly 
I will now move from discussing the more pragmatic reasons for a retreat to privacy towards 
discussing the more discursive limitations on ‘free deliberations’. As noted earlier, some 
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degree of free deliberations is essential in the public realm (Villa 1992), and is therefore 
significant start to understanding how leadership and organizing evolve in relation to this 
specific political context (Uhl-Bien 2006). 
 
In contextual literature, fear of ‘power obsessed’ leaders and violent politics is one apparent 
condition restricting residents from speaking publicly (Katsaura 2012). Additionally, there is 
a general fear of witchcraft applicable to cases of jealousy about money, children or 
consumer products (Bähre 2002). Nevertheless, looking beyond fear of violence, less 
apparent conditions are indicated, like the fear of gossip and rumour, which is widespread in 
areas amidst low-income areas of Cape Town (Ross 2010, Bank 2011, Muyeba 2011, 
Muyeba and Seekings 2012). Particularly ethnographic accounts display cultural cognitive 
assumptions and social norms of behaviour, like norms ‘decent’ behaviour with the notion of 
ordentlikheid (Salo 2003, 2009, Ross 2006, 2010, Jensen 2008). 
 
6.4.1 Stigma, marginalization and reluctance of speaking up 
As mentioned above, there is a strong stigma connected to living in informal settlements 
(Bray and Brandt 2007, Ross 2010, Meth 2013). Ross (2010: 29-30) notes that the 
consequences of the sort of life lived in informal settlements lead to short-term strategizing 
due to the uncertainties and  lack of confidence and  a feeling of humiliation, which 
discourage some residents to speak up for themselves. Such feelings of embarrassment 
connected to living conditions were expressed by many residents. Both in GP and Egoli 
residents seemed to display such embarrassment, like the earlier mentioned articulations of 
‘living like pigs’. In GP, the conditions are severe as there are very few toiles and the 
settlement are flooded every winter. As mentioned earlier, the settlement is actually called 
‘Enyunywini’ in Xhosa, which one resident reluctantly explained can be translated as ‘dirty 
place’. Residents in the neighbouring informal settlements gossip about the area. GP residents 
know about this stigmatization by the neighbouring informal settlements, and told me that 
they laughed at them when they started building shacks in this area. In Egoli, the divide is 
between ‘the front’ and ‘the back’ area of the settlement. The front, which became populated 
first and is less crowded, is by some termed the the upper class area (Resident, Egoli, 
10.8.2011). This area has larger shacks and more churches, while the ‘back area’ has more 
shebeens and is dirtier.  
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Feelings of stigma and marginalization become apparent in residents’ reluctance to confront 
‘externals’ like NGOs, local government departments, researchers and media. Note here that 
this does not signify a lack of willingness to establish sought-after external contacts, but to 
confront and directly disagree with externals that enter the settlements. In Kosovo, where 
there has been much higher involvement by the municipality in its attempts to upgrade the 
settlement, many complained that the process had not included them (this has also been 
observed by a student in the field, see Armitage et al. 2010). However, when I asked if they 
would be prepared to approach the people who deliver services, reluctance was expressed: 
 
W: The toilets are the main problem. The people that fetch the toilet sewage, 
they don’t come many times.  
L: Why don’t you ask them why they don’t come more often, when they 
should? 
W: No, they would throw it in your face (the sewage)… 
(Resident, Kosovo 6.10.2010) 
 
In GP, residents expressed that they felt offended when ‘outsiders’ come into their area, 
especially if these externals do not explain who they are and why they are there. Yet, it 
appears that when outsiders approach the settlement, most residents are too shy to initiate 
conversations, and rather expect to be approached or that one of the leaders should approach 
these externals. This was also my own experience in the first field visits.  
 
In Egoli, many NGOs have intervened with projects, some of which seemingly are 
unsuccessful over time. Only one of the leaders have confronted these projects ideas and told 
the NGOs when their plans were not good for the community as a whole. The same leader 
argued that there are too much NGOs involvement in the settlement, and that this creates 
apathy: 
 
There is too much hand-outs in Egoli, so people just sit and wait. And the 
NGOs exploit it, they make up NGOs sometimes. All the NGOs in the area 
concentrate on Egoli. The people are spoiled there.  
(Community leader 5, Egoli 17.1 2012)  
 
Such apathy is generally expressed by residents who feel marginalized and hope that others 
will help. Residents frequently ask leaders to sort out things for them, like contacting ward 
councillors about their own problems. I also experienced that residents would ask me to assist 
them, for instance, a mother asked me to phone the ambulance to fetch her son, even though 
the call and service is free. 
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Despite the above described hope that leaders will deal with the problems of the commons, 
there is also an aversion towards authorities. This can be connected to the history of 
oppression and the legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle, but might also be related to the 
presence of the young urban individual as discussed earlier.  
 
6.4.2 Jealousy and fear of expression 
Hanging around in the settlements, there is always something going on, and women and men 
sit around and chat and observe. Much drama is unfolding around family and neighbour 
issues, which sometimes leads to fighting and violence. Of course, family and neighbour 
conflicts happens in any neighbourhood, but the intensity and seriousness might be higher 
here, as the close proximity between neighbours with thin walls makes it easier to hear what 
the neighbours are up to.  
With this intensity, public spheres in poor areas in South Africa are sometimes dominated by 
exclusion and the fear of expressing meanings (Katsaura 2012). Fear of violence is a valid 
reason why many residents are scared to engage in discussion around public matters. It is 
known that leaders who spoke up have been killed or attempts were made, threatened, 
arrested, and engaged in violent confrontations. Jealousy seems to be widespread, and is often 
connected to family and neighbourhood conflicts and to jobs. Such jealousy can easily 
develop into violence or the use of witchcraft (Bähre 2002), and is consequently widely 
feared. Clearly, this is not a game for the feint hearted.  
 
The amount of jealousy creates a space of fear of expression, and of engaging in leadership. 
One of the leaders in Egoli opposing shebeen practice, whose shack is in between shebeens, 
explains that they throw the bombs of the mouths at me when she goes out of the shack. 
Therefore, she, like many others, stay inside during nights when people are drunk and even 
violent. On several occasions, it was mentioned by residents that they feared to talk about 
public problems, e.g. shebeens causing noise because then they could be accused of being 
jealous of the shebeen owner’s business.  
 
Community leaders are often in the middle of drama as they get involved in solving internal 
conflicts. In GP, one of the leaders explained the difficulties of acting publicly as a 
consequence of jealousy and anger:  
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M: Sometimes people get jealous and got issues. Sometimes you can’t be 
always right, and sometimes you have to interfere, and then sometimes it 
doesn’t feel right. If you become honest people who are wrong feel offended. 
You can’t be good to everyone.  
L:So it is hard to negotiate? Don’t people sometimes get angry? 
M: For myself I don’t care about that. But sometimes it affects your family… 
(Community leader 3, GP, 17.4.2012) 
 
As ‘public figures’, leaders are often targets for suspicion and jealousy. This is widely 
acknowledged. Talking to a random resident in GP, she knew much about the different 
leaders, and complained that many of them were not doing enough for the community. 
However, when I asked her why she did not become a leader herself, she answered No, it is a 
lot of stress. Maybe someone call you who is beaten by a man, and then he call you names.  
(Resident, GP, 27.3.2013) 
 
The amount of diverging rumours about leaders makes it difficult to understand what is going 
on, not only for researchers but also for residents. The leaders are sometimes suspicious of 
each other, like this leader who expressed deep anger about another leader: 
 
He is jealous. He is not good; he wants to destroy the meeting. He thinks that 
he is God; he thinks we don’t have brain and he has to think for us. He is not 
standing for re-election but he has a friend who he wanted to get elected – but 
we did not choose him. 
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 11.2.2011)  
 
Leaders themselves are sometimes the purveyors of rumours, mainly about rival leaders. The 
same leader as above indicated that another leader was jealous and spreading rumours:  
 
P: He wants to make this place ungovernable. He was trying to make things 
bad, but we did not listen to him in Kosovo. You know, he was a friend of the 
candidate we nominated, but now he is an enemy. He is jealous now. He is 
trying to make us to fight, but we said no, it is enough, we won’t fight.  
L: What did he do? 
P: He spread rumours. The old councillor – at that times we were fighting, but 
now we said no.  
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 17.3.2011) 
 
In Egoli, many rumours circulated around the different leaders, and it has been hard to 
understand how much truth there are to the different rumours. One example was how one 
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leader was accused for corruption by selling plots of land within the settlement, claiming that 
he was the owner of the land. This matter actually went to court, and the leader was found not 
guilty on this occasion. Counter rumours spread that the residents who started the rumours 
were bribed with wine and cigarettes to spread these accusations. Even now, as the main 
actors admit that there was a misunderstanding, there still seem to be resentment.  
 
Cases where suspicion has led to the demise of leaders and committees are also described by 
Allison (2002) and Barry (2006). An effect of the critical gossip around leaders creates a high 
level of suspicion (of corruption) and might help to keep actual corruption in check. In all the 
three settlements, critical accusations of leadership corruption have been raised.  
 
6.4.3 Norms of public behaviour and fear of gossip  
Behavioural norms are reflected in how residents condemn others. Behaviour around alcohol 
is often mentioned, and some make a distinction between those who go to churches and those 
who go to shebeens. Even a shebeen owner talked negatively about her guests in this manner:  
 
They make me laugh. When they are sober they are nice but when they drink 
they swear. When they drunk they talk about Jesus, singing church songs, but 
they don’t go to church. 
(Resident, Kosovo 20.9.2011) 
 
This reflects norms of decent behaviour. Such norms are also displayed in ethnographic 
accounts of daily life in informal settlements, which rather indirectly than explicitly talk 
about power relations. Relevant here is the notion ordentlikheid (Salo 2003, 2004, 2009, Ross 
2006, 2010, Jensen 2008). It signifies respectability and decency, which can be seen in the 
urge to display decency and properness, related to feelings of marginalization and fears of 
being judged for living in shacks (Ross 2010). External appearances are important, especially 
being clean and neat, in addition to sociability and behaving decently, friendly and modestly 
(Ross 2005). These norms seem to fit with the two predominantly Xhosa-speaking 
settlements as well, and the efforts to present decency and high morals are perhaps even 
higher here. Especially regarding appearances, most residents make much effort to appear 
clean and neat, and keep their home neat and tidy. Mothers often get up before sunrise to 
clean the home for several hours and preparing everything for their children to go to school.  
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Connected to the norms of decency, there is a lot of gossip in the settlements, and the fear of 
being gossiped about is widespread. Muyeba (2011), Muyeba and Seekings (2012) and Ross 
(2010) mention that gossip is widespread in low-income areas in Cape Town. As the direct 
fear of violence can hinder participation, less apparent fear of gossip and rumours are also 
significant. In a situation where you know that people talk about you behind your back, you 
always watch your words closely. This is indicated by the fact that, while moralizing remarks 
often were noted in private conversation, most residents seemed reluctant to say the same 
things publicly. It is particularly evident in the problems around keeping residents from 
littering. Many paths are filled with rubbish that stink especially in the summer, and in the 
winter it is a problem that some dump garbage and water with food leftovers into stormwater 
drains which block the pipes and thereby contributes to flooding and malfunctioning toilets. 
The problems can of course largely be explained by inadequate waste collection system 
initiated by local government and carried out through private tenders. In several occasions 
during the years of field visits, the waste collection breaks down and rubbish will not be 
collected for several weeks, piling up next to the collection areas and then spread around by 
street dogs. This contributes to discouraging residents to try to keep the areas clean. 
However, many residents also expressed frustration with some resident’s behaviour dumping, 
but emphasised that taking initiative to stop such action is difficult. This became apparent in 
the focus group interviews I conducted on flooding and heath problems. In a discussion with 
a group of ‘health club’ residents in Kosovo, it was pointed out that telling other residents not 
to dump is challenging:  
 
there are conflicts, we are not the same. For example, maybe when someone 
finished cleaning; you tell them not to drop the water there, but they don’t 
listen… 
(Resident, Kosovo 6.10.2010) 
 
In addition to that moralizing publicly is not effective, one risks being publicly shamed. In 
another focus group interview in GP, the topic hygiene came up, and an older woman 
explained that she tried to tell people to not dump the waste, but that they then just laughed at 
her and called her mentally disturbed. She seemed very pleased to get the opportunity to say 
this loudly in the meeting, as she got support for her hygiene concerns by the facilitators. 
However, when one risks to publicly be laughed at when revealing issues of the commons, it 
should not be a surprise that many prefer not to speak out. It is explained by that ‘people 
don’t like to get advice and commands from someone at their own level’, as one resident 
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explains: ‘Sometimes we are like that, if someone tries to suggest something people think they 
try to be clever…’ (Resident, GP, 26.4 2011). This also includes that residents do not like to 
be told what to do from internal leaders, as they too are living in shacks and hence are at the 
same level. 
 
This specifies that if one publicly complains about others behaviour, it indicates an 
unacceptable arrogance of the person complaining. Therefore, residents might fear to be 
deemed arrogant if speaking openly about troublesome behaviour, which could affect 
common concerns of the settlement. This also contrasts the possibilities of privacy and 
individual freedom, as described earlier in this chapter. Actually, gossip are essential parts of 
the internal public realm, both as they are significant ways in which news spread and limit the 
willingness to speak publicly. Further, gossip is indeed essential parts of political practice, as 
it can, if applied successfully, create conflicts and shift power.  
 
6.4.4 Discussion: disciplinary norms and the public realm   
Moving beyond the more pragmatic reasons for withdrawing to the private as discussed in the 
first section, this section has considered various fears that hinder residents from speaking 
freely and publicly. As displayed by Bähre (2002) and Katsaura (2012), it should be obvious 
that fear of violence and witchcraft makes many reluctant to engage in public discussions. 
However, it is not only the fear of violence that might hamper the motivation to speak 
publicly, but also the fear of rumours ad suspicions, which always circulate ‘public persons’. 
In relation to Foucaultian power objection to public realm theories (Villa 1992, Allen 2002), 
norms and cultural cognitive discourses can be seen as disciplining public behaviour and 
constraining ‘free speech’. Ordenlikheid seems to be one such norm that impacts on what 
residents say and how they say it. Notably, I have here only given some indications of 
disciplinary discourses of public behaviour, acknowledging that these are preliminary and 
that more deep ethnographic and historical research is needed, looking into what is left unsaid 
and why (Seekings 2010). Anyway, what is further important is that conforming to such 
norms and discourses are increased by the fear of rumours, gossip and jealousy. Hence, many 
residents appear to be reluctant to speak up about common concerns, because they know that 
people would speak behind their back, since many residents become angry if ‘someone at 
their own level’ tries to tell them what to do.  
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Important to note is that the disciplinary norms are not necessarily directly connected to 
‘ethnic traditional’ ideals, but rather a reflection of the particular insecure and unstable urban 
condition of informal settlements. They are related to feelings of stigma and the 
marginalization of living in informal settlements, which are countered by portrayals of 
decency and order. Also other ethnographic accounts show that there is certainly no lack of 
disciplining moral codes in South African townships, generally (Salo 2004, Buur 2008). 
 
What is further is interesting about the prevalence of such disciplinary norms is that it 
conflicts with the notion of an urge for privacy as outlined in the first section of this chapter. 
It shows an urban condition of informal settlement in South Africa that, on the one hand, 
reflects the classical ‘urban individuality’ (Wirth  1938), but on the other hand a social setting 
with certain disciplinary norms developed as a reflection of the marginalised condition.  
It is very difficult to say anything about the balance between these two polarities in my 
research other than to comment on the tension that it creates between residents and for 
leaders who act on issues of the commons or speak publicly, which will be discussed further 
in chapter seven.  
 
6.5 Conclusion  
Returning to the research question of the conditions of speaking publicly, the analysis 
indicates two problematic aspects of the public realm:  
 
First, a tendency of withdrawal to the private due to conditions of social fluidity and urban 
individuality seems to fit with classical urban theory (Wirth 1938). There is indeed an urge 
towards privacy, visible not only in the presence of urban young individuals who strive to 
start and manage their own private life, but also in the reluctance to engage in public 
meetings. The retreat to the private presents many limitations to the development of an 
internal public realm, and is relevant to Arendt’s fear that the social will take over the public 
realm and limit discussions of politics (Villa 1992). However, in contrast to gloomy 
conditions of a public realm, the analysis has indicated some possibilities for a vibrant public 
realm too, as there is much public space and as heterogeneous and traditional institutionally 
detached young residents and on-migration create room for openness to new ideas of 
organizing politics. 
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Secondly, cultural cognitive discourses and behavioural norms impact on speaking publicly, 
and can hence be seen as ‘disciplinary power’ which limits ‘free speech’ in the public realm 
(Villa 1992, Allen 2002). Not only valid fear of violence (direct power) (Katsaura 2012) and 
a lack of time or resources restrict the willingness to speak publicly, but also disciplinary 
norms of acting publicly and fear of normative judgement (Ross 2010). Many issues remain 
difficult to discuss openly. As the lack of time and fear of violence is quite obvious, the fear 
of moral judgement is more complex, and I believe I have only touched upon some elements 
in this chapter. The public realm in informal settlements has been given surprisingly little 
attention as a topic in itself, but drawing together contextual relevant accounts, significant 
indications are given. More ethnographic research is needed to understand why regular 
individuals are reluctant or afraid to engage in public deliberations. This would be interesting 
to follow up, as the vast majority of research on informal settlement political activity is 
empirically and methodologically focused on activists
63
. This might not only improve the 
understanding of the public realm, but also the limitations of civil society and of 
‘participation’. 
 
Adhering to the main theoretical framework underlining that leaders need to be analysed in 
relation to their specific context within which they emerge (Dachler and Hosking 1995, 
Osborn et al. 2002, Uhl-Bien 2006), this chapter has shown that insights into the public realm 
appear essential to understanding the tensions of leadership politics in relation to the 
residents. The problematic public realm underscores that only a few residents, which are 
comfortable with the risk of both violence and being gossiped about, emerge as leaders. This 
is because leaders are individuals who, with different motivations and to different degrees, 
decide to speak up despite these problematic internal public conditions.  
Further, this chapter has added another dimension to the balancing of conflicting logics in the 
particular urban setting of informal settlements: The paradox that arises by comparing the 
young urban populations longing for individual freedom, with the continuation of disciplinary 
norms of order and decency. This is reflected in residents, on the one hand resent being told 
what to do by leaders, but on the other hand long for more order. How leaders deal with this 
tension by displaying both bureaucratic and democratic logics, will be discussed further in 
chapter seven.  
                                                 
63
Nevertheless, I have also myself, in this thesis, focused on the activists, much due to methodological 
constraints as discussed in the methods chapter.   
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CHAPTER 7 Negotiating bureaucratic and democratic logics in relation to 
contextually grounded values 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The presentations, organizational ideals and models that different community leaders gave in 
informal conversations fascinated me early in the research. I was perplexed by the sometimes 
exceptionally sophisticated formalistic representations. As will be illustrated later in this 
chapter, they would explain in detail the organizational model of the committee, sometimes 
relating it to the South African Constitution or other formal instances. Democratic ideals were 
highlighted in these presentations, in models of representation of the interests of residents 
through securing open meetings and through mechanisms of elections. Bureaucratic models 
of organizing were also underscored, by portraying standardized committee models and 
processes. Unsurprisingly, irregularities in the presentations of these ideal and presented 
models emerged, especially in practically carrying them out.  Thus, as emphasised in the 
theory and methodology chapter, I will not analyse these presentations as ‘truths’ but rather 
analyse how and why leaders in the context of informal settlements negotiate these 
democratic ideas of legitimacy in relation to the expectations of residents.  Further, I am not 
trying to analyse if legitimate representation is possible or not, or even desirable. Rather, I am 
interested in how on different forms of legitimacy are presented and what this can tell us 
about political tensions of organizing internal public concerns. In this chapter I will 
concentrate on discussing the contextual grounding of these logics, and the research question 
here is therefore: 
 
How and why are leaders presenting both democratic and bureaucratic logics in 
asserting legitimacy with residents? 
 
With the assumption that leaders present models to symbolize legitimacy, the models and 
ideals presented will be outlined and interpreted in relation to contextual and historical 
expectations, norms and discourses. This is also building on insights from the various 
practises described in chapter five and on the indication of a tension between urban youths 
longing for individual privacy with the moralizing norms of decency as mentioned in chapter 
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six. The first part of this chapter will outline portrayals of democratic practises and models 
and discuss how these reflect adaptations to contextual discourses of urban modernity and 
historical discourses of the liberation from dominating authorities. Thereafter, I will show 
how bureaucratic logics are emphasised and discuss how these reflect adaptations to urban 
conditions of instability, lack of transparency and a notion of mature decency. Some of these 
presentations are in themselves contradicting, but together they do indicate the relevance of 
bureaucratic and democratic logics. 
 
Further, two assumptions outlined in my theoretical framework will be reflected over. 
First, when acknowledging that organizations have a dual nature, implying that they have 
pragmatic and symbolical sides, one cannot analyse an organization by simply referring to the 
organizational structure or strategic goals (Scott 2008, McQuarrie and Marwell 2010). 
Rather, as the symbolical sides of organizations are essential for defending their survival in 
relation to their environment, presentations of organizational models can be analysed as 
symbolic claims of legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Dimaggio and Powell 1983).  
Secondly, perceiving the committees as organizations faced with institutional pluralism 
provides the grounds for outlining several co-existing and grounded institutional logics 
(Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009). This is related to the critique of 
decoupling, enabling an analysis of how plural internal discourses impact on what models are 
presented. It fits with the acknowledgement that the committees are hybrid organizations, 
forming in a context of hybrid urban identities (Robins 2008, Myers 2011, Bank 2011). As 
the context of informal settlements is signified by plural historical discursive practises and 
behavioural norms of speaking publicly, committees might include plural logics in order to 
claim legitimacy. Notably, I am not here considering what legitimate leaders look like, but 
how legitimacy is presented though different organizational models. 
 
7.2 The favouring of democratic logics  
In following sections I will analyse the presentations of modern democratic logics as 
reflecting both discourses of urban individualism (as indicated in chapter six) and as 
reflecting historically specific discourses related to the social movements against Apartheid.  
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7.2.1 Presenting urban modern models rather than traditional 
During the early days of my field visits, I noticed that ‘traditional’ models of organising the 
committees were never mentioned naturally. I considered they did not want to speak about 
this to me as I am foreigner from ‘overseas’. It might also be that notions of traditional 
models are stronger in older settlements, e.g. in Khayelitsha. Lastly, some settlements are 
very mixed, like Egoli, and it would be hard to determine whose traditions count. Generally, 
my impression is that although there certainly are traditional churches and expressions of 
cultural traditions, these do not appear to be the most central in the formation of committee 
structures.  
 
Conversely, even in GP, which appears to have the most homogenous population as most 
residents are Xhosa speaking, traditional systems were never mentioned. So I decided to ask 
directly. I asked if the committee had a Xhosa name, but this was first denied. Finally, one 
leader explained that there had been traditional leaders earlier, but that this system had failed 
and had little legitimacy: 
 
No, we don’t have a Xhosa name. We removed the names we used before: 
‘Sibonda’, which means chief. That name was not good because people then 
thought they ruled the community and had certain rights and were owning that 
position. It was not cool. It was not democratic. Even before I started we had 
already called it community leader and chairperson. Those Sibonda people, 
they were more in control. At least the community leaders are controlled by the 
community…..Now when you are a chairperson you are only chairing the 
meeting. So it is much better these days. Also if you come up with something it 
must be based on what people want, because if not people will point fingers.  
(Community leader 3, GP, 17.4.2012) 
 
This statement underlines the symbolical importance ‘modern’ names and models, not only 
of committees but of the positions of the committee members. In the quote it is suggested that 
traditional names symbolize and present negative associations with authoritarian rule, while 
what is thought of as modern democratic and bureaucratic models are presented as more 
legitimate. This does not suggest that traditional authorities are non-existent. Rather, it 
suggests an idea of separation between traditional and democratic rule, each having its own 
place in society.  
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Instead of traditional, democratic logics were highlighted. Perhaps unsurprisingly, leaders in 
all the settlements were eager to explain the democratic election procedures and models of 
their committee.  
In Kosovo, leaders repeatedly referred to ideals like the South African Constitution and fair 
representation: 
 
We call a meeting, everyone must be there. N… is the chair person. We vote by 
raising the hand. It is democracy. Every year we have election and people 
decide who stays.  
(Community leader 9, Kosovo 6.4. 2011) 
 
N: You must be elected. We stick to the Constitution, you cannot appoint 
yourself! 
J: And you must think that all people are equal, and represent everyone.  
 (Community leaders 9 and 11, Kosovo 4.5.2011) 
 
Clearly, they here portray that their legitimacy is based on democratic voting ideals. Such 
systems of voting and references to the Constitutions might reflect the national system as an 
ideal.  
 
In GP, similar procedures of elections were explained, indicating that the major source of 
legitimacy is drawn from being suggested and elected by ‘the community’:  
 
L: How are they chosen? 
M: We don’t choose us self, we must be suggested by someone else. Then the 
community vote… If someone wants to leave the committee, we choose a new 
one…. We usually take one year. But if we chose to select them again then we 
will put them again. 
L: How did you get elected? 
M: People choose you don’t volunteer. People who know you suggest you. If 
people then support you they raise their hand. 
(Community leader 3, GP, 28.10.2010) 
 
Also in Egoli, the committee members underlined that they were elected by ‘the people of 
Egoli’.  
 
Although these quotes on election procedures are examples, it was striking that talk about 
election processes was brought up every time I asked about the committee structures. The 
elections are claimed to be held approximately once a year, and open to everyone in the 
settlement. Individuals are nominated, and residents vote by raising hands. When someone 
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leaves the committee, someone new must be elected. With this follows a ‘moral obligation’ to 
serve the public if elected, as expressed by these two leaders:  
 
If you are chosen, you can say no, but it must be a valid statement. You cannot 
just say no because you got a wife or something like that [laughing]. 
(Community leader 9, Kosovo, 21.4.2011) 
 
I told I have to get off the committee. I am holding these positions, because it is 
not like I am a person that likes to be a leader. But at the end of the day I 
cannot be leader forever. But when I told them they were against it. 
(Community leader 3, GP 22.3.2012) 
 
In line with a democratic ideal, the leaders indicated in these quotes that they don’t have a 
natural ‘right’ to be leaders by way of tradition, but that they are chosen by people and 
therefore have an obligation to fulfil a ‘civic duty’.  
 
However, as these ideals are important symbolically for portraying and claiming legitimacy, 
they are hard to carry out in practise. In line with new-institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan 
1977, Dimaggio and Powell 1983) and discursive leadership theory (Alvesson and 
Svenningsson 2003), organizational models and names are powerful as symbols, sometimes 
more than reflecting actual practises. During the research, I only observed one public voting 
occasion (details of this election will be given in chapter eight). Besides this incident, I did 
not find many proofs of mass democratic election of leaders. Rather, most elections seem to 
include a small collection of particularly active residents, which can be due to residents’ lack 
of engagement in community meetings, as discussed in chapter six. Further, it is questionable 
whether these small elections are ‘free and fair’ and as comprehensive as the stated ideals, 
due to constraints on speaking publicly and the lack of anonymity when voting done by 
raising hands. Instead of being chosen through grand elections, the leaders are often 
‘volunteers’, sometimes self-appointed64. They are being shaped through social processes as 
described in chapter 5, especially through being able to mediate internal conflicts, mobilizing 
residents or being appointed by externals. The tendency that the same representatives are 
committee members over several long periods and the difficulties of engaging new residents 
to join the committees indicates another pragmatic challenge to the election ideals. Hence, 
                                                 
64
 Despite her notion of democratic procedures, Zuern (2011:80) also acknowledge that local civics are far from 
immune to the power hierarchies operating within the communities in which they were formed. Additionally, it 
cannot be ignored that some leaders do attempt to rule via patronage (Lucas 2000).  
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leaders’ presentations of models should not be assumed to be ‘truths’, visible in settlements 
like Kosovo, where claims of democratic election procedures are particularly frequently 
confronted and opposed by residents and rivalling leaders. As outlined in the theory chapter, 
many contextual case studies problematized democratic representation, as it is underlined that 
a central feature of informal settlements is that there cannot be legitimate representative 
control (Adler 1994). Although legitimacy might be claimed by groups, it cannot be tested. 
The main issue in this chapter is however not to judge the degree of democracy, but to 
analyse why democratic logics are so important to leaders and residents.  
 
7.2.2 Reflecting discourses of urbanity and radicalization in township history   
In my interpretation, the resentment towards the traditional and the favouring of democratic 
models can be related to two specific contextual and historical discourses.  
 
First, the moving away from ‘traditional’ logics can be related to the symbolic value of 
modernity and urban identity in informal settlements. As emphasised in chapter five, many 
informal settlements consist of a high number of young urbanized individuals, directed at 
pursuing their own visions and enjoying freedom from certain authorities. Many of these 
residents appear to have a somehow detached relation from the rural. One illustration of this 
appeared in one of the less planned visits I made to Kosovo, where I encountered a random 
resident who seemed eager to talk about the committee and leaders in his settlement. He 
highlighted that he opposed the legitimacy of the current main committee, and his main claim 
seemed to be that they still are ‘too rural’:  
 
So many people come from the villages, I come from a township in East 
London so I know the urban situation. ….They don’t know city life, because 
they are from the rural areas.  
(Resident, Kosovo, 17.4.2012) 
 
Here, the importance of a modern urban identity was highlighted, particularly in relation to 
the urban-rural difference. In this quote he indicates that the urban situation needs other 
organizational models than the rural. He further explained that: 
 
My vision of this place is not like this. Most people here come from the 
Transkei, they never struggled, they never had toyi-toyi. When I came here I 
saw that it is not right here. Most people here come from the homelands. They 
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don’t have education. I wanted to help the people, because of the things I had 
experienced.  
(Resident, Kosovo 17.5.2012) 
 
Thereby, in addition to the lack of legitimacy gives to residents with traditional backgrounds, 
he indicates legitimacy connected to experiences with anti-apartheid social movements, 
where the struggle was not only directed at the apartheid state but also at the traditional 
structures implemented in townships functioning as indirect rule through its connections with 
the apartheid state (Mamdani 1996). Although I cannot generalize from this quote, it seems 
that such notions are present.  
 
Whilst visiting leader in GP in her home, her daughter, who was in her early 20s interfered, 
and started talking about how the young generation must be given a chance because they 
know democracy better:  
 
They need to let us – the young people – take over. The old people are not up 
to date, they don’t understand democracy.  
(Resident, GP, 9.3.2013) 
 
She had studied one year at a local university, and she indicated that this is because the older 
people studied under the old apartheid system and hence did not learn much about 
democracy. Strangely, the mother not comments on this, and let the daughter do the rest of 
the talking (perhaps also because the daughter spoke better English than her mother). Also 
other leaders have mentioned that it is an advantage that the youth are more updated and have 
better schooling, and should therefore be involved more. This shows that some leaders do 
acknowledge that the urban youth could be an important asset to committee work. 
In Egoli, one leader adheres to these ideas and often talked about that the new generation of 
youth should take over committee work: 
 
But I am finished with politics now; it is time to provide for my family and 
grandchildren….. It would be nice if somebody younger could take over in 
Egoli now, not to enrich themselves but to help the community….  
(Community leader 5, Egoli, 13.10.2011) 
 
As the last sentence indicates, he however noted that he found it hard to engage youth in 
doing unpaid work for the community. Indeed, most of the leaders I have engaged with seem 
to be in the thirties and fourties, and this generation seems also to be more frequent in 
attending community meetings as well. As will be discussed later, ambivalence to youth still 
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remains. There are contradictions in practises and morals related to disciplining youth in 
urban townships indicate that modern and traditional components might overlap and imitate 
one another (Buur 2008).  
Important to note here is that the displayed resentment towards traditional logics and models 
confirm the importance of not simply asserting ethnic traditional identities to Africans 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2009). It does not imply that traditional structures are not relevant 
to these residents, as many proudly explained to me certain rituals they would perform when 
going back to the Eastern Cape for holidays. It rather indicates the line that many draw 
between the rural and the urban and switching between rural and urban identities, which 
Bank (2011) has displayed as prevailing in townships at least since the 1950s.  
 
Secondly, the resentment towards traditional authorities might be impacted by discourses 
formed through historical experiences of repressive traditional authorities. Historically, 
traditional authority roots in urban townships can be connected to certain organized security 
and order initiatives. Especially, community courts and street committees are mentioned to 
have roots in traditional organizing (Burman and Schärf 1990, Schärf 2001)
65
, and in the 
1960s, township ‘parents courts’ called Lekgotla were dominated by older men with 
conservative values, often members of the state installed ‘Advisory Boards’66 (Seekings 
2001, Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012b). As described by Glaser, these were aimed at fighting 
juvenile delinquency, and can be understood as an attempt by the older men to regain 
authority over the urban youth (Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012b). Nevertheless, Schärf (2001:52) 
underlines that although these courts draw substantially on value systems and procedures of 
their rural counterparts called ‘makgotla’ and chiefs’ courts, they are adapted to the needs and 
realities of city life, in that they are less patriarchal and conservative
67
. A shift signified a 
transformation of the political leadership and in the moral codes of leadership in the 
townships after 1976: Whereas Makgolta represented patriarchal power and rural traditions, 
                                                 
65
 Also Skuse and Cousins mention that street committees are traditional forms of governance with an adapted 
modern framework as they are textured, interpenetrated expression of traditional forms of governance such as 
imbizos, a form of traditional meeting where a chief listens to his people’s complaints and concerns, within a 
modern framework of democratic norms and values (Skuse and Cousins 2007:991). 
66
 Advisory Boards were established by the state to advise local government on the administration of urban 
blacks, and were usually made up of older men who were identified as community leaders and could assist the 
authorities in managing township affairs (Baines 1994, cited in Bénit-Gbaffou et al.. 2012b:939).  
67
 The Lekgotla / Makgotla, as described by Seekings (2001) was rather conservative and often aimed at 
combating juvenile delinquency, and can be understood as an attempt by the older men to regain authority over 
the urban youth . With the shift from Makgotla to street committees in the late 1970s, different moral codes 
were drawn into the Makgotla, and additionally a different political agenda (Seekings 2001: 81-86).  See also 
Bénit-gbaffou et al. (2012b: 944-946).    
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the political radicalization with the 1976 uprising represented the emergence of township 
youth, who also expressed resentment towards their parents’ acceptance of Apartheid 
Seekings 2001)
68
.  Therefore, resentment towards traditional authorities can be found in the 
period of radicalization of the anti-apartheid movements. Since the social movements fighting 
apartheid are one of the roots of organizational practises in informal settlements (as discussed 
in chapter 5), this legacy seems to have left traces of a favouring of democratic and radical 
logics above traditional ones. Zuern (2011:75-76) mentions that democratic models became 
central in the resistance movement due to the urge to symbolically contrast the un-democratic 
apartheid regime, to the pragmatic need not to become too depended on individuals, and the 
need for support from Western NGOs and states. The marked organizational distance from 
traditional authority systems therefore became a vital legitimacy source, which is still 
reflected in the portrayals of informal settlement leaders, as displayed above. 
 
7.3 Charismatic versus bureaucratic logics 
As the previous sections have outlined the significance of presenting democratic logic, these 
following sections will discus the relevance of bureaucratic logics. I will first outline both 
unbureaucratic and bureaucratic practises and models, and thereafter discuss how they reflect 
contextual behavioural discourses.   
 
7.3.1 Charismatic leaders and straight-talk  
When interacting with residents on community or semi-public matters, the community 
leaders can take two very different approaches: one charismatic and one more regulative in a 
bureaucratic way. Charisma is essentially unbureaucratic, as decision-making is sporadic and 
based on emotional judgements rather than standardized procedures aimed at guaranteeing 
equal treatment. Unbureaucratic procedures and decision-making in the form of direct 
confrontations certainly occurred in the three informal settlements of this study. These were 
particularly carried out by the more ‘charismatic’ leaders in cases where they dealt with 
internal conflict or crime, and when mobilizing and motivating. Some degree of charisma is 
significant in almost any kind of leader. In the settlements of this study, there are ‘straight-
talk’ leaders who shake things up and who not are afraid of talking loudly:  
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 For more on youth politics in townships, see Seekings (1995, 2006). 
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In Kosovo, the first leaders I engaged with appeared to me to fit into a more formal approach 
during the first encounters, since she insisted on formal ideal practises in community 
organizing. She, like most leaders, presented herself as a steady, mature and reliable leader. 
However her ‘straight-talk side’ became evident after observing her in action after several 
months of visits, seeing her engagement in tense situations, which in some cases would lead 
to angry confrontations. When walking around in the settlement, she would often engage in 
long political discussion with residents, expressing frustration and anger. Further, when 
residents approached her with problems related to committee politics, she sometimes engaged 
with much energy. She even admitted becoming violent:  
 
We fight against each other and then we become friends. That lady you talked 
with, we used to fight, I beat her, and I was arrested by her [she called the 
police].  
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 30.11.2011). 
 
In many situations, she would be the first one to speak up, especially around accusations of 
corrupt internal leaders. But even outside the settlement she fell into the role of mobilising 
protests, as I experienced when I visited her at the taxi rank in town where she informally 
trade fruit and sweets. Informal trading has become regularized here by law and some traders 
have received legal permits while others continue their illegal trading and are often chased 
away by law enforcement. On this day, one of the elderly traders was arrested as she refused 
to leave and continuously screamed loudly. The leader I met with, after hiding her trading 
goods at a secret spot, was the first of the crowd to intervene. She showed her anger loudly, 
and shouted at the police for treating an old lady like this. This drama went on for almost an 
hour, and she did not give up and mobilized others to protest. I was surprised by her lack of 
fear, and this side that I had not seen before. Her teenage daughter, who stood next to me, 
explained that her mother often behaves like this. 
 
In Egoli one of the main leaders I engaged with, appeared immediately as a charismatic 
personality. He had fascinating stories to tell, and compared to many other people in the field, 
he was very outspoken even during the first encounters. He is well spoken, but in a natural 
way which seems authentic. I have observed that when he talks in community meetings, 
residents listen and sometimes cheer, especially when he talks about creating unity and 
fighting crime and violence. In open conversations, he admits his weak sides and that he has 
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done wrong things before, which strengthens his authentic image. He talks directly to anyone, 
and in his own words, he is not afraid of telling people straight to their face what the 
problems are. He is even not afraid to disagree with externals like politicians, researchers and 
NGOs. For instance, when an NGO initiated a development project of building a community 
hall, he told them straight that this would be waste of time and resources due to the threat of 
eviction. Like any charismatic person, he is both loved and hated, and there are many stories 
circulating about him. However, he also presents and sometimes favours bureaucratic 
regulative models.  
 
In GP, many stories were told about an earlier leader called Michael. According to the stories, 
he was a strict leader who was not afraid of confronting criminals. They explained that he 
managed to do this because 
 
He was very vocal. He told people straight not behind peoples back. When 
people throw stuff and litter he told them. And when people try to open 
shebeen he confronted them.  
… Michael was not scared of being killed. He was a Christian and he did not 
drink.  
(Community leader 3, GP, 22.10.2012) 
 
This clear straight-talk approach of not being scared of confronting people was valued; on the 
other hand, it also appeared to cause his death. Different stories around this emerged, but they 
had in common that he apparently was not afraid to confront people who were accused of 
being criminal, and that this made certain people angry.  
 
This valuing of charismatic leaders is highlighted in some ethnographic research. In a section 
of her book, Ross (2010) discuss how leaders in the informal settlement ‘die Bos’ describes 
two different conceptions on what it means to be a ‘good leader’: a ‘straight-talk’ and a more 
‘ordentlik’ (decent) approach: 
 
One of the committee leaders is widely feared because her mode is extremely 
confrontational. Angry words burst forth irrespectively of whether one is in a 
public or private space. Indeed, she seems often to choose to stage straight-talk 
confrontations in public, an action that reinforces her power by humiliating 
those to whom she speaks… 
Another leader is respected for her calm approach. She usually takes one aside 
and tells one bluntly but in relative privacy about her complaint. Her approach 
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does not reveal or debase, it is widely considered to be ordentlik and a sign of 
good interpersonal skills. 
(Ross 2010:145) 
 
Both of these approaches are charismatic and unbureaucratic as they underline personalized 
leadership styles. Ross (2010) further argues that the straight-talk approach is particularly 
valued:  
 
The second leader’s approach, while valued for its ability to soothe difficult 
situations, is not necessarily regarded as good leadership. Confrontations 
couched in proper forms – forms of which marriage councillors and conflict 
resolvers alike approve – are considered less than authentic and certainly less 
effective: people value angry performances as reflecting the immediacy and 
urgency of the moment and motivating action, and many believe that the first 
leader is more effective than the second.   
(Ross 2010:145) 
 
This indicates that the charismatic approach is appreciated for its symbolic value of showing 
the urgency of the action, and for its actual effectiveness. In other words, charismatic 
practises have both symbolical and pragmatic importance. With feelings of fatigue and 
marginalization as outlined in chapter six, charismatic leaders might be favoured by residents 
as they represent someone strong who can fight for their needs, and perhaps also symbolizes 
a resistance to feeling marginalized. Especially in Egoli, where the never-ending threat of 
eviction seems to be a demoralizing force, it seems that the charismatic leadership is valued. 
 
However, in addition to charismatic practises, significant bureaucratic procedures have 
developed in order to deal with problems in a less random way with established and 
standardized procedures, contrasting the essentially unbureaucratic practises of charismatic 
decision-making. 
 
7.3.2 Presentations o bureaucratic modes and procedures  
Bureaucratic logics are expressed in formalistic ideals of standardized bureaucratic 
organization models and procedures. In conversations around organizational models with 
leaders, standardized procedures were highlighted. Many leaders kept talking about how well 
organized their committees are, and the committee models were portrayed with surprisingly 
similar formalistic models in the three settlements (see brief overview figure 7). Several 
bureaucratic models and procedures were indicated: 
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First, the leaders and committee members in the three different settlements often stressed the 
formal organization models of the committee. These portrayed models might resemble a 
government system; ‘employment’ here is not granted on merits, as ideal bureaucratic 
organizing requires. The most important parts of the model are the ‘chairperson’, who leads 
the meetings, and the ‘secretary’:  
 
In Egoli, the committee members explained that the first leader is the chairperson, while 
another leader is the secretary and the others are committee members. There are currently 
(2013) four women and three men in this committee. Besides the stable position of the 
chairperson, which always ends up being the main leader who started the settlement and with 
whom most residents are familiar, the secretarial position seems to be rather vague, and the 
number of committee members fluctuates.  
 
In GP, a similar committee model is presented. According to the leaders there are six 
members, including the secretary, chairperson and vice chairperson. The chairperson is the 
main leader, and the secretary keeps a book, which lists the residents of the settlement.   
 
Of the three settlements, standardized models had the strongest presence in Kosovo, as the 
detailed quote below explains: 
 
Every year when a new elected committee is made, they select the secretary. 15 
are elected, and those 15 must go and elect who is going to be chairperson, 
deputy chair person, secretary and deputy secretary, and treasurer who keeps 
the finance – he is the finance minister and he does the fundraising for 
transportation. The rest are members. 
(Community leader 9, Kosovo 4.5.2011) 
 
Further, it was mentioned that there is a sub-system to the main committee in Kosovo, and 
that each street has its own committee, similar to the tiered system described by Zuern 
(2011). 
 
Secondly, in addition to symbolically clear organizational models, regular and standardized 
procedures, like having regular meetings, are underlined as being important.  
In Kosovo, these meetings take place at ‘the office’ provided in collaboration with local 
government. By residents it is often termed ‘the super shack’ because it is big and is built 
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with a strong material. Inside, there is an empty desk and a few plastic chairs. On the walls, 
there are pictures and news-clippings from when local government officials visited the 
settlement, in addition to an organizational map of the committee stating who the chairperson 
and the other members are. Such organisational maps or charts can be seen as important 
symbolical artefacts. The meetings I observed follow formal procedures; the chairperson sits 
behind the desk and leads the meetings, and the secretary makes notes in the book. The 
meetings start with a prayer, then the announcement of the agenda, and then discussions 
facilitated by the chairperson. The chairperson sits behind the desk, and does most of the 
talking. The main chairperson (during 2011-2013) shad many connections to local 
government officials, and sometimes called them during the meetings to invite them. 
In GP and Egoli, there is no office, although it was mentioned as desirable. My impression of 
the ‘feel’ of meetings I participated in here was less formal. The meeting procedures were 
however similar, usually starting with a prayer, continuing to announce the agenda. Notably 
though, meetings where internal conflicts were discussed had less of this feel. The frequency 
of meetings varies, although the ideal is once a week. In periods, when the committee 
members are active, when there are developments or court cases, of when there is a felt 
increase in crime and conflicts, meetings are usually more frequent.   
 
Third, in all the settlements, the committees keep books and some written accounts of the 
meetings. As mentioned chapter 4, ‘book keeping’ is related to regulative practises of 
migration and of arranging collections. ‘The book’ usually contains a list of all the settlement 
residents, their phone number, shack number and sometimes identity number. I was first 
surprised about the notions of ‘the book’. When first asking why they have such a book, no 
one was actually able to explain how and when it started, but they just explained that ‘book 
keeping’ is necessary. In GP, a leader explained that it had always been like this, and 
speculated that maybe someone come up with this system, to control the people that move 
here. … Since at least 1990 when I moved here it was already happening (Community leader 
3, GP, 1.11.2011). Clearly, ‘book keeping’ is a taken-for-granted system, which has been 
‘institutionalized’ historically, due to internal regulative practices of migration, and perhaps 
also influenced by a diverse range of external actors like NGOs, social movements and local 
government. Sometimes there are disputes over who should keep the book, but usually it is 
the ‘secretary’s’ duty.  
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Fourth, in relation to some practises that can lead to tensions, like practises of employment 
and collecting money, bureaucratic procedures are underlined. Many highlight the importance 
of not accepting payments or bribes, and that they are volunteers and not paid in any way by 
the residents for the work they do. Sometimes leaders complain that they have to pay for 
communal issues themselves, like arranging for people to travel to a court case. Worth 
mentioning here, however, is that in Kosovo some leaders admitted that they did charge small 
fees, from 50-120 ZAR, to carry out some of their administrative tasks. One leader, who 
reluctantly admitted this practise, stated that at least, she charged less than the other leaders. 
She further explained that she needed to charge a small fee because it took much of her time 
to carry out these administrative tasks.  
 
Contrasting these portrayals, it should not be a surprise that these ideals, models and 
procedures are not as clear or standardized in practise. Even leaders themselves sometimes 
unsure about how many committee members there are and who has what position. In Kosovo, 
there were different answers given; one leader mentioned that there are around 14 committee 
members, another stated that there are more than 20. Every time I asked, I got a new number, 
and it seems that none of the leaders are really sure about the number. This confusion might 
be linked to that this settlement is very large. Further, leaders claim that the committees 
arrange meetings once a week, but the frequency of meeting varies between the settlements 
and with time (when there are important things happening – like development of the eviction 
case, they are more frequent). This indicate that the bureaucratic models might be more ideal 
than actual, reminding that presentations of models by leaders not be considered as actual 
truths (Alvesson and Svenningsson 2003). Again still, the main point in this thesis is not to 
judge the degree of bureaucracy, but to discuss why the bureaucratic logic is so important to 
portray related to the contextual norms and discourses.  
 
In trying to understand these formalistic presentations of bureaucratic logics, which in many 
ways starkly contrast the chaotic setting of informal settlements, I have identified three 
reasons why the symbolizing of bureaucratic logics are valued: Norms of mature decency, the 
urge to retire into stable administrative work, and the value of symbolizing transparency. 
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Norms of mature decency  
First, the presentations of bureaucratic models seem to have the value of symbolizing a 
‘mature decency’ in relation to norms of ‘ordentlikheid’.  Compared to the examples of 
straight-talk leaders, most current leaders presented themselves more as decent, reflecting 
‘proper ways’ of dealing with problems, which often are described as rather bureaucratic 
procedures than charismatic ones.  
 
The notions of mature decency can be linked to conservative ideals. As noted in the stories 
about Michael from GP, he did engage in straight-talk, but he was also morally stable as ‘he 
was Christian and did not drink’. Similarly, in Kosovo, some leaders also seemed to perceive 
themselves as ‘moral leaders’, and emphasised the importance of being good role-models. In 
conversations with a leader in Kosovo, mostly taking place in his shack, he underlined how 
he would never appear drunk in public spaces: 
 
You cannot sit in a shebeen and be drunk, we cannot show in public that we are 
drunk. If we drink we go to another place (other settlement) and come back 
sober. People must respect us. We must do things for the community. Also, if 
there is a job here, we cannot take it, we must always be here, so that people if 
they fight come to us. 
(Community leader 9, Kosovo 6.4. 2011) 
 
Worth mentioning here, I did observe leaders drinking alcohol inside the settlement. One day 
I visited the leader who made the above statement and found him and his friends drinking 
outside his home. It indicates how moral values are overstated in self-portrayals. 
 
The link between mature decency and bureaucratic logics is reflected in the different 
practises of by ‘unruly youth’ and older, more dignified leaders.  With a rather conservative 
perspective of decency, leaders describe how they perceive proper negotiations as a better 
tool than the confrontational protests (toyi-toyis ) of the  ‘rowdy youth’:  
 
We had a meeting with the council to go to that area over there by Spar….. Me 
and N…, we are old, we don’t want toyi-toyi, we tell people not to do that.  
(Community leader 9, Kosovo 6.4.2011) 
 
People are running out of patience. The people on the other side wants us to 
join in the toyi-toyi. We are doing something but the city is slow. … About the 
toyi-toyi, I told them they are destroying the road, but it is not easy to talk to 
when they are angry.  
(Community leader 3, GP 22.7.2011) 
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The scepticism regarding such toyi-toyis is also related to the fact that these leaders are trying 
to negotiate with local government officials directly.  
 
Paradoxically, some of the leaders who perceive toyi-toyi as disruptive admit that they 
themselves have been active in such protests when they were younger. The leader from GP 
who is quoted above, admits that  
 
…before 1994, I was young and also a bit angry with opinions, but I did not 
join the front row of demonstrations. Of course, you had to join the toyi-toyis, 
but I was careful then because I did not want to go to jail.  
(Community leader 3, GP, 17.9.2011) 
 
So too leaders from Kosovo said that they used to engage in more confrontational politics and 
toyi-toyis when they were younger, but that they now have matured and are engaged in more 
‘mature ways of negotiating’. In this way, the decency side of charismatic leadership 
somehow resembles the generational conflict between the traditionalist elderly and the rowdy 
youth, as discussed by Seekings (2006) and Buur (2008). In other words, the notion of dignity 
might be related to the dignity of an elder, and hence it can also have roots in traditional 
legitimacy. 
 
Longing for stability and retiring into stable administrative work 
A second reason for the portrayals of well-organized and formal administrative bureaucratic 
logics might be related to reactions to the fluidity and fragmentation of informal settlement 
life.  
Charismatic leaders who are able to sort out internal conflict and to motivate residents are 
needed. However, especially mediating internal conflict and security is not only dangerous 
but also exhausting and unpredictable.  Leaders who deal with such issues can be associated 
with authoritarianism, which is unpopular, and straight-talk easily insults people, which can 
lead to anger and conflicts. The fear of speaking publicly, as discussed in chapter six, and 
pragmatic challenges of mobilizing and dealing with residents’ concerns might increase the 
withdrawal from straight-talk work, into bureaucratic work. This does not necessarily imply 
that the straight-talk work is attempted solved with more bureaucratic procedures instead, but 
rather that the straight-talk actions are left hanging. However, charismatic leadership is harder 
to withdraw from, and increases the settlement’s dependency on certain individuals. The 
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dependence on such leaders seem to be higher in the two smaller settlements, and became 
evident when they attempted to withdraw or became less active. Compared to this, 
bureaucratic practises are ideally less ‘person focused’ and leave room for both rotation of 
leaders and more administrative positions. As will be discussed further in chapter eight, many 
leaders express a wish to ‘retire’ or withdraw into more mundane administrative tasks, 
because they are exhausted with informal conflict mediation and mobilization. Therefore, a 
reason for bringing in bureaucratic logics, besides the symbolic values of decency and urban 
modernization, is the longing for the stability that these models provide.  
 
Further, the portrayals of bureaucratic stability might be symbolically important to contrast 
the instability of everyday life. This is not only important symbolically, but as outlined in 
chapter five, detailed administrative practises have evolved to increase stability in the 
settlements by attempting to regulate migration and informal businesses. Also the formal 
procedures are actual institutionalized practises that are carried out. The keeping of a books 
and notes of meetings is happening in all the settlements.  
 
The importance of both symbolically and practically working towards stability by applying 
bureaucratic logics and administrative practises is interesting in relation to Simone’s (2010) 
comment that the chaos and fluidity of cities in the urban South might be followed by a 
multitude of attempts to create order.  The magnitude of attempts to create orders can be seen 
as a way of trying to deal with the complexity and fluidity of the city, especially in spaces 
which are chaotic. In informal settlements, were complexity, fluidity and uncertainties are 
very high, there is a range of agents which see the possibilities and try to create order out of 
the chaos, and out of this, rationalized practises and logics of creating order emerge. Rather 
than assuming that this indicates actual bureaucratization, it can be seen as a general longing 
for bureaucratization and for the abolishment of fragmented politics.  
 
Bureaucratic models symbolizing transparency  
Third, portrayals of bureaucratic practises are applied to symbolize transparency, which as 
underlined in chapter six is a huge problem. Although the procedures are not necessarily as 
bureaucratic as they aim for, they are needed to deal with issues of transparency and 
suspicion. Especially practises such as the employing residents for communal work and the 
collection of money can easily lead to corruption or suspicion of corruption.  
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Illustrative here is the practice of collecting money for common purposes and for burials, 
which has been common in informal settlements and townships for decades
69
. Where there 
are not active burial societies, leaders often arrange money collections for the expensive 
affair of transporting the corpse back to the family homestead. In both Kosovo and GP, 
leaders explain that everyone must contribute about 5 ZAR, and committee leaders appoint 
someone to take care of the collection. Collections of money are also used for other purposes, 
like paying for transport when leaders need to attend meetings with e.g. local government 
regarding service delivery. 
 
In GP, residents are suspicious of collections of money for leadership purposes based on their 
experiences with the second generation of leaders: Early in 2010, a leader was arrested, and 
other committee members decided to help bail him out by collecting money from the 
residents. It turned out that these leaders collected more than they needed, and that the money 
collected was not spent in the way it was intended: 
 
There was a collection of money, everybody contributed with 10 Rand to 
release the leader [from custody]. So then the community leaders saw that they 
could get money, so they ended up again that every shack must contribute with 
20 rand for the court case. But then they got released for free, so they took the 
money and used for food for …….. People were angry. So after that they did 
not want to be community leaders again, and we ended up not having a 
community leadership structure….  
(Community leader 3, GP, 21.8.2011) 
 
As a result of this experience, the whole committee collapsed, the leaders were dismissed, 
and for several months after this incident there was no committee at all. A strong suspicion 
towards leaders remained, and residents still talk about these leaders as criminals. In order to 
deal with this level of suspicion, the third generation of leaders, which formed around 2010, 
were first of all  reluctant to engage in any kind of ‘money issues’: We don’t want to collect 
too much money - the people would think that we eat their money (Community leader 3, GP, 
3.5.2010). However, despite this reluctance to deal with ‘money issues’, some collections 
were carried out especially to support residents who cannot afford to pay for burials. In one 
instance money was collected to cover the burial of two children that had died in a shack fire, 
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 Such collections are mentioned by Cole (1987:18-19), Cross (2005), Skuse and Cousins (2007:984) and Zuern 
(2011:50). 
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and apparently around 2700 ZAR was collected. In these cases, the community now 
emphasised bureaucratic practises of ensuring transparent procedures to avoid suspicions. 
They underlined that they note down every contribution in a book, and hold open meetings in 
the settlement to tell how much each had contributed: 
 
We had a list and read it in front of everybody. So that everybody knows that 
their name is there. Because previously there were problems where the 
community leaders used the money, so we did not want that to happen. The 
previous leaders – I asked them many questions. Under my own leadership I 
did not want that to happen. So the other leaders did not read it out to the 
community about the money that was put together. They must tell the people as 
it is. That did not happen before. 
(Community leader 3, GP, 17.4.2012) 
 
Here, bureaucratic procedures of keeping records, in combination with democratic practises 
of publicly sharing information of these records are applied to effect and symbolize 
transparency and decrease corruption suspicions. These procedures are also useful to regulate 
and keep track of who is donating and who not, thus keeping track of who deserves to get aid 
later: You don’t have to contribute with 5 rand. But we go through the book to see who is 
contributing – if you don’t give to others then you also don’t get. (Community leader 3, GP, 
3.5 2011). By this means, this practise, which initially was related to mobilization, can also 
become a mode of control and regulation. 
 
Notably, the unavoidable fluidity of informal settlements and lack of transparency severely 
put strains on such bureaucratic procedures in practise.  
 
7.4 Discussion of the groundedness of democratic and bureaucratic logics 
Drawing the two parts where I have discussed the symbolic presence of democratic and 
bureaucratic logics together, I am interested in two implications: 
 
First, as I have outlined how both bureaucratic and democratic logics are contextually 
developed, they cannot simply be viewed as acts of decoupling. Decoupling, in Meyer and 
Rowan’s (1977) sense, occurs when organizational ideals are presented to reflect what is 
perceived as legitimate rather than actual practises (Alvesson and Svenningsson 2003). 
Surely, one reason for bureaucratic and democratic models to be applied is for improved 
interactions with externals, and it can therefore be assumed that these models have been 
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implemented symbolically to achieve aid and development. As this often can be the case, and 
in line with the critiques of decoupling theories (Kraatz and Block 2008), democratic and 
bureaucratic models are not simply a form of symbolical decoupling in the form of 
‘mimicking’ governmental models, but are also essential historically and contextually formed 
parts of the hybrid organizations of community committees. Specifically, I have outlined how 
both bureaucratic and democratic logics have strong symbolical sides in relation to historical 
discourses of organizing and behavioural norms reflecting the conditions of informal 
settlements. Summing up, democratic logics are symbolically significant related to discourses 
of urban identities (Bank 2011) and related to memories of fighting authoritarianism under 
apartheid, which has left negative associations towards notions of traditional leadership. 
Bureaucratic logics, as expressed in standardised organizational procedures and models, seem 
to reflect a need to confront instability and the lack of transparency, in addition to norms of 
mature decency. This confirms that these logics are not necessarily only imported to conform 
to external governmental or NGO pressure, but have developed a grassroots symbolic value 
in relation to context specific historical and behavioural discursive practises.  
 
These discussions have displayed the importance of analysing the duality of leadership and 
organizations in an urban context (Lowndes 2001, McQuarrie and Marwell 2010). 
Specifically important in the social constructive approach to organization (Scott 2008) and 
leadership (Alvesson and Svenningsson 2003, Denis et al. 2012) is that presentations of 
ideals and models should never be taken as ‘realities’ or truths but as indications of symbolic 
values of the context within which they emerge. It also shows that in relation to Weber’s 
types, different forms of legitimacy co-exist in African societies too (Pitcher et al. 2009). In 
other words, in a context of hybrid urban identities of township and informal settlement 
dwellers (Bank 2011), the committees and leaders need also to be hybrid, both in practice and 
symbolically. In relation to the circulation of models inspired by broader politics and policies 
(Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a, 2012b), the models reflect various historical policies, as change 
of policy is not absorbed completely. Therefore, it is hard to determine what the core of the 
leadership organizations are, and hence, neither bureaucratic nor democratic procedures 
should be assumed to purely be acts of decoupling (Kraatz and Block 2008). 
 
Secondly, comparing the democratic with bureaucratic logics, an inherent tension of the 
urban condition in informal settlements can be sensed: the tension between individualized 
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urbanity confronted by disciplinary norms of public behaviour. On the one hand, leaders have 
to adapt values of urban individuality and modernity, and consequently display democratic 
logics. In my interpretation, the presentations of democratic models as legitimate does only 
reflect urban individuality, but also memories of authoritarianism. On the other hand, they 
also display bureaucratic logics, which symbolize stability and mature decency. As discussed 
in chapter six, decency and proper behaviour is valued by residents for symbolizing a contrast 
to the insecure and unstable situation, and hence leaders adapt to these values by holding 
decent bureaucratic procedures rather than more rowdy and desperate protests. This is also 
related to the continuing ‘moral panic’ and urge to regulate rowdy urban township youth 
(Seekings 2006). Hence, in my understanding, the tension emerges in that the expressed 
longing for freedom and democratic practises connected to urban individuality, confronts the 
expressed longing for stability which requires bureaucratic procedures. This results in that the 
essential conflict between democratic and bureaucratic logics becomes relevant; that while 
democratic logics essentially allow for individual expressions and disagreements, 
bureaucratic logics standardize procedures and minimize individuality to create stability 
(Wolin 1983). As will be discussed further in chapter eight, committees attempt to balance 
these two logics and adapt them in different situations and in dealing with tension and 
conflicts between committees, but these logics are not set in stone. 
  
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed how both democratic and bureaucratic models are displayed 
and have symbolical values as they are grounded in contextually and historically developed 
norms and discourses. Hence, both democratic and bureaucratic logics are important in 
relation to portraying legitimacy. Democratic logics, portrayed by election and participation 
procedures, are brought in contrast to traditional legitimacy. The symbolic values of 
democratic logics can be connected to two interrelated issues of the specific informal 
settlements context: discourses around the modern urban dweller and discourses developed in 
the township based social movements fighting apartheid (Adler and Steinberg 2000, Zuern 
2011). Bureaucratic logics, highlighted by adhering to a language of administrative 
committee models and displaying administrative artefacts like ‘the book’ and ‘the office’, 
seem to be applied to symbolize mature decency, stability and transparency. The value of 
decency, stability and transparency can be related to behavioural norms of ordentlikheid, and 
to confront the actual contextual conditions of instability and lack of transparency.  
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Hence, in relation to the research question why leaders portray bureaucratic and democratic 
models, the answer to this is that both these models have specific contextual symbolic values. 
The leaders adapt the committee procedures and models presented to these logics in order to 
claim legitimacy.  
 
Two implications have been discussed:  
First, it moved the debate from assumptions of mimicking or decoupling to discussing 
legitimacy politics. In relation to theories of decoupling (Meyer and Rowan 1977), it might 
be assumed that bureaucratic and democratic presentations are symbolical presentations 
aimed at achieving legitimacy with external agents. Instead, the analysis shows how both 
democratic and bureaucratic logics have developed internally in relation to historical and 
context- specific social conditions of the informal settlements. This adds to the argument that 
these models are far more than a ‘mimicking of government’, but a reflection of certain 
contextual conditions. Further, in addition to the fact that urban township dwellers encompass 
a range of modernist and non-modernist logics and are capable of switching between these 
(Robins 2008, Myers 2011, Bank 2011), informal settlement committees are hybrid 
organizational forms, balancing multiple and sometimes conflicting logics and sources of 
legitimacy. With the acknowledgement that these are hybrid organizations, one cannot simple 
to determine what the actual ‘core’ of the committee organizations are and what parts are 
symbolically detached through decoupling (Kraatz and Block 2008). Rather, in this setting, 
leaders need to constantly negotiate their legitimacy symbolically by balancing both 
democratic and bureaucratic logics, and this will be further discussed in chapter eight. 
 
Secondly, presentations of bureaucratic and democratic logics reflects a paradox of the urban 
setting of South African informal settlements: on the one hand the presence of urban 
individuality implicating a need for democratic practises, and on the other hand the 
continuation of more conservative values and an urge for stability manifested in bureaucratic 
practises. While urban identities can be connected to ideals of individual freedom, decency 
norms can be seen as socially oppressing individual freedom. This implicates that the 
classical tension between democratic logics of allowing heterogeneity and deliberations, and 
bureaucratic logics of standardizing and creating stability, is relevant at this scale too.  
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CHAPTER 8 The politics of negotiating democratic and bureaucratic 
logics in internal committee conflicts and changes 
 
8.1 Introduction 
During the field visits, it was not only in informal conversations or discussions around 
organizational models that bureaucratic and democratic logics were portrayed. These logics 
were also portrayed in more tense interactions between leaders and residents, community 
meetings, and in accusations between conflicting leaders or committees. While the 
settlements of this study do not currently have plausible prospects of changing into 
formalized housed settlements, they have all experienced conflicts between committees and 
leaders. My interest here is how leaders mediate and negotiate bureaucratic and democratic 
logics to either confront each other or deal with the conflicts.   
 
Therefore, while the previous chapter explained the importance of symbolically portraying 
bureaucratic and democratic logics in relation to contextual discourses and expectations, this 
chapter will go deeper into how these logics are applied practically in dealing with internal 
tension, suspicion and committee conflicts and changes. The research question is 
consequently: 
 
How is the politics of balancing democratic and bureaucratic institutional logics 
reflected in committee changes and conflicts?  
 
I will discuss how these conflicting logics are negotiated and reflected in committee conflicts 
and organizational changes in each of the settlements, enabling some comparisons and 
indicating tendencies.   
 
Recognizing that the committees are hybrid organizations faced with plural institutional 
logics enables an analysis of the politics connected to balancing these logics (Kraatz and 
Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013); in this setting specifically, the politics of balancing  
bureaucratic and democratic logics (Etzioni-Halevy 1983, Peters 2010). This will advance 
insights into internal politics and conflicts, which several scholars have acknowledged are 
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common in informal settlements (see e.g. Barry and Mayson 2000, Allison 2002, Oldfield 
2002, Bénit 2002, Barry and Ruther 2005, Barry et al. 2007, Bähre 2007a, Lemanski 2008). 
Notably, these case studies focus on settlements undergoing major upgrading, and conflicts 
are often linked to these external interventions splintering internal communities. The three 
settlements of this study were not undergoing any major externally-initiated upgrading 
projects during the three years of research
70
, but as outlined in chapter five, a diverse range of 
external actors have intervened.  
 
This chapter first considers how, when applying democratic logics in relation to tension and 
conflicts, two very different approaches can be taken: either building unity and consensus or 
a more liberal democratic logic of allowing diverse and conflicting politics. Thereafter, I 
discuss how bureaucratic logics confront the more dynamic interactive and participatory 
democratic logics.  
 
8.2 Democratic logics and dealing with conflicts in the three settlements 
Although a main tension is between bureaucratic and democratic logics, I will first discuss 
some significant tensions between conflicting democratic logics. Particularly, looking into the 
history of committee changes and conflicts, the conflicting democratic logics of ‘creating 
unity’ versus allowing plural representations through e.g. political parties emerges as relevant 
in all the three settlements.  
 
8.2.1 Egoli: keeping conflict at bay through unifying democratic logics 
In Egoli, two sides of democratic logics prevail: securing diverse representation and logics 
creating unity. One could easily assume that achieving unity would be difficult here, as it is a 
mixed settlement, similar to the settlements studied by Ross (2005) and Lemanski (2008). 
However, compared to Lemanski’s case, it does not seem that ‘coloured’ and blacks exist as 
two different groups and these ‘racial identities’ and language differences severely hindered 
the potential for cohesive or united organization or agreement. (Lemanski 2008:397). 
Instead, in Egoli, many residents have learnt both Xhosa and Afrikaans, and party political 
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divisions do not appear central. In informal conversations, many have indicated that Egoli is 
an example of the ‘democratic rainbow nation’. 
 
This does not imply that the heterogeneity is not a threat to unity. Both residents and leaders 
are very aware that these potential divisions can increase at any time. There are also some 
racial tensions between the ‘coloured and blacks’. Particularly two leaders, one Xhosa- and 
one Afrikaans-speaking, are concerned with keeping a lid on such potential racial tensions. 
When one of these leaders withdrew, the other feared that opportunists would draw on ‘the 
race card’ to divide people and create tension:  
 
I need a meeting with A.. – I need him back in his job. Because it is racism 
here now. Because his sister is not good, she only talks to some people. One 
person here (J…), he is against the committee, so he is saying they are racist 
here, that the colored’s say the black people here at the back are stealing. He 
said they call people here hottentots. But the youngsters here in Egoli are 
together, they hang out together and they don’t care about race.  
(Community leader 4, Egoli, 26.2.2013) 
 
In order to keep such tension at bay, these two leaders applied a typical democratic logic of 
securing representation of diverse groups, making sure that there was always representation 
of both Xhosa- and Afrikaans-speaking residents in the committee. When jobs through 
externals were made available, they made sure that the jobs were rationed out equally among 
the ‘blacks and browns’, in one of the leader’s words. Additionally, at open community 
meetings, there are usually translators, which are residents that speak both Xhosa and 
Afrikaans well.  
 
However, keeping unity is a constant struggle. I was leaving a community meeting in a 
church shack in Egoli as one of the girls, nine-years old, in a playful manner jumped up on 
one of the chairs, imitating the grownups with an ironic voice: We must all come together and 
solve these problems as a community. Then she and the other girls chuckled. Clearly, she had 
heard these kinds of things many times before. This reminded me that I myself, after 24 
months of interaction, had heard these kinds of statements over and over again. It was a 
reminder that ‘coming together as a community’ is an ongoing challenge.  
 
Although the memory of unity in the settlement is strong related to the fight against the 
common threat of eviction, keeping this unity alive over several years is difficult. As 
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highlighted by Oldfield (2002) and Lemanski (2008), fighting such a common case is central, 
yet, as evident in the case of Egoli, this unity is fragile and perhaps lost over time. Reminded 
that residents here have been living under the threat of eviction since 1999 when the first 
court case was brought, it should not be a surprise that many get tired of fighting when there 
is still no end in sight
71
.  
 
Further, although racial tensions were held at bay by applying democratic representative 
logics, internal fighting between two committees evolved due to other reasons: 
Tension in the settlement increased in 2009 and 2010, as one committee member left and 
started his own committee (this committee was also a mixed). A major factor behind this was 
the frustration with the never ending eviction threat and the court cases that had proceeded 
for years. One resident, who had moved to the settlement in 2006 and joined the original 
committee in 2005, was approached by the owner of the land around 2009. This interaction 
led to a renewed hope that the owner of the land would help with developments such as 
getting electricity installed. The older leaders were sceptical of this interaction, and as they 
did not approve, a new committee was formed, referred to as ‘the land owner’s committee’. It 
represented approximately 130 residents, mostly staying in the most densely populated area, 
which were said to have the worst conditions, including the most shebeens. These 130 
residents received their own shack numbers, and signed papers delivered by the owner of the 
land in the belief that they would receive electricity. In July 2009, a newspaper article 
optimistically stated that an agreement was made and they would now receive electricity 
(Hartley 2009). Nevertheless, electricity never came; the owner backed out of the idea of 
providing electricity and argued that he rather would work towards finding a place to which 
residents could relocate, which neither seem to have progressed. The older leaders see this as 
a confirmation of that the owner is ‘playing with their minds’ and cannot be trusted. The 
rumour is even that the residents who signed the papers to received electricity actually 
‘signed that they agreed to be evicted’ instead, although no eviction occurred.  
 
The broader effect of this new committee formation was increased internal tension. There are 
still a lot of neighbours who do not talk to each other. Instead, they talk a lot about each 
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 As mentioned in chapter four, there has been three court cases, the last one started in 2009 and lasted until 
2012. This last case too ended with no resolution, as the land owner cannot evict the residents before providing 
alternative housing. The residents are therefore still living on private land, which hinders infrastructure 
development.  
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other. Deep suspicion and rumours, and sometimes violence, erupted not only between the 
leaders but also between the followers of the two different committees. Accusations were 
made that the leaders were undemocratic and corrupt, and even court cases against each other 
were filed. With this tense situation, as highlighted by both leaders and residents were that 
the unity of the settlement was lost: 
 
I can see Egoli for 15 years now, for the past 11 years things where good. But 
now the owner started coming to the community and spreading rumours. He 
told people that they have to get me away, then they will get electricity… must 
start from new now, to build the community. For all those years we were 
fighting together. 
(Community leader 5, Egoli, 18.2) 
 
The conflict cooled down in 2011 as the leader of the rivaling committee admitted that the 
negotiations with the owner did not go well, and that We are fighting each other now because 
of him (the owner). He further explains: 
 
The things we are fighting for is service delivery must come to the people…. 
Electricity, water and toilets. They promised they would provide us water 
and… Also the owner promised us electricity. We were in a meeting with him 
and they said to us that they are going to put electricity. Afterwards, the police 
was here and told us we were going to be evicted, the police and the sheriff of 
the court, it was August 2010.  
(Community leader 7, Egoli, 5.12.2011) 
 
This reminds of the ‘divide and rule’ logic that some papers suggest are initiated by externals, 
especially connected to government (Burman and Schärf 1990, Bénit 2002, Lemanski 2008). 
Despite acknowledging that the collaboration with the owner did not work out, the tension 
continued. Both sides kept on blaming each other for various issues and even crimes and 
violence. Older residents often repeated that the unity of the settlement was much stronger in 
the early days: 
 
W: Ja, when I came it was nice, but now it is not that nice anymore. 
L: Why? 
W: Because then everybody stood by each other, but now people don’t stand by 
each other anymore… It was the new people that came… 
W: Earlier there were just churches, now there are also shops and shebeens. 
And now there are only 2 churches. 
(Resident, Egoli, 18.8.2011)  
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Although this might be explained by nostalgia, it seems to have relevance, as the numbers of 
shebeens has increased, and as the tension between the committees has also increased tension 
between neighbours.  
 
In April 2013 (21.4.2013), a major measure was taken to re-unite the settlement committees 
through applying a central democratic tool: holding an open election. That morning, I was 
called by one of the leaders, asking if I could help out by printing some papers at my office 
for a community meeting. I did not know at first that this was for an election, and when I was 
told, I was eager to help out by printing voting papers and being an ‘election observer’. In 
addition to me, two other externals were invited to oversee the process: a priest and a 
propositional councillor (who is not the councillor of the ward but who often interacts with 
some of the leaders in Egoli). The meeting took place at an open field next to the settlement. 
The residents had been informed about his meeting through posters at the spaza shops, and 
before the meeting started, it was announced through a loudspeaker and several were asked to 
go and fetch more people directly from their homes. Approximately 250 grownups and a 
mass of children gathered. In the opening speeches, by a priest, a proportional councillor and 
one the former leaders all promoted that unity had to be restored to the settlement. The 
residents gathered seemed to become inspired as they cheered and loudly expressed their 
agreements regarding the unity focus, and an optimistim spread. After speeches, there was an 
open round of residents nominating candidates. Six residents were nominated, three of them 
from the original committee. One of the six candidates was however disqualified, as the 
committee who arranged the election and the councillor noted that ‘druglords and shebeen 
owners cannot be elected’. Then, the election started. Everyone was handed a small voting 
note stating: write the name of the person you want to lead Egoli informal settlement in the 
box. A queue formed at the table where they could write a name on the note and put it in a 
ballot box. The priest, the councillor and I oversaw the process to make sure there was no 
cheating and to ensure anonymity. There were a few problems with anonymity, as a few of 
the older residents could not write and asked us or someone else in the queue for help. It went 
smoothly otherwise, and after everyone had given their note, the priest and I counted them 
and gave the results.  The five candidates were all included in ‘the new committee’. The main 
leader, who received an overwhelming part of the votes, made a motivating speech, and in 
order to restore the unity and trust in the leadership, he promised that the committee would be 
available every Tuesday evening at the church to listen to people’s concerns.  
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Summing up, the Egoli leadership engages the unity democratic logic to keep conflict at bay. 
This unity is also based on a balancing of racial and language diversity, making sure that such 
representation is prominent in the committee. Still, conflicts are constantly threatening, not 
only due to suspicions around lack of representations of certain groups, but also due to the 
fatigue with the lack of development process and the never-ending threat of evictions. Due to 
this threat, different residents engage with different externals that might ignite the hope of 
development. This creates not necessarily an intentional ‘divide and rule’ situation, but can 
unintentionally create conflicts between residents with different connections.  
 
8.2.2 GP: Democratic logics of representation but scepticism of party politics 
Similarly to Egoli, democratic logics are connected to working towards unity in GP too.  
In the early years of the settlement, the committee of the neighbouring settlement Siyachlala 
was consulted by the residents of GP. However, as GP started to expand, two internal leaders 
started to emerge: Michael and Madoni. These two first collaborated directly with the leader 
of Siyachlala, before eventually forming a committee only for GP with an own administrative 
‘book’.   
 
Although predominantly Xhosa speaking, residents have originated from different areas of 
Eastern Cape, and apparently it is difficult to work with people here because they come from 
different cultures and political backgrounds (Community leader 3, GP, 21.8.2011). Despite 
this worry, there was not much tension between internal committees during the three years of 
field visits. Still, stories were told about a more turbulent history, related to the vacuum after 
the killing of the first main community leader, Michael, who unified the settlement. 
Memories of unity were related to his charismatic and unifying style: 
 
When Michael was alive, there was no shebeen here; he did not like that 
because of crime. And there was not much littering…. And usually every two 
months he would get a party together, so that people here could get together. 
That kept us united. 
(Community leader 3, GP, 22.10.2012) 
 
However, in 2007 he apparently was killed, which left a vacuum that other leaders did not 
manage to fill. From 2007 and 2008 different leaders came and went, sometimes fighting 
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with each other. As explained by one resident, there were a lot of conflicts and many different 
committees:  
 
There were a lot of committees after him. They chose different ones and it 
changes all the time. Every five months they changed. I don’t even know their 
names, only M. 
(Resident, GP, 27.2.2013) 
 
This resident could not explain these rapid changes, because she, like many others, did not 
attend the community meetings after Michael’s death. It seems that, when there is fluctuation 
in leadership, residents keep their distance, fearful of conflicts behind this fluctuation.  
As there was no particular committee in the settlement for a time, the leadership in the 
neighbouring settlement Siaychlala took over again. Then, in the year of the ward councillor 
election in 2009, a new internal committee emerged in GP, as residents felt that the 
neighbouring leadership did not acknowledge the specific conditions of those ‘living in the 
pond’. GP is low lying and worse affected by flooding, and residents in GP complained that 
the neighbouring leadership did not contact local government who would provide aid.   
 
This new committee implemented a democratic logic of an approximate representation of the 
number of residents: Normally we select 6. It was not like that before. But the more shacks 
are coming the more people we need in the committee (Community leader 1 and 3, GP, 
28.9.2010). However, there was reluctance towards the liberal democratic logic of allowing 
party political competition in the new committee. This was because, as one leader explained, 
they were worried that this would divide the settlement: 
 
M: At one point there was a leader that had this thing of mobilizing and trying 
to convince people to join a party. But luckily people did not want to be 
divided.  
L: when was this? 
M: Around 2009. They called meetings and then they started talking about 
organizations. But we said no – if you are going to talk about the political 
organizations you must not call the whole community but only the political 
party. So people saw it does not work that way. It is a community meeting and 
not about the politics – but about the problems of this area, the community 
issues. So now when we have a meeting it is a community meeting. And certain 
people are part of organizations, but when we have a meeting that must not be 
shown.  
(Community leader 1, GP, 25.11.2011) 
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This quote does not only illustrate the worry that party politics would divide the newfound 
unity, but also the perception that issues of the internal commons or internal public issues 
need a different organization from those of party politics. It is indicated that some kind of 
unity around the concerns of the commons is necessary, and that therefore the committee 
working with the public issues must ‘represent everyone’. This is also related to an earlier 
experience under the neighbouring committee, where political divisions appeared in 2009:   
 
Last time they [the neighbour settlement] were under COPE. So people did not 
want to join them. But if you don’t join you don’t get anything…. We left them 
when they broke up with ANC. Not because we did not like COPE but because 
they did not help us. It was when they elected Ward Councillor. 
(Community leader 3, GP, 28.9.2010) 
 
Such experiences with conflicts around political affiliations appear common in informal 
settlements, as also mentioned in other case studies (Skuse and Cousins 2007, Barry et al. 
2007).  
 
Drawing this together, the democratic logics in GP are applied in attempts to unite the 
settlement. Also, particular logics of representation of the amount of residents are applied as 
the settlement grows. However, there is resentment towards a plural democratic logic of party 
competition, based on experiences and fears of conflicts.  
 
8.2.3 Kosovo: Allowing political parties but uniting the committee 
In Kosovo, working for unity has proved difficult both due to the size of the settlement and 
due to the long-lasting tension between leaders. More than in GP or Egoli, conflicts in 
Kosovo seem to be related to macro politics and democratic logics of political party 
competition. In April 2006 before a local election, a newspaper reported violent fights and 
connected them to divergences between political parties, as two leaders from two opposing 
parties rallied to become ward councillors (Makoba 2006). Such party-politics are still often 
discussed in the settlement. During the early period of my engagement (2010 and 2011), 
party politics was a hot topic, and there were two committees, one DA and one ANC based. 
When chatting to leaders from both committees, it appeared that they were engaged in similar 
practices, therefore could be called parallel community organizations, just with different 
party associations. Of course, both of the committee’s also claimed full representation of the 
settlement as a whole, and that they were ‘elected by the people’. One leader from the DA 
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committee maintained that he was representing a registered permanent committee, termed 
‘the resident committee’.  He further explained that they had split from another committee, 
but was not willing to explain why, except stating it was due to ‘political misunderstandings’. 
Similarly, representatives from the ANC committee were reluctant to explain in-depth why 
there were two committees, but highlighted that they did collaborate: 
 
L: Why are there two committees? 
N: [laughing]. The problem is with the politics.…… But it is not right, 
community leaders are supposed to be one.  
L: So do you collaborate sometimes? 
N: Sometimes. Even now we try to sit down and talk, for the sake of the people 
and the development of Kosovo. Like today, they look at the toilets (the health 
department), and both DA and ANC members are involved.  
(Community leader 11, Kosovo, 13.10.2011) 
 
Another leader gave an explanation linking the two committees to representational and 
democratic rights logics of having different parties to which different residents could turn:  
 
P: If you and your neighbour have a fight, you can go to the one committee to 
get support and he to the other. 
L: Would it be better to just have one committee? 
P: Yes but it cannot, because we have democracy and everyone can have an 
organization. That is why if there is a development project, they don’t want to 
use the old leaders, so they have meetings and elect new leaders. 
(Community leader 8, Kosovo 20.9.2011) 
 
Here, a major problem in Kosovo is indicated; that there are many conflicting committees 
and leaders. As stated above, it is seen as necessary and useful to have different committees 
for different issue. However, the same leader that made the statement above later talked about 
how there now are too many committees: 
 
About politics in Kosovo, and we are tired of it, because everybody is a 
leader…. Even now we need a space for garden, if she does anything here a 
person will come and say he is the leader and she is not allowed to do this…  
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 23.11.2011) 
 
This multitude of committees not only increased regulations, but also conflicts between 
committees. A leader who opposed the current main committee, often focused on the 
difference between party-linked committees and more ‘neutral committees’ that were elected 
in relation to government-initiated upgrading projects: 
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Here In Kosovo there are different committees. There are ANC and DA 
committees. But if there are development projects we elect committees that are 
not political parties.   
(Community leader 8, Kosovo 20.9.2011).  
 
She thereby indicates that politically-based committees are not democratically elected 
internally, compared to externally installed committees. This distinction is not straight 
forwards in practice, and much of the conflicts between committees revolved around blaming 
each other for not being elected and being too strongly affiliated to one political party. The 
different leaders constantly applied democratic logics to downplay the legitimacy of each 
other. 
 
Due a fatigue with the conflicts between committees and leaders, the tendency over the past 
few years has been to work towards a ‘united committee’, favouring non-party affiliation. It 
seems that residents, leaders and externals now view political parties as the main obstruction 
to development of the settlement. The current committee (2012-2013) has adapted to this 
discourse and has included representatives from a variety of political parties as committee 
members. This is also reflected in their new name: ‘Kosovo united committee’. Committee 
members highlight that in their meetings they do not discuss party politics but development 
issues. In the committee meeting I observed this appears a valid claim, as the issues discussed 
were mostly internal upgrading issues. Still, suspicion of party politics is not easy to get rid 
of. Some residents still blame the committee for favouring DA people especially when job 
opportunities are brought to the settlement, as the chairperson is DA affiliated, and tension 
erupted around this. At one committee meeting I attended, four furious residents suddenly 
entered the office and screamed out accusations. The situation became very tense. The 
protesters claimed that the residents had not been informed about the service delivery plans 
(more public toilets), and that the committee only consisted of DA people and were not 
elected representatives of the community. Members of the committee who state they are ANC 
affiliated disagreed. The very confusing issue for me was that both the protesters and some of 
the committee members claimed that they were the ‘real ANC’ members and the others not. 
The committee ANC members eventually managed to calm the protesters down. After the 
protesters left, the committee members again underlined that the committee was not about 
political parties, and that the protest was a planned sabotage by other leaders that had spread 
rumours and wanted to take over.  
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Knowing who is right or wrong is very difficult in this case. In a context of fluidity, little 
transparency, and numerous diverging rumours, it is no wonder that any leadership is, and 
maybe should be, contested.  
 
8.2.4 Democratic dilemma: unity and consensus or plural democracy 
Comparing the three settlements, it is clear that internal tensions and fights between 
committees can happen in any settlements, but that these conflicts can have different reasons. 
Related to the argument that fighting a common cause brings unity (Oldfield 2002, Lemanski 
2008), the cases of GP and Egoli show that unity might be created in this way, but that this 
unity can easily be lost again, especially after several years of waiting for unity to lead to 
development.   
 
More relevant to this thesis, it becomes evident that applying democratic logics and practises 
are necessary to deal with internal tensions and conflicts. Particularly important are holding 
public meetings logics, and organizing proportional representation according to the size of 
settlement and of different groups. A dilemma of allowing plural political party competition 
is reflected in all the three settlements, as it is seen as another challenge to securing unity. 
Although political parties are present in the settlements and have their own representatives, 
most leaders stress that party politics is negative and even irrelevant for committee work in 
the settlement. One reason for the scepticism to party competition is the experience that 
politicians ‘only promise and never deliver’, which was repeated by both leaders and 
residents. More importantly, political parties are seen as a threat to unity, as they support and 
create different leaders which often lead to damaging internal conflicts.  
 
The ‘unity’ side of the democratic logic can be understood as focusing on deliberations and 
participation aimed at reaching a consensus. Confronting this focus is a more liberal and 
conflict-oriented democratic logic, underlining the need for different and antagonistic voices 
to be heard. At the scale of informal settlements, a pluralist/liberal democracy model is 
suggested by Lemanski (2008) by arguing that a plurality of organizations might better 
represent the diversity of communities and secure against elite capture, or to initiate 
community development forums instead of relying on pre-existing community groups. The 
fear of elite capture is relevant, yet, the problem of tensions between committees that appear 
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in the three informal settlements of this study, indicate that such plural committees might also 
increase conflicts.  
 
The problems of pluralist democracy models are particularly expressed in residents’ and 
leaders’ negative relations to experiences with political party conflicts. Additionally, a root to 
the unity discourse can be found in the memory of unity, which was central in the anti-
apartheid social movements. In this grand social movement, there was a sense that unity and 
consent was necessary in the fight against a common enemy (Ballard 2007:19), and the urge 
for unity sometimes overshadowed internal democratic practise (Adler and Steinberg 2000, 
Seekings 2000). It is suggested that the ‘comrade model’, which was essential in the 
organization of civic movements in South Africa in the 1970s and 80s, inspired by 
intellectual activists’ reading of communist ideas, also implies less room for disagreements, 
as the model gives the organization a disciplinary form (Seekings 2000). For instance, vital 
democratic logics of the street committee system are described as a mixture of participatory 
and representative democracy, however, internal limits to broad participation and free 
democratic discussion appeared when leaders of the United Democratic Front stressed that 
too much debate and a lack of explicitly defined goals would undermine the project of 
liberation by weakening the prospect for united action (Zuern 2011:77). In other words, unity 
is connected to a consensus focus because disagreements can weaken unity. Further, while 
the regime change to democracy led to fragmentation (Cherry 2000), the memory of unity 
lived on, underlined by the challenge of shifting organizing logics from comrades to citizens 
(Adler and Steinberg 2000).  
 
This displays the ambiguity of democratic logics in a setting where discourses of ‘unity’ have 
deep historical roots, combined with a heterogeneous, fragmented and realistically suspicious 
population. It relates to the essential dilemma within the democratic logic, being the line 
between conflict and consensus. In pluralist perspectives on democracy, allowing conflict 
through political party competition is central. It is also related to the Arendt versus Habermas 
debate; an essential discussion is to what degree either confrontational politics should be 
continued or the search for consensus should dominate democratic politics (Villa 1992, Allen 
2002)  
 
180 
 
In these cases, adopting party politics into the organizational structure can on the one hand be 
perceived as healthy for a liberal democracy enabling different interests to compete. On the 
other hand, as political parties are associated with conflicts and violence, they are seen as 
disruptive not only by leaders but by many residents, generally. Therefore, the urge for unity 
indicates that the consensus approach to democracy is preferred, at least symbolically.  
 
The following sections will look further into how bureaucratic logics further might 
deteriorate the discussion side of politics. 
 
8.3 Bureaucratic logics and conflicts around developments in the three 
settlements 
Bureaucratic logics are specifically applied in practises of securing order, and stability and in 
enabling external development interventions. As discussed in chapter 7, bureaucratic models 
have significant symbolic values of order and urban modernity. Bureaucratic practises have 
also emerged to deal with regulative needs, like the regulation of migration as discussed in 
chapter 5, and to improve physical developments of the commons with the aid from externals, 
like government and NGOs. However, an essential dilemma is balancing bureaucratic 
practises with keeping in touch with residents through democratic practises of mobilizing, 
holding meetings, sharing information and directly engaging with residents’ problems. The 
classical problem with bureaucratization is therefore detachment from residents and 
compromising democratic grassroots practises.  
 
In the following sections I will discuss how this played out differently in the three 
settlements.  
 
8.3.1 GP: Longing for bureaucratic procedures and detachment from residents 
In GP, the current committee, following the two first-generations committees, is less and less 
active and reflects a longing for bureaucratic withdrawal. Slowly but surely, the main leader 
who used to deal with residents directly, both through securing democratic participatory 
procedures of open meetings, and through mediating internal family or neighbour conflicts, 
seemed to withdraw into more administrative practices. This is reflected as problematic by 
residents, as it compromises more direct interaction procedures, which further detach the 
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leaders from the residents. Some residents reflect this lack of engagement with internal 
security as the major problem of the new committee. They complain that, compared to the fist 
leader (Michael), who actively engaged in the settlement’s tensions and conflicts, the current 
leaders appeared invisible. They express that the committee is not doing anything for them 
anymore. In 2011, community leader 2, who has been in the committee for four years, 
explained that there had been a change in the duties of the committee: 
 
There is a bit change. Before then we were only talking family problems, but 
now we are talking more about development and the way forward.  
(Community leader 2, GP, 23.8.2011) 
 
This talking about development however soon dissolved as no concrete plans were made. 
During the three years of field visits, both practises of mediating internal order and of 
mobilizing fell into the background. First, this seemed to be due to the fact that more 
administrative tasks emerged though engagements with local government departments, which 
gave the leaders tasks like numbering shacks, filling out forms and carrying out surveys. 
Thereafter, it emerged that the decrease in democratic activity also had to do with fatigue and 
disappointments. For a period in 2010-2011, many open community meetings were held as 
the leaders engaged with a local social movement. This movement demanded from the 
leaders that they mobilize and inform residents, and democratic logics of deliberating on 
common concerns were applied. One leader highlighted the importance of an ‘accountable 
process’ where he would attend meetings with the social movement, and then report back to 
the residents in GP what had happened in the social movement meetings: it was accountable, 
because we reported back to the communities – every week… We always told them what we 
heard in the meetings with the city (Community leader 3, GP, 1.11.2011). Nevertheless, as 
the social movement collapsed due to internal tensions in 2011, these open community 
meetings declined and the settlement returned to not having very engaged leaders. The 
leaders felt exploited by the local movement/organization; they had carried out mobilizing 
work for this organization voluntarily, but felt that the movement left both themselves and 
GP as a whole hanging. The interaction with local government department also decreased. 
As the leader who used to arrange meetings was seeking to withdraw, he struggled to 
motivate and mobilize other residents to take over and arrange meetings:  
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They rely too much on me to organize community meetings. If I do nothing 
they also do not do anything…..People are getting lazy now, and waiting for 
things to happen. We can’t wait for things to come from heaven… 
(Community leader 3, GP, 17.1 2012) 
 
I gave them the task to organize a meeting. Everybody can organize a meeting. 
It is everybody’s job. I met with Y [the other community leader]. She said 
people phoned her and said there were no meetings. 
(Community leader 3, GP 22.3.2012) 
 
When he did withdraw, fewer meetings were held, and since 2013 there has been no 
functioning committee in GP.   
 
In the period where the main leader tried to withdraw, he expressed a longing for bureaucratic 
and administrative work and a detachment from working directly with residents. A main 
reason for withdrawing from mediating internal conflicts and crime is the danger associated 
with these practices. The dangers are quite real for the third generation of leadership, looking 
back on the experiences of the two previous generations of leaders. The first leader’s 
engagement in an internal accusation of stealing, led to his assassination in 2007: 
 
How his death started – somebody stole shoes from another guy – so Michael 
told him. Then they started pointing fingers and talking behind peoples back, 
setting out rumours, and then he got shot.   
(Community leader 3, GP, 22.10.2012) 
 
This incident has left a prevailing fear of engaging in security measures. The main leader of 
the current committee is actually the cousin of Michael who was killed, and some residents 
have indicated that he has similar skills and urges him to intervene in current cases. His 
girlfriend is worried about this, and wants him to avoid such work.  
 
Further, lessons have also been learnt from the second generations of leaders who also tried 
to deal with internal security issues. As their approach resembled vigilantism they got into 
trouble with the law, and two leaders were arrested: 
  
They destroyed a shack of one lady whose son was a thief. It started by that the 
lady came to the community leaders and asked for their help because of her 
criminal son. But when she came to them, some other people came up with that 
they also had been stolen from. So they turned against her, and they wanted to 
beat the kid. Naturally the woman resisted. So then they destroyed the lady’s 
shack. Then the lady went to the police, and the community leaders got arrested 
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and went to jail – even though it was not the community leaders that were the 
only ones who did it.  
(Community leader 3, GP, 21.8.2011) 
 
Due to these dangers, the main leader frequently expressed that he preferred to work with 
‘development issues’ rather than with internal security and with people’s problems. He 
highlighted that he wanted to withdraw from all involvements in security issues and rather act 
as an ‘advisor’ to a new committee. The other committee members too seemed keener to 
carry out administrative work for externals.  
 
Summing up, the current (2013) committee in GP is weak and the leaders have either 
withdrawn completely or withdrawn into more mundane bureaucratic administrative 
practises. This is not only because few engage, but because there is a fear and fatigue both 
with dealing with internal security issues and with mobilizing practises. There has also been a 
decrease in democratic mobilizing practices and in any kind of negotiation directly with 
residents. 
  
8.3.2 Egoli: from administration to re-attachment to residents  
In Egoli, bureaucratic logics appear to be downplayed compared to democratic logics, as the 
effort to unite is a major and constant concern of the committee. Bureaucratic logics seem to 
be played out in relation to externals, like NGOs and local government departments, while 
democratic logics are more central in internal meetings.  
 
However, in the period 2010 to 2013, the main leader withdrew from the mediating practices, 
as he was employed by NGOs to administer development projects around urban farming. In 
this period, there were few community meetings. The projects demanded that he monitor 
processes and organize other residents to join. He received an ‘office’ some 15 minutes 
walking distance from the settlements, and started staying there overnight. Eventually his 
whole family moved in there. When chatting with him during this period, he stated that he 
now needed to withdraw from the duties of the community work and concentrate on helping 
his own family. He explained that the work as a leader had exhausted him: 
 
For a long time I have neglected my family, because I was working for the 
community. It is very hard to be community worker. A councillor he gets 
money but community worker work for free. And Government never realizes 
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the community workers….Egoli is now 16 years old, 16 years of hard life. And 
what does government do? – Nothing. Sometimes I get too much upset, so I 
want to distance myself from it… But if you are only quiet and do nothing, 
then nothing will happen…. 
I have stayed here for a year now (at the house of the NGO), and my life has 
improved so much. In Egoli I had sleepless nights because I had to worry. If 
the government could take care, the community leaders would not have to go 
that extra mile…  
(Community leader 5, Egoli, 28.9.2011) 
 
Here, he also explains that leaving the settlement had made his life is easier. Yet, in a later 
conversation, he expressed reluctance to leave his community duties:  
 
Since I moved from Egoli things are not right there. I cannot live nice when 
things are going on there. I want to move back, I started the settlement…. The 
eviction case started again…..If I stay here things go backward. ….I must start 
from new now, to build the community. For all those years we were fighting 
together….The women who I thought I could leave in power, they need help. 
(Community leader 5, Egoli 18.2.2011) 
 
It seemed that tension had indeed increased in Egoli during the two years in which he was not 
present. Some became suspicious and accused him for corruption. Others complained that he 
had left them, and that things were getting out of hand. When asking two of the remaining 
leaders how it was like to be in the committee then, they also complained that they wanted to 
withdraw:  
 
L: Is it hard to be a community leader? 
AA and E: Very! It is not a lekker job. Next time they must elect another 
people, we are tired now. They need to give us a break. Sometimes we must 
buy airtime and call from our own pockets. 
 (Community leader 4 and 6, Egoli, 21.4.2011) 
 
Eventually, the leader who withdrew returned in 2013, as the NGO projects that had 
employed him came to an end. As he re-emerged in the leadership role, meetings were held 
again to discuss common concerns. It became clear that these meetings were necessary not 
only to ease suspicions and tensions, but to motivate residents fatigued by the never ending 
conflicts. In other words, although pragmatic projects are useful, it is problematic to focus 
only on actual projects and to leave out community mediation and mobilizing.  
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8.3.3 Kosovo: bureaucratization and tensions    
Bureaucratization is particular pertinent for the main committee in Kosovo. This might be 
related to the fact that it has engaged in collaborations with local government departments 
(skipping the link of working via the ward councillor). According to the chairperson, this 
committee is registered at the sub-council, and the secretary of the committee claimed they 
update the sub-council when new people are selected. The committee meets on a Tuesday 
almost every week, and local government department officers are often invited to attend. The 
committee chairperson has contact numbers to many government officials, and calls them 
frequently. The interaction with departments has resulted in the need for committee members 
to carry out certain administrative tasks of reporting and monitoring internal developments. 
By increasing administrative tasks, such intermediary interactions increase the 
bureaucratization of the committee. This becomes apparent when noting that the committee is 
termed ‘Kosovo United Development Forum’ or the ‘the service delivery committee’: 
 
We are the service delivery committee. The other committee reports in the 
problems inside. That is the resident committee. It is there for the reports of the 
community. The guys in yellow, they are still our people but they are all 
monitoring. We have one committee for each tender who we are monitoring. 
(Community leader 8, Kosovo 7.2.2012) 
 
This statement suggests a separation between an administrative unit (service delivery 
committee) and more a democratic participation-oriented unit (resident committee). This 
model clearly resembles a government setup of the division between an appointed 
bureaucratic unit and a democratically elected unit. However, an actual ‘resident committee’ 
with which the service delivery committee supposedly communicates does not seem to exist 
in a very organized form. The highlighting of a ‘service delivery committee’ might also be an 
indicator that the committee increasingly becomes an extended arm of local government 
bureaucracy, in line with theories of co-optation (Selznick 1949). 
 
The balance between bureaucratic and democratic logics is also expressed by a rival 
committee, especially by one leader who frequently highlighted the difference between what 
she termed ‘organizational leaders’ and ‘committees’: 
 
I was appointed by the community, not by an organization. But because 
Kosovo there are organizations, he says he is a leader. They don’t understand 
the difference between organizational leaders; they think that when they are 
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elected a leader of an organization, they say that they also are community 
leaders.  
(Community leader 8, Kosovo 23.11.2010) 
 
Here, she underlines the difference between a democratically elected model (democratic 
logic) and a more professional, appointed model (bureaucratic logic), despite the fact that all 
the committees claim to be elected democratically. 
 
Returning to the issue of bureaucratic logics, the classical problem of becoming detached 
from the grassroots populace when professionalizing or bureaucratizing (Selznick 1949) 
applies to Kosovo. Many residents have complained that they don’t know what is going on, 
and increased amounts of regulations are imposed on them. Additionally, the formality and 
the bounded space of the office, located on the edge of the settlement, might have contributed 
to distancing the committee from the residents, not only physically. There are less open 
community meetings in this settlement than in Egoli and GP. However, compared to other 
context where such detachments simply leads to the organizations become less visible and 
less important to the residents, detachment in this context leads to heightened tension and 
conflicts. Not only does it decrease transparency and provide opportunities for corruption, but 
it also increases the suspicion of gatekeeping and corruption, and the possibilities of rival 
leaders to draw on such suspicion when confronting the committee. Interestingly, Kosovo is 
the settlement where the leadership is the most contested and also where notions of formality 
are the strongest. Many conflicts emerge when the committee acts as an extended arm of 
government bureaucracy.  
 
One source of conflicts revolves around regulation of homes in the settlement. De-
densification or ‘re-blocking’ is a current favoured strategy promoted by both NGOs and 
local government and consists of clearing some space by removing and rebuilding some 
shacks, which is necessary for creating space for installing e.g. toilets. In the case of Kosovo, 
such regulation of space with assistance from local government has granted some power to 
the leaders. A resident unrelated to the leaders explained: 
 
The community leaders regulate the new shacks. They work closely with the 
law enforcement and land invasion. If someone tries to put up a shack here in 
front of the garage then they call to get them removed.  
(Resident, Kosovo, 26.8.2011).  
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These practises of removing and relocating shacks have created conflicts, which take a long 
time to resolve. Relocating a few residents from flooded areas to another internal open area 
took over two years of negotiations between residents, leaders and departments. Further, in 
one instances of removing certain shacks for de-densification, suspicions arose that the 
leaders did this deliberately to remove enemies and thereafter sold the space. A practice 
specific to Kosovo is that when a resident wishes to build an extensions to their shack, the 
process needs to go through a bureaucratic procedure of registration, which has created 
tensions. Extending a shack is a normal occurrence in many informal settlements, especially 
when families grow, and more rooms are needed. In other settlements, usually such 
extensions are made after a chat with neighbours and / or community leaders. Conversely, in 
Kosovo, a system was set up that insisted that residents register their wish to extend the 
shacks in collaboration with a local government department:  
 
Before you renovate you must come here and out your name in the book of the 
informal settlement department. This is to prevent that people put illegal 
shacks. They come and check the book twice a week, collect the names and 
give a paper permit.  
(Community leader 10, Kosovo, 7.2.2012). 
 
Clearly, this is a continuation of practises to control and regulate migrations into the 
settlements. This system came with the threat of sanctions: if unregistered extensions were 
discovered, the committee could call the anti-eviction unit of local government and have the 
shack forcefully removed. Residents were informed of this new system through word of 
mouth. Some residents who were already sceptical of the current committee, suspected that 
the committee was doing this for own gain. I was invited to join a meeting where they 
discussed this: 
 
P: The leaders called law enforcement to tear down the shack. Because they say 
the owners do not stay here, and that there are criminals staying here. This 
shack came here in June 1999; it was one of the first shacks here. Yesterday 
law enforcement came and demolished but we rebuilt it. This lady stays here. 
… 
L: Why do they want to demolish this place? 
P: they want to sell the place, they already have customers from other areas. 
They are going to sell the land for 1500 Rand.  
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 30.11.2011). 
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The resident’s claim here is that this regulative power given to certain leaders is illegitimate. 
Further, she claimed that there was a lack of information sharing and democratic deliberation 
around these regulations:  
 
P: I don’t know why they suddenly started doing this, maybe J. will explain. 
They said they had community meetings, but the people here do not know 
about the meeting. 
L: You talked to the other community leaders?  
P: No. But yesterday when the law enforcement came we told them we want to 
meet with those community leaders. Law enforcement said they came here 
because community leaders told them to. We said those community leaders 
have to come then. They said they will fetch them, but they did not come. Only 
the law enforcement came, with a lot of cars - maybe 15, and with guns. It was 
terrible. So those leaders do not want to talk to us. No warning was given to the 
inhabitants before they came.  
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 30.11.2011). 
 
This story indicates not only that the system of micro-regulating and sectioning extensions 
created anger and tensions, but also that the committee and community leaders involved in 
this regulation could withdraw from the actual conflict due to their support in external 
authorities of local government and the police.  
 
Another continuing source of tension revolves around employment, like the appointment of 
settlement cleaners through local government processes (private companies compete for the 
tender and the successful bidder then appoints the cleaners, who are residents of Kosovo). 
The competition to get these jobs is often intense, and the process has been linked to 
suspicion of corruption several times. In 2006, two media articles explained how the political 
in-fighting is related to a public works project (Phaliso 2006a, 2006b). The suspicion was 
both that the jobs were given to people outside Kosovo, and that they employed people from 
only one political party. In November 2010 such suspicions escalated again as new people 
from within the settlement were employed to clean the streets. The same suspicions and 
accusations were alleged. The suspicion was heightened because the selection of the 
employees apparently did not happen transparently. It resulted in an internal toyi-toyi, the 
new employees were scared to work and the garbage was not cleared. After a few weeks the 
settlement was floating in garbage, until some residents set fire to the garbage pile. An online 
media article reported on this in-fighting (Mquqo 2010). Some residents assumed that it was 
connected to the party politics. When I chatted to the cleaners, however, they did not 
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acknowledge that they were involved in politics, but claimed that the allegations were based 
on a rumour put out by certain leaders, aimed at destabilizing the main committee.  
 
The main point for the discussion in this chapter is not who is right or wrong, or if the tension 
really was about political parties or not, but rather how significant the need is for increasing 
transparency through booth democratic and bureaucratic procedures. As stressed by one 
leader, the procedures were the main problem: 
 
People said in Kosovo that the new woman had won this tender. She was 
supposed to call the community meeting and inform everyone! She did not do 
that. She just got the people form Fesega….. They said when government was 
to employ people, everybody must know, and everyone can apply. Then they 
will draw from a bucket who will get the job – in front of everybody. 
(Community leader 8, Kosovo, 16.11.2010).  
 
This shows that against accusations of corruption, a mixture of democratic participatory 
processes and bureaucratic models of written procedures are not just ideals, but also 
pragmatic suggested procedures for dealing with issues of suspicion and distrust in general. It 
also highlights that democratic and bureaucratic procedures are both necessary to increase 
transparency. 
 
Summing up, adhering to bureaucratic logics and shying away from ‘politics’ does not 
remove the possible political tensions in Kosovo. Rather, it increases tensions as 
administrative regulations are carried out without consultations, increasing anger, suspicion 
and accusations. Further, the conflicting logics are drawn into accusations between 
committees and leaders, highlighting how balancing these logics is highly political. 
 
8.3.4 Bureaucratization from below and the politics of balancing logics  
Summing up the similarities and difference between how the leaders balance bureaucratic and 
democratic logics, two specific implications are observed: 
 
First, comparing the settlement committees, there seems to be a general tendency to embrace 
bureaucratic logics. In the case of Kosovo, bureaucratization can be partly attributed to co-
option by government departments, especially as the committee is called ‘the service delivery 
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committee’. In Egoli too, a main leader was co-opted to carry out administrative work for an 
NGO.  
 
Yet, as evident in GP and Egoli, processes of bureaucratization can also be consequences of 
fatigue with participatory and interactive practises and a longing to ‘withdraw’ into more 
stable and secure administrative positions. This might also be linked to the fact that, as 
revealed in chapter six, norms of decent behaviour, combined with widespread gossip, might 
limit the willingness to speak publicly. Hence, bureaucratization processes are related to both 
grassroots issues and co-option. In other words, in addition to the fact that co-option is 
possible, there is a tendency to ‘bureaucratize from below’, in that bureaucratic logics are 
favoured not only presented to satisfy externals, but to adapt to the insecure urban context. 
This is also indicated in chapter seven.  
 
Secondly, balancing democratic and bureaucratic logics is problematic in all the settlements; 
yet there are different ways of dealing with this. Essentially, the main difference between 
these logics is that while democratic logics are applied to organize discussions and interaction 
with residents to allow for specific ideas to be heard, bureaucratic logics are focused at 
administrative and regulative practices to get things done. Clearly, both are needed, but the 
balancing of these might lead to tensions and conflicts. 
 
In Kosovo, leaders interact with both political parties and local government departments, and 
much tension has erupted around modelling the committees in relation to either of these. 
Despite underlining that the committees are not related to political parties, individual leaders’ 
links to parties are still strong, and necessarily so, as these links provide connections. 
Extensively highlighted by the committee members, the latest tendency has been to lean more 
towards bureaucratic models as a reflection of the experiences of the fights that evolved 
around party politics. However, adhering to bureaucratic logics has also led to tensions. The 
problem of bureaucratic detachment of the committee from residents is particularly high in 
Kosovo, physically symbolized by the meetings held inside ‘the office’. This has led to 
tension and suspicion towards committees and community leaders, and democratic logics are 
applied in accusations. Suspicion of corruption is particularly high here, and several incidents 
underscore the popular demand for transparency. This suspicion might be healthy, as it sets 
barriers that prevent individual leaders from carrying out their own agendas. On the other 
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hand, protesting and the contesting of leadership in Kosovo can hinder infrastructural 
development. Several times, when something external is brought to the settlement, there have 
been claims of corruption. 
 
In GP, direct engagements with residents, through dealing with security issues, have declined, 
linked to the experience that previous leader who did so was killed. Residents are unhappy 
with this detachment, and state that there are no leaders who are present anymore. Also 
democratic practises of participation have declined due to disappointments and fatigue, and 
the leaders have either withdrawn completely or expressed the desire for a withdrawal into 
more mundane administrative practises.  
 
In Egoli, the application of democratic logics seems to be stronger than bureaucratic logics. 
This might be based on the experience that bureaucratic withdrawal did not provide many 
outcomes for the settlement generally and led to increased tensions. Hence, the latest 
developments (2013) are that democratic attempts to secure representation and to keep a 
strong connection to the residents is seen as necessary to keep motivations up and tensions 
down. Here, meetings are less formal and more open to the audience.  
 
Together, this shows that, on the one hand, working towards practical administrative-based 
upgrading is also important, and dragged out negotiations with residents can be seen as 
inefficient and hindering development. This is sometimes expressed as an issue that has 
become ‘politicised’ (Bénit 2002, Oldfield and Zweig 2010, Millstein 2011), which has 
negative connotations. On the other hand, the current tendency to bureaucratization should be 
questioned; politics or ‘politicisation’ might be seen as necessary rather than a problem 
(Robins et al 2008). With the lack of public discussions, as evident in Egoli and Kosovo, 
suspicions and tensions increase, especially towards administrative procedures that do not 
make insights into the decision making publicly available. The suspicion and tensions that 
increased bureaucratic procedures can be linked to the classical problem, as raised by Arendt, 
that they standardize and simplify complex situations, leading to a neglect of political activity 
in the form of speaking publicly and processes of discussing common concerns (Wolin 1983, 
Crick 2005).  As also highlighted by some South African studies, the problem of 
bureaucratization of civic organizations lies in the fact that they might lose their community 
connections and cover up tensions (Bähre 2007a, Saniland 2008, Zuern 2011). Although 
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bureaucratic procedures are needed to ensure transparency, if the committees neglect politics 
and become a sole administrative unit, corruption or suspicion of corruption might occur that 
severely endangers the settlement as a whole and hinders development. Hence, maintaining 
flexible democratic procedures that connect with and mediate between residents is important.  
 
Further, especially the case of Kosovo shows that the conflicts between these logics are 
drawn into politics accusations. Especially bureaucratic logics are associated with hierarchal 
and even authoritative forms of governing (Peters 2010) and can consequently be perceived 
as ‘anti-democratic’. Hence, when residents and leaders accuse the committee they draw on 
the discourses of bureaucratic or democratic forms to confront the legitimacy of certain 
leaders. These discourses came up often, in the other settlements too, especially in 
accusations that some leaders have not really been elected but rather appointed, and in the 
frequent claims of residents that they were not informed about public concerns.  
Thus, beyond the facts that conflicts often are fights over resources, the analytical focus on 
plural institutional logics and legitimacy politics (Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 
2013) has provided insights into how politics evolve around negotiations over logics and 
ideal organizational models, and how organizational discourses are central in these policies.   
 
8.4 Conclusion  
Summing up, I have in this chapter discussed the how community leaders apply both 
democratic and bureaucratic logics pragmatically, and the tension that evolve around these 
logics in practice.   
First, I have discussed a central ambiguity of democratic logics: That the consensus- oriented 
‘unity’ approach rooted in the discourses of the anti-apartheid social movements (Adler and 
Steinberg 2000, Zuern 2011), which most leaders see as necessary to keep tensions down, 
conflicts with a more modern pluralist democratic logic of allowing competition between 
groups and party-politics. Some degree of party politics seem accepted, however the fear of 
escalating conflicts make most leaders focus on working towards integration and 
downplaying  party political divisions in addition to cultural divisions. Although plural 
committees might limit elite capture in informal settlements (Lemaskis’s 2008), lessons from 
political tensions in the histories of the settlements have led most leaders to favour a unity 
model. 
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Secondly, there is an increased tendency to apply bureaucratic logics, not only due to co-
option but also due to a bureaucratization from below. A balance that includes both 
bureaucratic and democratic logics is needed, but tensions can emerge when one of these 
logics dominate. In all the settlements, periods of bureaucratization has led the less 
interaction with residents, which further has led to increased suspicion and tension. The 
challenge to balance these logics is therefore significant, as accusations are easily made by 
drawing in discourses of organizational models.  
 
Drawing this together and answering the question posed in the introduction, committee 
conflicts and changes reflect the politics balancing these logics, by the fact that leaders 
attempt to deal with the conflicts and changes by applying these logics, and by that ‘rivals’ 
and residents apply these logics to contest certain leaders. Hence, this underscores that 
politics of leadership organizing could be analysed by a focus on plural competing logics, 
discourses and ideals of how to organize. From this perspective, politics is not only seen as 
conflicts over resources, but as also as discursive negotiations over systems and 
organizational models, evident in that organizational discourses are drawn into conflicts 
between committees.  
 
This further underlines a room for agency. As there are no set rules for what these 
committees should be and look like, but rather a multitude of expectations and political 
challenges, they are in constant formation and change, trying to adapt to these challenges. 
That different institutional logics can be drawn in at different times also gives the committees 
and leaders some flexibility. They are not trapped into an ‘iron cage’, but are loose 
organizations that can attach themselves to different institutional frameworks or jump from 
one to another. The reflections over the value of party politics are a strong indicator of the on-
going organizational learning and openness to adapt logics. This is a reminder of the 
argument that community organizations do not necessarily confine themselves to one strategy 
but create possibilities by applying several strategies (Oldfield and Stokke 2006, 2007, Skuse 
and Cousins 2007, Thorn and Oldfield 2011). This can be useful for the organizations, but 
can also decrease transparency and accountability which decrease creates a significant source 
of suspicion, tensions and conflicts. Thus it also gives committees or leaders the flexibility to 
oppose each by drawing on accusations of illegitimate organizational ideals, in other words, 
legitimacy politics are constantly on-going.   
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CHAPTER 9 Conclusion 
 
9.1 Summary  
Before discussing the main conclusions this thesis, which highlight aspects of the politics of 
negotiating organizational models in the particular neighbourhoods of informal settlements, I 
will sum up the main argument and the findings of each analysis chapter. 
 
9.1.1 Summary of aim and argument  
The aim of this thesis is not to disagree that informal settlement politics is signified by 
intense fights over scarce resources or that informal settlement leaders sometimes engage in 
patronage. Rather, this thesis suggests that politics and leadership in these spaces also have 
other sides, which when analysed, can contribute to the understanding of urban politics in 
these neighbourhoods. Hence, beyond describing politics, organizing and leadership with 
instrumental and rational-choice perspectives, the focus on the social constructions of 
organization and leadership through plural and conflicting institutional logics, has given 
insight into some significant tensions that continue to inform the politics of leadership 
organizing. These politics are important, because informal settlements as particular urban 
neighbourhoods contain several and significant internal common concerns, in addition to 
several, and sometimes conflicting, ideas around how these common concerns should be dealt 
with through certain organizational practises and models.  
 
Before elaborating on the main conclusions of this thesis, I will sum up the theoretical 
framework and the main conclusion of each analysis chapter.  
 
9.1.2 Summary of theoretical framework  
Beyond politics of the belly, hero or villain leaders, and instrumental organizing: Social 
construction and legitimacy politics 
Theoretically, I have aimed to contribute to a niche within South African urban studies 
grappling with neighbourhood politics. In line with some recent suggestions that it might be a 
problem that liberal and neo-Marxian perspectives dominate urban theory (Parnell and 
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Robinson 2012, Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012a), I have suggested that this might be one of the 
reasons why there is a focus on an instrumentalist analysis of politics, organizing and 
leadership in informal settlement. This indicates that in order to better understand the politics 
of leadership organizing in informal settlement we need to move beyond instrumental and 
outcome-oriented analyses. Therefore, I have in line with the suggestions by the urban 
scholars Lowndes (2001, 2009) and McQuarrie and Marwell (2010), applied a theoretical 
framework inspired by new-institutionalism, as an alternative to instrumentalist explorations 
of organizing and leadership. In the theory chapter, I have outlined and discussed this 
framework in relation to literature mentioning informal settlement organizing, politics and 
leadership in South Africa.   
 
First, I have outlined how new-institutionalism promotes a process approach to the focus on 
politics of negotiating organizational models (March and Olsen 1984, 1989, Hall and Taylor 
1996). Combined with an Arendtian focus on politics as processes of negotiating common 
concerns (Arendt 1958, Wolin 1983, Villa 1992), this has enabled an analysis of the politics 
negotiating which organizational models should be applied to deal with internal common 
concerns in the informal settlements. In other words, it has enabled an analysis of politics 
beyond ‘the belly’. Certainly, there are resource fights and there is patronage, but there is also 
legitimacy politics and politics of negotiating how organizations that deal with the commons 
should be organized. Hence, in relation to Katsaura’s (2012) suggestion of ‘micro-politics’, I 
agree that politics should be studied at any geographical scale or in any space, but suggest 
that this also requires different ideas and applications of the highly debated concept of 
politics. The de-connection of politics from the arena of state-based organizations highlights 
that politics as discussions over common affairs can happen at neighbourhood scales as well. 
Looking into the politics around institutional logics is therefore also useful to approach the 
gap between ‘everyday’, as mundane, everyday life described by ethnographers, and 
‘politics’ as contestations or interaction with the arena of the state. This is because taken-for-
granted ‘everyday’ practises within the framework of new-institutionalism can be viewed as 
institutions influencing the formation of organizations dealing with politics as common 
concerns. In the cases of the informal settlements, the analysis (especially chapter three and 
five) has shown that there are several institutionalised practises that have contributed to the 
formation of informal settlement committees and leaders, especially dealing with internal 
conflicts and crime, mobilizing against common enemies, and negotiating with externals. 
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Drawing these practises together, they are not really ‘micro’ concerns, and it is revealed that 
the classical tension between bureaucratic and democratic models (Etzioni-Halevy 1983, 
Peters 2010) is relevant at this scale as well.  
 
Secondly, for analysing organizations beyond instrumental and leaders beyond heroes or 
villains, new-institutionalism has above all provided an analytical focus on organizations as 
socially constructed in relation to the institutional environment providing practises, logics, 
and organizational models (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Dimaggio and Powell 1983, Scott 2008, 
Czarniawska 2008a). Leaders are with this perspective seen as constructed in relation to their 
environment too, moving beyond the focus on leadership styles and notions of heroes or 
villains (Alvesson and Svenningsson 2003, Collinson 2005, Uhl-Bien 2006, Denis et al. 
2012). Further, the development institutional pluralism and the consequence of ‘legitimacy 
politics’ (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013), has proven relevant 
for acknowledging informal settlement committees as hybrid organizations or bricolages 
(Skuse and Cousins 2007), and hence analysing the politics and tensions of balancing 
multiple institutional logics. This is particularly evident in chapter seven and eight, where it is 
explored how leaders balance both democratic and bureaucratic institutional logics to assert 
legitimacy and deal with internal tensions, or sometimes, to contest other leaders. 
 
Summing up, the theoretical argument is that applying new-institutionalism in urban theory is 
could be useful for South African urban theory considering neighbourhood politics. In this 
thesis, it has enabled me to analyse the symbolic sides of organization and leadership models 
and the politics around displaying these models in the plural institutional setting of informal 
settlements.  
 
9.1.3 Summary of insights from analysis chapters 
I have unpacked the research question and argument through four analysis chapters. In each 
of these chapters, a sub question to the main research question is posed, looking into different 
aspects of the politics of leadership organizing in informal settlements. The first two analysis 
chapters focus on the institutional environment and have displayed how informal settlement 
leaders and committees can be seen as micro-government fulfilling several practices and that 
behavioural norms condition the possibilities of acting politically by speaking publicly. This 
underlines the importance of historical and contextually formed practises and norms. The two 
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following chapters have indicated the contextually developed importance of portraying 
bureaucratic and democratic logics, and how tension and politics evolve around balancing 
these two essentially conflicting logics.  
 
As each chapter on their own has provided interesting insights in addition to adding to the 
main argument, I will now summarize these chapters and their specific insights. 
 
Chapter 5: Informal settlement committees as micro-governments shaped by plural 
institutional practises 
This chapter, after introducing the three settlements and highlighting some fundamental 
differences in size, history and demographics, suggests that despite these differences, there 
are certain practises particular to the informal settlement context that these settlements have 
in common. Although there is a complex bricolage of practises, I have identified three 
practises relevant to the social construction of leadership committees: mediating and 
regulating internal order, mobilizing, and intermediary negotiation. In line with new-
institutionalism (Scott 2008), I perceive these practises as ‘institutionalised’ in the specific 
setting of urban informal settlements, and hence they contribute to the social construction of 
similar leadership committees in different informal settlements. It is also indicated that co-
option is possible by a range of external actors, but that for the most part, the committees 
have several organizational cores that they need to continue balancing. I have argued that 
they can be seen as micro-governments, as they fulfil both bureaucratic and political tasks. 
Further, while regulating order and intermediary practises with externals have developed into 
administrative and more bureaucratic practises, mediating internal conflicts and mobilizing 
require more symbolically motivating and democratic practises. Therefore, as the leadership 
committees have to adhere to the multiple practises they are shaped by, they are essentially 
hybrid organizations, adhering to multiple institutional logics.  
 
Chapter 6: Tensions of the internal public realm: urban individuality and disciplinary 
norms 
Chapter six explores an important aspect of politics as negotiating organizational models 
(March and Olsen 1984) of common concerns (Arendt 1958): the condition of speaking 
publicly within the settlements. The analysis shows that a central problem of the public realm 
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in the specific urban condition of informal settlements is that, even though there is little 
privacy and intense needs for collective action, open public deliberations are difficult in 
practice. Adding another level of complexity to the institutional environment, the chapter 
shows how residents’ relations to public – private divisions and norms of public behaviour 
limit a free public realm. The chapter first outlined the specific urban condition of the 
dominance of a young, fluid and ‘urbanized’ population, and related this to the reluctance to 
participate in community meetings. On the other hand, both on-migration and the presence of 
individualized urban youth increase the circulation of organizational models (Bénit-Gbaffou 
et al. 2012a, 2012b), which provide conditions for and multiple urban ideals of organizing 
politics. Thereafter, I discussed how the specific urban condition of marginalization and 
instability is reflected in feelings of fatigue, fear and suspicion, in addition to the social 
norms of decency, and how this further impacts on the motivations to act publically. Drawing 
this together, beyond displaying a problematic public realm, the chapter indicates a paradox 
in the urban informal settlement’s public realm: That the dominance of a young urban 
population, longing for individual freedom, conflicts with the socially disciplinary norms of 
order and decency. This adds to further complicate the politics of balancing conflicting logics 
that leaders have to engage in.   
 
Chapter 7: Leaders’ presentations of democratic and bureaucratic logics as reflecting 
legitimacy of the specific urban institutional environment  
Building on the previous chapters, chapter seven explores presentations of democratic and 
bureaucratic logics in relation to contextual norms, conditions of speaking publicly and 
historically institutionalised logics of organizing (discourses). Borrowing from new-
institutionalism, organizations and leaders are dual in nature, encompassing pragmatic and 
symbolic sides (Scott 2008, McQuarrie and Marwell 2010) and presentations of 
organizational models are analysed as symbolic claims to legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 177, 
Dimaggio and Powell 1983). Further, as the leadership committees are faced with 
institutional pluralism, their presentations of multiple logics are not analysed as signs of 
decoupling, but signs of ‘legitimacy politics’ (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 
2009, Yu 2013). With this fundament, the analysis shows how democratic logics are 
important to contrast traditional authority - which does not fit with modern urban identities 
and the memories of organizational logics of the movement against the authoritarian 
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apartheid system. Thereafter it analyses how bureaucratic logics are portrayed to appropriate 
behavioural norms of mature decency in addition to providing stability, and transparency.  
 
The difference between the symbolic values of democratic and bureaucratic logics therefore 
becomes apparent: that democratic logics adhere to radical and modern urbanity discourses, 
while bureaucratic logics adhere to more conservative norms of mature decency.  It points at 
a problematic urban condition in informal settlements: the tension between individualized 
urbanity confronted by disciplinary norms of public behaviour.  
 
This contributes to the argument that these conflicting logics are adaptations to the plural 
nature of the institutional environment of the settlements, especially the plural historical and 
contextual developed norms, and not mere acts of decoupling or results of co-option.  
 
Chapter 8: The tensions and politics of applying conflicting democratic and bureaucratic 
logics  
With the indications of a tension between democratic and bureaucratic logics, this last 
analysis chapter has analysed and compared how these two logics are balanced by leaders in 
dealing with internal tensions, committee conflicts and changes in the three settlements. This 
related to the fundamental suggestion that a context of institutional pluralism require leaders 
to negotiate conflicts and carry out adaptive work, and this can lead to conflicts and 
‘legitimacy politics’ (Stryker 2000, Kraatz and Block 2008, Kraatz 2009, Yu 2013). Further, 
the classical tension within democratic logics and between bureaucratic efficiency and 
democratic consultation (Etzioni-Halevy 1983, Peters 2010) are drawn in.  
 
The comparison shows how the committees in all the three settlements are concerned with 
balancing democratic logics, which are complicated, as it entails balancing residents’ 
heterogeneity and with building unity. The tendency is that, although unavoidably present, 
party-politics is seen as a threat to unity and hence and more a consensus-oriented democratic 
logic is preferred. Moreover, the classical problem of balancing bureaucratic and democratic 
logics is that too much bureaucratic administrative work distances the committees and leaders 
from the residents, which can increase internal suspicion and tension, but on the other hand, 
too much democratic work unifying and connecting with residents might compromise 
physical developments. Comparing the settlements, the tendency here seems to be increased 
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favouring of bureaucratization, not only due to co-option but linked to mediation fatigue and 
a ‘bureaucratization from below’. 
 
Together, this confirms that important aspects of the politics of leadership organizing revolve 
around balancing democratic and bureaucratic logics. The balancing of these logics is also 
drawn into ‘legitimacy politics’ of accusations against leaders and conflicts between 
committees. These ongoing negotiations of logics, implying ideas on how the committees 
should be organized, are also a source of tension within the settlements. 
 
9.2 Main conclusions: the politics of balancing bureaucratic and democratic 
logics  
Drawing together the insights from the analysis chapters, the overall conclusion is that the 
politics of organizing leadership in informal settlements is informed by many tensions, 
especially since there are no established rules but rather several norms, discourses and ideas 
about how these committees should be organized. These politics of negotiating how 
committees should be organized are important because the informal settlements as specific 
neighbourhoods have especially many common concerns. I further conclude that although 
there are several institutional logics, democratic and bureaucratic logics are displayed by 
community leaders as particularly pertinent, due to specific conditions of urban 
heterogeneity, behavioural discourses and historical organizational memories. Since these 
two logics are essentially conflicting, much of the politics of leadership organizing revolves 
around how to balance these.  
In addition to this main conclusion, I have made three sub-conclusions, which contribute to 
nuancing some aspects of politics, organizing and leadership in the particular urban spaces of 
South African informal settlements.  
 
9.2.1 Rather than de-coupling or co-option: bureaucratic and democratic logics shaped 
in the specific urban environment  
As noted in the introduction, some scholars briefly mention democratic and bureaucratic 
organizational models (Runciman 2011), but do not analyse these further. Without deeper 
analysis, it might be assumed that these models are a result of either mimicking external 
formal organizations like government, de-coupling sides of the committees to strategically 
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gain legitimacy with externals, or results of co-option by externals. In the analysis, I have 
shown that although these processes in relation to externals do take place in some cases, 
bureaucratic and democratic logics also form in the internal relation between leaders and 
residents, related to internal and norms and discourses. Bureaucratic and democratic logics 
have evolved both due to pragmatic needs and symbolic conforming to specific historical and 
urban norms. Bureaucratic logics have emerged both due to pragmatic need for detailed 
regulation (especially related to internal security as described in chapter five), and to 
symbolically adhere to context-specific discourses of mature decency and stability (as 
discussed in chapter six and seven). Democratic logics have emerged due to pragmatic needs 
to deal with internal tensions (as discussed in chapter eight), and to symbolically adhere to 
discourses of urban individuality and discourses related to the anti-apartheid struggle (as 
indicated in chapter seven and eight). Therefore, indications of bureaucratic or democratic 
logics are not mere acts of mimicking or decoupling, neither necessarily only results of co-
option. This analysis has been possible by applying Kraatz and Block’s (2008) argument that 
a problem with decoupling theory is that one needs to know the organizational ‘core’ from 
which a thing is decoupled. In other words, it is problematic to describe something as merely 
symbolic unless we know where the true substance resides, and this is difficult in a pluralistic 
organization (Kratz and Block 2008:250). Pache and Sanots (2010) argue that hybrid 
organizations need not hybridise all practises, but can also have coexisting practises linked to 
different logics.   
 
One implication of terming community leader committees hybrid organizations in a plural 
institutional environment, is that it is insufficient to fit community leader ‘rationalities’ into 
one of Weber’s ideal types. Contrary to Watsons’ (2003, 2009) suggestion of ‘conflicting 
rationalities’, where an informal settlement rationality is contrasted with a bureaucratic 
government department rationality, it is evident that bureaucratic rationalities is one of the 
many logics informal settlement residents and leaders encompass. This is in line with the 
observations that informal settlement dwellers encompass multiple or hybrid political 
identities (Robins et al. 2008, Myers 2011, Bank 2011)
72
.  
This further implicates that the committees as some sort of public organizations are flexible 
and adaptable rather than purely bureaucratic organizations, which, in Weber’s terms, 
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 Both Myers (2011) and Robins (2008) also mention a critique Watsons idea of a clash of rationalities. 
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become inflexible ‘iron cages’. Their development should be studied with curiosity. As they 
are not iron cages, relevant to Bénit-Gbaffou et al. (2012b) notion of the circulation of 
organization models, they can rapidly take up and adapt to a range of organizational models 
and institutional logics. Especially with the extended interventions by a variety of actors, and 
with the constant on-migration of residents from different townships and informal 
settlements, organizational models and practises spread fast. This also underlines that 
organizational practises and models do not ‘belong’ to a certain organizations. For instance, 
bureaucratic organizing does not ‘belong’ to governmental organizations, and street 
committees do not belong to SANCO, but are organizational forms of street committees are 
carried forward by a range of organizations, as described in chapter five. In other words, 
organizational practises and models should be viewed as institutions that are carried by a 
variety of organizations.  
 
Lastly, this underlines that politics in South African informal settlements is more 
sophisticated than often assumed. This is in line with the suggestions of moving beyond 
exotic presentations of politics in an African setting in general (Robins 2002a, Hagman and 
Péclard 2010), and of ‘urban slums’ generally (Wacquant 1997, 2008), and not treating 
informal settlements as sites of decay and disorder (Myers 2011).  
 
9.2.2 Legitimacy politics - structural constraints and possibilities  
In relation to the polarised ideas of community leaders and power, the analysis chapters in 
this thesis show that they have evolved through both internal and external pressure, as they 
are socially constructed in relation to different historically institutionalized practises. 
Especially in chapter six and seven, I have applied the institutionalist assumptions that 
organizations cannot be viewed as purely instrumental, outcome-generating units, but are 
dual in nature because they have to adapt symbolically to the environment from within which 
they emerge to gain legitimacy, in addition to providing outcomes (Scott 2008, McQuarrie 
and Marwell 2010). What this implies is that organizations have an inherent ambiguity of 
actually doing practical work, but also adapting more or less symbolically to their 
institutional environment (Scott 2004, Czarniawska 2008a). This is the duality of 
organizations that Lowndes (2001, 2009) and McQuarrie and Marwell (2010) argue should 
be useful for urban theorists to draw on.   
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On the one hand, I have indicated several internal structural constraints. There are first of all 
the limitations of the public realm do impact on the conditions of speaking publicly and 
leadership formation. Suspicion, gossip and jealousy can destabilize leader’s legitimacy and 
lead to shifts in power, and change dynamics from solidarity to schism (Barry 2006).   
Further, I have indicated some norms and discourses that leadership organizing needs to 
adhere to. These are shaped both in relation to the specific history of South African informal 
settlements’ relation to the state, and to specific urban conditions of stigma, marginalization 
and instability. Especially, I found the tension between notions of urban individuality as 
opposed to the disciplinary effects of conservative values interesting in this setting, as 
discussed in chapter six and seven. The notion of urban individuality is linked to classical 
theories of urban individualization (Wirth 1938), expressed by a longing for freedom from 
intervention, also by community leaders. This however contrasts the disciplinary effects of 
contextually developed behavioural norms and urges to regulate indecent behaviour. Such 
tensions have been indicated around youth in townships too (Seekings 2006), and in the urge 
to morally regulate criminal behaviour (Buur and Jensen 2004b). For this thesis, this urban 
tension has also some structuring effects on how leadership should be organized, and it has 
brought conflicting expectations to leadership. Leaders need to adapt to these norms, 
especially by portraying both democratic and bureaucratic logics. Together, these structural 
aspects of informal settlement life emphasises that in these settings too, power is not just 
something that leaders can take or own as a position, but is shaped and reshaped through 
social interactions and discourses.  
 
On the other hand, leaders are not merely dominated by institutional constraints, and there is 
certainly room for agency.  Here, the recent theories of how organizations adapt to plural 
institutional demands have proven particularly useful (Kraatz and Block 2008, Pache and 
Santos 2010, Greenwood et al. 2011, Yu 2013). By applying these theories I have shown that, 
due to the complexity of the institutional setting, there is room for agency, as leaders can 
manoeuvre within this setting and apply the fitting logic to a specific situation. For instance, I 
have mentioned how committees and leaders might adapt to several externals simultaneously, 
and hence, instead of being co-opted, balance between these. Some contextually-related 
papers have also reflected that informal settlement residents encompass and engage in a range 
of different strategies in relation to negotiating with government (Oldfield and Stokke 2006, 
2007, Skuse and Cousins 2007, Thorn and Oldfield 2011). Additionally, as displayed in 
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chapter eight, logics are deliberately brought into conflicts, sometimes to solve and 
sometimes to fuel these conflicts. 
 
Drawing this together, the focus on legitimacy politics has enabled to include both structural 
constraints and possibilities.  
 
9.2.3 The longing for stability and bureaucratization from below?   
Lastly, an issue I found particularly interesting is the indications of bureaucracy as developed 
from below in this very specific urban setting. I will therefore add some thoughts on how this 
related to the extended discussion of problems of bureaucratization. 
 
The bureaucratization from below is played out both symbolically and pragmatically: 
Pragmatically, as mentioned in chapter five monitoring and regulating migration for order 
and security have led to the use of bureaucratic procedures of counting and keeping books. 
Additionally, increased regulatory and bureaucratic practises are also related to the fact that 
resident in informal settlements are not living solely in a sphere of informality, but are 
integrated into the ‘formal’ sphere of the state and the formal market. Hence, an increased 
duty of committees and leaders is to help issue residents with formal papers like ‘proof of 
residency’, necessary for receiving mail, establishing bank accounts, registering a car, buying 
things on credit, or for receiving grants, whether disability, child grant of pension grant. And 
lastly, related to a fear of dealing with politics, crime and internal conflicts, withdrawing into 
more mundane administrative positions is tempting for many leaders.  
Symbolically, as discussed in chapter seven, bureaucratic logics might be linked to internal 
norms and discourses of stability, order and decency. It might seem a paradox that the 
fragmented and fragile setting is coupled with a longing for stability, order and rationality. 
However, similarly to the notion of ordentlikheid (Salo 2003, 2009, Ross 2006, 2010, Jensen 
2008), the symbolic value of bureaucratic logics linked to decency, regularity and formality 
can be seen as a reaction to the insecurity and instability that dominates informal settlement 
life. In other words, the urge to portray stability and order as counteracting instability 
increases the value of bureaucratic organizational practices and symbolic models. Leaders 
need to reflect order despite tensions and complexity. Further, both in informal settlement 
residents’ and leaders’ reflections, there is a tendency to democratic unity above ‘political-
party’ logics.   
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This shows that the urge for stabilization and rationalization is also emerging from below. In 
relation to southern urban theory (Pieterse 2008, Simone 2010, Myers 2011), the multitude of 
attempts to create order in the chaos of the urban south, are not necessarily state driven. It 
becomes evident that the instability that signifies informal settlements has attracted a 
multitude of micro regulation initiatives, and rather than disorganization, a problem is 
perhaps too many uncoordinated attempts at shaping order develop into competition.  
 
More importantly, this touches upon the problems of bureaucratization. As emphasised in the 
theory of isomorphism (Dimaggio and Powell 1983), when bureaucratic organizational 
models dominate modern society, these models are applied by a range or organizations, 
making them similar and creating homogeneity. Hence, the problem of bureaucratization is 
not only a detachment from the residents, which is commonly acknowledged (Selznick 1949) 
and also mentioned in South African literature (Bähre 2007a, Staniland 2008), but also 
standardization. This is relevant to the argument that stabilization and rationalization 
threatens the open-ended engagement which is essential for many residents in the urban south 
(Simone 2010). Thereby, the bureaucratization from below might increase problems of 
standardization, which in Arendt’s thinking results from that diversity is bureaucracy’s worst 
nightmare (Wolin 1983).  
Moreover, as highlighted in Arendt’s writing, technical and surgical approaches to dealing 
with problems might compromise democratic and political processes of public discussions 
and debates (Arendt 1958, Wolin 1983, Crick 2005). Bureaucratization is related to the 
encroachment of the social into the public, by the fact that micro regulation of everyday 
matters or ‘household concerns’ of the oikos take over the public realm (Villa 1992). Mainly, 
this is specific to modern western societies, and has received numerous critiques. However, 
the empirical material presented in this thesis indicating increasingly technocratic micro-
regulations, show that Arendt’s worry might be relevant here too. The problem is that if 
detailed micro regulations become the main concern, politics as deliberating common affairs 
and attempts to organizing democratic practises of inclusive and open deliberations might be 
neglected. This is relevant particularly when looking at the case of Kosovo, where 
bureaucratization of the committee seems to be the strongest where the committee is focused 
more on detailed regulation than mobilizing or discussing common concerns in public 
meetings. In GP and Egoli, on the other hand, leaders have recognized the tensions that such 
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bureaucratization brings and are reluctant to a solely focus on micro-regulations. This 
underlines that politics as negotiating how common concerns should be dealt with is 
essential, and perhaps one should be careful about the too negative associations with the term 
‘becoming politicised’, as it could neglect the importance of confrontational politics in 
heterogeneous societies (Robins et al. 2008). At least, the case of Kosovo shows that 
bureaucratic procedures to some degree need to be politicised – if politicised is understood as 
opening up processes for public deliberations.  
 
The indication of a bureaucratization from below therefore underscores the relevance of 
further analysing the tensions between democratic and bureaucratic logics when exploring 
politics and organizing in urban neighbourhoods.  
 
9.2.4 Suggestions for further research  
As indicated above, I suggest that there generally is room for continued examinations of the 
emergence and developments of specific collections of urban organizations with a social 
constructive and process focus, and that including a notion of the politics of conflicting 
institutional logics might be specifically relevant to the urban situations. I have also indicated 
that the on-going tension between democratic and bureaucratic logics seem relevant to apply 
to urban organizing in the South as well. Social constructive perspectives on organizing and 
on leadership span an enormous range of theories; there is room for finding several 
theoretical analytical tools for further research. Current urban theory, inspired by 
postmodernism, describes heterogeneity and plurality in detail, which is especially relevant in 
cities of the South. However, the indication that there might also be homogeneity in 
organizational models is interesting. Therefore, in relation to the idea of ‘bureaucratization 
from below’, it could be interesting to further engage in the debate between the theory of 
isomorphism (Dimaggio and Powell 1983) and its critics, the plural institutional logics 
perspective (Friedland and Alford 1991, Thornton and Ocasio 2008, Thornton et al 2012) to 
analyse the organizational models and practises portrayed in different urban settings and by 
different urban actors.  
 
In relation to the topic of informal settlement leadership, the limitations of only engaging 
three informal settlements in one South African city suggests that further case studies for 
comparisons could be useful. There might be significant differences between in leadership 
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and committee formations in informal settlements in different South African cities, in 
informal settlements in villages or towns compared to the ones in bigger cites, and even 
between areas within cities, such as Khayelitsha and Philippi.  
Further, more research could be conducted into understanding the public realm. I see the 
issue of public fatigue and retreat to privacy, which actually is one of the most classical 
topics in urban theory, as under-researched in the context urban South Africa. This might be 
due to the fact that there is a focus, both in media and in research, on the people and 
organizations that speak the loudest and try actively to change the situation. However, this is 
not the majority of people, and even in informal settlements, it seems that the percentage that 
actually engages is low. Hence, more research is needed on regular residents instead of 
organized ones, looking into why they are not involved and what is not talked about and why 
(Seekings 2010). This requires both deep ethnographic research (like the accounts of Bank 
(2011) and Ross (2010), and quantitative surveys (like the accounts of Muyeba and Seekings 
(2012) covering larger amounts of random residents rather than organizations and leaders. 
This could also benefit the participation debate, and issues of measuring legitimacy and 
representation, which is important concepts indicated but not fully tackled in this thesis. 
These could be investigated further, but would also need both qualitative research on what 
different types or categories of legitimacy or representation that are relevant, followed and 
tested with quantitative surveys on larger groups. 
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Appendix A: List of field visits 
 
Date Activity Data 
12.04.2010 Shadowing master student: Interview community 
activist Kosovo informal settlement /Philippi. 
Interview notes 
14.04.2010 Shadowing master student: Workshop Kosovo Field notes 
15.04.2010 Shadowing master student: Interviews residents  
Kosovo 
Field notes 
15.04.2010 Shadowing master student: Interview  Disaster Risk 
Manager 
Interview notes, observation 
notes 
 
10.05.2010 Meeting NGO, getting network access No notes, planning 
20.05.2010 Meeting  community leaders Sheffield Road informal 
settlement  
No notes, planning 
21.05.2010 Interview manager of NGO  Audio file transcribed 
interview 
26.05.2010 Interview CBO activists (Embasa/Metro Health 
Clubs) 
Interview notes 
 
June + July 
2010 
Research assistants monitoring + reporting own areas Short interview answers, 
assistant observation notes 
22.07.2010 Meeting with NGO managers No, planning and evaluating 
27.07.2010 Interview community leaders / research assistants 
Sheffield Road 
Audio file transcribed 
interview 
 
5.8- 
7.8.2010  
Stay-over Sheffield Road Field notes 
12.8.2010 Meeting CBO activist, community leader Sheffield 
Road 
No notes, planning 
17.8.2010 Visit GP informal settlement, Kosovo Planning, networking 
21.8.2010 Meet community leaders GP No notes, planning 
21.8-
23.8.2010 
Stay-over Kosovo Field notes 
24.8.2010 Meet CoCT official, visit Egoli informal settlement No notes, planning 
27.8.2010 Interview community leaders Egoli Audio file transcribed 
interview 
 
1.9.2010 Visit CBO activist, Kosovo, GP, Egoli Field notes 
2.9.2010 Court case Egoli (case postponed) No  
6.9.2010 Survey GP Survey data 
7.9.2010 Survey GP Survey data, field notes 
8.9.2010 Visit Egoli, CoCT initiative Samora  No, networking 
9.9 .2010 Workshop Kosovo day 1 Focus group interview notes, 
observation notes, audio files 
10.9.2010 Workshop Kosovo day 2 Focus group interview notes, 
observation notes, audio files 
12.9.2010 Survey GP Survey data 
15.9.2010 Visits all 3 settlements, interview leaders Field notes, interview notes 
28.9.2010 Evaluation interview survey assistants GP Audio file transcribed, field 
notes 
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Date Activity Data 
1.10.2010 Visit GP and Kosovo Field notes 
6.10.2010 Focus group interview ‘Health Club’ Kosovo Focus group interview notes, 
observation notes, audio files 
11.10.2010 Visits all settlements, interview community leaders 
Egoli  
Field notes, interview notes 
19.10.2010 Visit GP Field notes 
21.10.2010 Visit Egoli planning workshop No notes, planning 
26.10.2010 Visit GP planning presentation Field notes 
31.10.2010 Presentation survey data  to GP residents  Field notes  
 
9.11.2010 Visit Egoli, plan workshop No, planning 
11.11.2010 Visit Egoli workshop cancelled due to police issue Field notes  
16.11.2010 Visit Egoli, Kosovo, Graveyard Pond Field notes  
17.11.2010 Workshop Egoli day 1 Focus group interview notes, 
observation notes, audio files 
18.11.2010 Workshop Egoli day 2 Interview notes 
23.11.2010 Interview  leaders and residents Kosovo and GP Interview notes 
 
1.12.2010 Short visits Kosovo, Graveyard pond No notes 
16.12.2010 Informal visits all 3 settlements  Field notes 
 
11.2.2011 Visit Egoli, GP. Interview community leaders 
Kosovo 
Field notes, interview notes 
18.2.2011 Visit Egoli, Kosovo. Planning survey Egoli Field notes 
28.2.2011 Survey Egoli day 1 Survey data 
 
1.3.2011 Survey Egoil day 2 Survey data 
2.3.2011 Survey Egoli day 3 Survey data 
8.3 .2011 Survey Egoli day 4 Survey data, field notes 
17.3 .2011 Survey Egoli day 5, follow up interviews residents Survey data, interview notes 
17.3.2011 Visit leaders GP and Kosovo Field notes 
30.3.2011 Visit Egoli, interview community leader GP  Field notes, interview notes 
31.3.2011 Visit Kosovo  Field notes 
 
1.4.2011 Meet lawyer Egoli Notes 
6.4.2011 Interview residents GP , leader Kosovo, visit Egoli Interview notes, field notes 
8.4.2011 Interview single households residents GP Interview notes 
14.4.2011 Visit GP  No notes, planning 
21.4.2011 Interview community leaders Kosovo and Egoli Interview notes 
25.4.2011 Interviews GP family household residents Interview notes 
28.4.2011 Workshop GP day 1 Focus group interview notes, 
observation notes, audio files 
 
3.5.2011 Visit GP community leader Field notes 
4.5 .2011 Workshop GP day 2, visit Kosovo and Egoli Focus group interview notes, 
field notes 
5.5 – 
7.5.2011 
Stay-over Egoli Field notes 
16.5.2011 Visit Egoli No notes, planning 
17.5.2011 Visit Kosovo and GP No notes 
24.5.2011 Interview leaders and residents Kosovo, visit GP Interview notes, field notes 
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Date Activity Data 
June + July 
2011 
Research assistants monitoring + reporting own 
areas 
Short interview answers, 
assistant observation notes 
14.7.2011 Visits all settlements, interview assistant Field notes, interview notes 
20.7.2011 Interview assistant Egoli Interview notes 
22.7 .2011 Interview assistants  Kosovo and GP Interview notes 
26.7.2011 Visit all settlements with visiting researchers No notes 
 
3.8.2011 Interview committee members Egoli Interview notes 
6.8.2011 Visit Egoli (fix car) Field notes  
10.8.2011 Interview early residents Egoli, visit GP  Interview notes 
17.8.2011 GP CBO meeting, visit GP and Kosovo Interview notes  
21.8.2011 Visit GP with student Field notes 
23.8.2011 Interviews leaders and informal traders GP Interview notes  
26.8.2011 Interview resident Kosovo, visit Egoli  Interview notes 
31.8.2011 Visits all settlements Field notes  
 
1.9.2011 Visit Egoli  Field notes 
11.9.2011 Visit GP, Kosovo No notes, planning 
17.9.2011 Interview leaders GP and Sheffield Road  Field notes, interview notes 
20.9.2011 Visit Kosovo, GP and neighboring settlement Field notes 
21.9.2011 Interview informal traders Kosovo  Interview notes 
28.9.2011 Interviews informal traders Kosovo, visit Egoli. Interview notes  
 
1.10.2011 Visit GP  and neighboring settlement Field notes 
5.10.2011 Interview informal traders and residents Egoli and 
Kosovo, visit GP leader 
Field notes 
8.10.2011 Evening observation Egoli Field notes 
13.10.2011 Interview residents and leaders Kosovo and Egoli Audio file transcribed, field 
notes 
23.10.2011 Visit Egoli No notes  
 
1.11.2011 Interview leaders GP and nearby settlement  Interview notes, field notes 
3.11.2011 Visit GP with NGO  Field notes 
8.11.2011 Interview community leaders GP with student Audio file transcribed, field 
notes 
9.11.2011 Visit leader Kosovo, GP and neighboring 
settlement 
Field notes 
10.11.2011 Interview ‘veteran activist’ Philippi Audio file transcribed, field 
notes 
16.11 .2011 Visit Egoli leader and interview ex-community 
leader  
Field notes, interview notes 
25.11.2011 Visit GP, Kosovo, Egoli Field notes 
30.11.2011 Interview residents  / cleaning employees Kosovo Interview notes 
 
1.12.2011 Visit Egoli, interview neighbor residents GP Field notes, interview notes 
5.12.2011 Interview community leaders Egoli Interview notes, field notes 
7.12.2011 Visit Kosovo –ad-hoc meeting Field notes 
9.12.2011 Kosovo ad-hoc meeting  Meeting notes 
16.12.2011 Visit all settlements Field notes 
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Date Activity Data 
19.12.2011 Visit Egoli (after fire) Field notes 
23.12.2011 Visit all settlements No notes 
 
17.1.2012 Visit all settlements Field notes 
 
2.2.2012 Visit GP, interview leader Kosovo, Egoli Interview notes, field notes 
3.2.2012 Meeting subcouncillor 13 Field notes 
6.2.2012 Interview Ward councilor 33 (for GP) Interview notes  
7.2.2012 Community meeting Kosovo, visit Egoli Meeting notes, filed notes 
22.2.2012 Visit GP, Kosovo, subcoucil meeting Field notes 
23.2.2012 Committee meeting Kosovo Meeting notes 
 
 
17.4.2012 Visit all settlements Field notes 
26.4.2012 Visit all settlements Field notes 
 
17.5.2012 Visit all settlements, interview ex-leader Kosovo Field notes, interview notes 
18.5.2012 Visit Kosovo  Field notes 
31.5.2012 Community meeting Egoli Meeting notes 
 
8.6.2012 Visit GP, Egoli Field notes 
9.6.2012 NGO initiated mass meeting w. Egoli residents Meeting notes 
12.6 .2012 Visit Kosovo, GP Field notes 
 
3.7.2012 Visit Egoli, Kosovo Field notes 
8.7.2012 Visit leader GP Field notes 
26.7.2012 Visit Egoli, Kosovo Field notes 
 
8.8.2012 Visit Egoli attend residents birthday No notes 
13.8.2012 Visits all settlements, ad-hoc meeting GP  Field notes  
 
9.9.2012 Visit GP, Kosovo neighboring settlement  Field notes 
10.9-
11.9.2012 
Visit Kosovo – painting assignment Field notes 
 
2.10.2012 Visit Egoli Field notes 
22.10.2012 Visit Kosovo, interview leader GP Field notes, interview notes 
30.10.2012 Visit Kosovo and Egoli Field notes 
 
2.11.2012 Kosovo painting assignment No notes 
8.11.2012 Wedding Egoli evening Field notes 
 
20.12.2012 Visit GP, Egoli, Kosovo Field notes 
 
10.1.2013 Short visit all settlements No notes 
 
 
3.3.2012 Visit Egoli and ex-leader Kosovo at taxi rank Field notes 
14.3.2012 Visit Egoli Field notes 
22.3.2012 Visit all settlements Field notes 
27.3.2012 Committee meeting Kosovo, visit Egoli Meeting notes, field notes 
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Date  Activity Data 
11.2.2013 Visit all settlements, plan workshop Derek H. No notes, planning 
19.2.2013 Interview community leader Kosovo Interview notes 
21.2.2013 Workshop Derek H.  No notes, presenting back 
26.2.2013 Visit Egoli Field notes 
27.2.2013 Interview residents GP Interview notes 
 
5.3.2013 Visit leader GP, Kosovo community meeting with 
police  
Field notes, meeting notes 
9.3.2013 Interview GP neighboring settlement leader, 
interview ex-leaders Kosovo and Egoli 
Interview notes, field notes 
13.3.2013 Visit Egoli Field notes 
 
6.4.2013 Community meeting Egoli w. councilors Meeting notes 
18.4.2013 Visit Kosovo, GP, Egoli after rain Field notes 
21.4.2013 Election community meeting Egoli Meeting notes, pictures 
22.4.2013 Visit all settlements with journalists  No notes 
24.4.2013 Community meeting Egoli (evening) Field notes 
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Appendix B: Survey form  
Note: This survey was copied from an NGO and sightly modified, and applied in collaboration with 
other  other researhers for sharing data 
 
Settlement ENUMERATION 
This survey is a part of a research project at the University of Cape Town. The enumeration survey 
collects information on housing conditions, expenditures (and income if possible), employment and 
sanitation in your community. Please co-operate with the enumerator to fill in this questionnaire. 
Thank you for your co-operation.  
 
Household Details and (Data)       
 
1) Shack  Number         
 
Respondent (occupant of shack): Surname _______________     Names 
________________________ 
 
2) Age             
 
3) Gender of the head of respondent:     Male                       Female   
 
4) Home Language ______________________ 
 
 5) How many people stay in your house?      1                  2        3+   
 
6 -10) How many people in the house are…     0 -  6 years                           18 – 35 years               
                                                                          
        7 – 17 years                           36 – 64 years   
                                                                          
                                                              65 + years                    
 
  
11) How many people in this household attend school?   
 
 
Employment, Income & Expense 
12)  How many people are employed in the house? 
       
    0                     1                       2                        3                                       
 
 
13) What type of employment are they involved in? 
 
Self Employed                                   Part time/Casual                              Full Time  
 
 
Who is employed? ):___________________________________________ 
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14)  Do you receive any kind of a welfare grant?  Yes                    No 
 
15)  What kind of grant do you receive? 
      
Disability                         Child support                    Pension                                               
 
Refugee Other   
                                  
 
16)  How many people have any form of income in your house?  
         
    0                     1                       2                        3                                       
 
 
17 -19) How much are the main expenses per month? 
 
Food                                           Electricity                                            Transport 
 
    
20)  What type of transport do you use when going to work? 
   
Walk                        Private                 Taxi/ Bus                      Train      
 
 
21)  How far is the place of employment (or where the household head gets the income)? 
 
(Hours, Minutes of TRAVEL or WALK) 
 
 
 
Nature of house  
22)  Use of structure: Residential only          Church                  Pre –school     Spaza 
     
 
23) How many rooms does your house have? 
 
1                                   2                             3                        4 +  
 
 
24)  Do you own a car?   Yes                      No   
 
  
Eligibility for Housing Subsidy 
 
25)  Were you ever approved for a housing subsidy? Yes     No 
 
 
26)  Would you like to state your income level for the purpose of understanding how many 
households in the community can apply for subsidies?   
    
R R R 
 
 
  
 
   
  
    
    ____ Hrs   ____ min 
  
R  
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Flooding History  
27-29) Have you ever experienced the following when staying at this settlement? 
  
27) Fire Disaster       Yes                            No   How often? _______________   
 
28) Flooding        Yes                            No                How often? _______________ 
 
29) Evictions            Yes                No                              
 
 
30) If your answer to 28 was YES, what type of flooding affects you? (Only tick one) 
             Under ground water                Leaking roof/wall   Real flooding  
  
 
31) for how long does your house remain flooded? (Only tick one) 
½  day                                             One day                                   more than one day 
 
 
32) if you have experienced flooding, which of these mechanisms are most effective(Only tick one): 
Dig Trenches                    Relocate to family/shelter                     Concrete Floors  
 
Raise Shack on stones or wood                   Other _____________________________ 
 
 
33) If your answer to 28 was NO, do you think you are at risk to flooding? _______________ 
If yes, why?__________ _______________________________________________________ 
 
 
34)  If your neighbors where flooded, would you help them?    Yes                  No 
 
 
35) Have you ever received any warnings or help when flooding? Yes                  No 
 
 
36) If yes, from who? Municipality                    NGOs                          Community leaders  
 
Neighbors                           Others:________________________________ 
 
 
 
37) Do you call any authority during a flood?  Yes                 No                 If yes, who? _____________ 
 
 
38) What do you think could be done to reduce the effect of flooding? (Only tick one) 
 
Dig more Trenches                 Provide sand                   Provide building material 
 
Relocation                                    Other  ______________________________ 
 
  
  
 
   
      
            
    
        
        
        
  
Pr
vi 
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Migration History 
39) How long have you lived in Cape Town?       
40) Where are you born / originally from: _______________ 
41) How long have you lived in this settlement?    
42) Where did you living before you came here? ____________ _____    
43) Why did you choose this settlement?  Close to family                          Close to friends                 
Close to work                              Other __________________________________________ 
 
44) How many people do you know (are your friends) here in this settlement?   
45) How many of you relatives are living in this settlement?  
 
 
Health & Sanitation  
46)  Which toilet do you use?  Bucket System                 Water System (Flushed)                      Other                                                     
 
47) How many people use this toilet? 
 
                             
 
49) What health problems have you or your family suffered after a flood?__________________ 
 
50) Do you know the community leaders / street committee in this settlement?  Yes                  No  
 
51) Do you participate in community meetings?  Yes                  No                  If yes, how often: ______ 
 
52) Do you have any other things you want to say? :_____________________ 
 
Please Note:  All Enumerators have to write their names including dates during the process.                  
THANK YOU!            ENKOSI!            DANKIE!                
 
ENUMERATOR:_____________________________________ 
DATE:____/ _____/ 2010 
 
About 
_______people 
 
__
__
__
__ 
pe
op
l  
    
Year/s 
            
Year/s 
About 
_______people 
About 
_______people 
